While Langewiesche's new work has a great "hook," it
offers little new insight into Pakistan's role in Abdul Qadeer
(A.Q.) Khan's aid and abetment of nuclear weapons proliferation.
Moreover, it is largely silent on the danger that Pakistani nuclear
weapons might, in the midst of political chaos, slip into
al-Qaeda's murderous hands.
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
The book starts off with a general discussion of the problem of
states acquiring nuclear weapons after the Cold War nuclear standoff. It
focuses on the new post-9/11 dimension of nuclear weapons
proliferation--the danger of non-state actors such as al-Qaeda acquiring
nuclear weapons. Langewiesche develops an interesting description of the
tradeoffs for non-state actors in the stealing and operational handling
of plutonium and highly enriched uranium from existing stockpiles around
the world (especially from Russia) to use as the fissile material for
nuclear weapons. He then devotes a chapter to Pakistan's infamous
A. Q. Khan's role in fueling--literally and figuratively--nuclear
weapons proliferation. The book ably traces Khan's contribution to
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, which largely occurred in his
development of centrifuge capabilities to enrich uranium to weapons
grade. Khan offered his expertise and entrepreneurship to eager buyers
in Libya, Iran, and North Korea as a short-cut alternative to the
traditional bottom-up development of indigenous uranium enrichment
capabilities.
Langewiesche is rightfully skeptical that A.Q. Khan was a
"rogue" operating on his own without approval from Pakistan,
but he does not uncover any compelling evidence of under-the-table deals
and kickbacks. The best Langewiesche can do is to write in the
concluding chapter that "A. Q. Khan had allies in high places who,
rather than ignoring his activities, were directly involved and almost
certainly approved. In Pakistan this can only mean the generals,
including some of those currently in power, and to a certain but
unknowable degree Musharraf himself." After widespread exposure of
Khan's proliferation business, Musharraf only made Khan apologize
for his nefarious activities before whisking him off into house arrest,
away from any questioning regarding his global nuclear proliferation
operations and collusion with Pakistani military and security services.
Langewiesche also pays admiring tribute to a fellow journalist and
nuclear technology expert, Mark Hibbs, who has covered breaking stories
over the years for specialized nuclear trade publications. Hibbs has
used an array of public information to piece together major trends in
global nuclear weapons proliferation--including Pakistan's
assistance to Iran's uranium enrichment program--well ahead of
government intelligence agencies. American intelligence agencies can
learn a great deal from this section, since they chronically suffer from
inexperienced analysts following subjects with too little time and
substantive insight. Interesting as this chapter may be, however, it
might strike some readers as tangential filler.
Many of the book's pages are sprinkled with
Langewiesche's conversations in Russia, Turkey, and Pakistan. These
anecdotes are important tools for escaping the mindsets and commonly
accepted wisdom of the United States. Indeed, books by well-traveled and
street-savvy journalist are invaluable for understanding the
international realities that can elude scholars publishing narrower and
more specialized studies. In this sense, journalistic books can be more
effective than works written for consumption by colleagues in the
academy, policymakers locked under the tyranny of official talking
points in government-to-government exchanges, or intelligence analysts
cloistered in narrow bureaucratic confines of responsibility without
direct access to foreign players.
On that note, the protection of sensitive sources with anonymity is
a fair journalistic practice. Yet Langewiesche offers only shallow
descriptions of his sources. To take one example, he examines the
purported nuclear material black-market trade that runs through Turkey,
which at times is broken up by Turkish police arrests. He describes this
by saying, "From distant America--among professors and in the
policy circles of Washington--their arrests seem to signal the existence
of a dangerous trade, but from up close within the bazaar they mostly
just add to a sense that for now even Tel Aviv remains safe. Or so the
Israeli told me." But is this Israeli an expert nuclear physicist,
a senior intelligence official, or a shawarma sandwich vendor?
Langewiesche's writing gives readers no way of knowing or gauging
the legitimacy of his sources.
The book also comes up short on standards for scholarship. It has
no references for conversions, interviews, or research materials, making
it impossible for readers to retrace Langewiesche's footsteps. Nor
does it have a bibliography or index. One might counter that this is a
journalistic account and should not be held up against academic
standards. But other journalists have more ably tackled the challenge of
writing engaging analysis of weapons of mass destruction proliferation
while offering extensive documentation for the benefit of their readers.
In terms of content, the book raises some tantalizing tidbits
regarding Saudi Arabia, but fails to follow them up with substantive
exploration. Langewiesche mentions that Saudi Arabia is suspected of
funding A.Q. Khan, most likely with the expectation of a return. Later
in the book, he writes, "We discussed the funding of Khan's
laboratory over the years, and in general terms the extent to which
Saudi Arabia and other countries had contributed to it." The reader
may be forgiven at that point for wondering what discussion he is
referencing. Langewiesche only makes passing mention of rumors of Saudi
collaboration, and he offers no documentation or sources of these often
rumored, but never confirmed, suspicions. Langewiesche also fails to
explain the implications of a potential Pakistani-Saudi nuclear pact.
This is a significant omission because some observers have speculated
that Islamabad and Riyadh might have come to a clandestine arrangement
whereby Pakistan--in exchange for Saudi financial subsidies to
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program--would provide Saudi Arabia with
a nuclear deterrent in a future regional contingency.
The book suffers from large blind spots on the dangers posed by
more nation-states gaining nuclear weapons in the future. The reader
would look in vain for analysis or discussion of what would happen if
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt were to join the nuclear weapons
club. Some scholars, most notably Kenneth Waltz, argue that the slow
spread of nuclear weapons would greatly reduce the chances of
inter-state war because leaders would recognize that war with nuclear
weapons would be disastrous for all participants. Others, however, argue
that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would likely push countries to
put nuclear forces on hair triggers during crises, thereby increasing
the risks of future conflicts pitted with the use of nuclear weapons.
This is especially true in the Middle East, with its tight geographic
confines and long history of warfare. Though this debate is critically
important, it is not even mentioned in the book.
On a final note, Langewiesche offers excellent accounts of the
rampant corruption that permeates Pakistani society. A reader should
therefore come away from the book with unease about the command,
control, and security of the country's nuclear weapons arsenal. By
his account, Pakistani nuclear stores are guarded by corrupt Pakistani
military personnel, which may include potential al-Qaeda sympathizers.
Yet Langewiesche does not proffer scenarios for how al-Qaeda would go
about bribing or snatching fissile material or even a handful of nuclear
weapons. This is a topic ripe for journalistic investigative reporting.
Despite these shortcomings, the book does a public service by
sounding an alarm over the risks of non-state actors acquiring nuclear
weapons. At the end of the day, though, the work just scratches the
surface of the formidable dangers and challenges that will face the
international community in coming decades.
RICHARD L. RUSSELL teaches security studies at the National Defense
University and Georgetown University. The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the
Nuclear Poor is by William Langewiesche (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2007).
COPYRIGHT 2008 Harvard International Relations
Council, Inc. Reproduced with permission of the copyright holder. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.
Copyright 2008 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights
reserved. Gale Group is a Thomson Corporation Company.
NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.