Imperfect competition and quality
signalling.
by Daughety, Andrew F.^Reinganum, Jennifer F.
* Vanderbilt University; andrew.f.daughety@vanderbilt.edu,
jennifer.f.reinganum@vanderbilt.edu.
This research was supported by NSF grant SES-0239908. We thank Kyle
Bagwell, Patrick Greenlee, Michael Riordan, Editor James Hosek, and two
referees, as well as participants in seminars at Cambridge University,
Columbia University, Emory University, the London School of Economics,
the University of British Columbia 20th Summer Conference on Industrial
Organization (2006), University College London, the U.S. Department of
Justice, and the University of Southern California for helpful comments
and suggestions on an earlier draft.
TABLE 1 Comparative Statics Results
[alpha] [gamma] n
[P.sub.L] [direct sum] - -
{Q.sub.L] [direct sum] - -
[[PI].sub.L] [direct sum] - -
[P.sub.H] [direct sum] - -
[Q.sub.H] [direct sum] - -
[[PI].sub.H] [direct sum] - -
[P.sub.H] - [P.sub.L] [direct sum] - -
[Q.sub.L] - [Q.sub.H] [direct sum] - -
[lambda] [delta]
[P.sub.L] [direct sum] [+.sub.[lambda]]
{Q.sub.L] [direct sum] [+.sub.[lambda]]
[[PI].sub.L] [direct sum] [+.sub.[lambda]]
[P.sub.H] [direct sum] +
[Q.sub.H] + -
[[PI].sub.H] + ?
[P.sub.H] - [P.sub.L] [direct sum] [direct sum]
[Q.sub.L] - [Q.sub.H] [direct sum] +
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