I. INTRODUCTION
II. MUST-CARRY'S PURPOSE
A. Cable Becomes a Threat to Broadcasting
B. FCC. Attempts to Protect Local Broadcasting from Cable
C. Objections to the Must-Carry Provisions
D. Road to the Modern Must-Carry Law: Century
Communications and the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992
1. The Case that Caused Congressional Intervention:
Century Communications v. FCC
2. Congress Writes the Must-Carry Rules: The Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992
III. THE TURNER DECISIONS
A. Turner I
B. Turner I on Remand to the District Court
C. Turner II
IV. TURNER REASSESSED: FIRST AMENDMENT LITIGATION OF
THE MUST-CARRY RULES
A. Turner was a Facial Challenge
B. Facial Challenge Jurisprudence: Res Judicata from the
Turner II Decision Will Not Preclude As Applied
Challenges to the Must-Carry Law
C. How Advancing Technology is Undermining Turner's
Premise: Must-Carry Applied to Markets with Multiple
Cable Equivalent Services is Constitutionally
Inappropriate
1. A Competitive Market Can Achieve the
Governmental Ends Without the Must-Carry Law.
2. Addressing the Opposition
V. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, the must-carry rules have had a troubled
constitutional history. After two sets of rules were struck down by the
D.C. Circuit for violating the First Amendment rights of both cable
operators and cable programmers, Congress revised the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") rules in the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 ("1992
Cable Act"). (1) In 1997, the Supreme Court determined that the
must-carry law was constitutional under an intermediate scrutiny test.
(2) The Court's decision was ultimately based on the determination
that Congress relied on substantial evidence when inferring that
broadcasters would be hurt without the must-carry rules. However, does
the Turner II (3) decision preclude further First Amendment challenges
to the must-carry rules?
This Note argues that the answer is no and that the time is drawing
near for new challenges. Because the must-carry rules were facially
challenged in the Turner decisions, no party is precluded from
challenging the rules as applied. Although subsequent challengers of the
must-carry law have the burden of overcoming the deference afforded to
Congress's findings, this should be possible. In many markets, the
central premise to Congress's findings--cable will abuse its market
power by behaving anticompetitively toward broadcasting--is no longer or
increasingly less possible. After all, Turner I (4) established that a
harm must actually be proven, and Turner II merely established that
Congress' findings were sufficient to withstand a facial
application of First Amendment scrutiny.
This Note has four subsequent Parts. Part II will provide
background on the birth of the must-carry rules. Part III will discuss
the Turner decisions. Part IV will discuss must-carry rules today and
the impact of the Turner decisions on future litigation. Part V
concludes the Note.
II. MUST-CARRY'S PURPOSE
A. Cable Becomes a Threat to Broadcasting
The must-carry provisions are as old as the initial attempts to
regulate cable, which began when cable was first perceived as a threat
to broadcasting. Cable was first used in the 1940s as a means to
facilitate broadcasting. (5) Because broadcast waves reflect off of
mountains, (6) instead of bending around them, individuals living in
mountainous areas had a difficult time receiving broadcast signals. In
order to solve this problem, large antennae were placed on mountain
tops, and cables were run from the head end, (7) where the broadcast
signals from an antenna were "collected," to people's
homes in the surrounding communities. (8) This was the beginning of
Community Antenna Television ("CATV"). (9) Because CATV was
the only means for these individuals to receive broadcast signals,
broadcasters welcomed CATV for the additional viewers it provided. (10)
Because, on the whole, CATV was not perceived as a direct threat to
broadcasting, FCC refused to regulate the cable industry in the late
1950s. (11)
Broadcasters' and the FCC's perceptions of cable began to
change in 1961 when a cable operator began to serve the San Diego area,
(12) an area that broadcasters had little trouble servicing. (13) The
San Diego cable antenna picked up signals from as far as one hundred
miles away, which meant that Los Angeles's content could be
retransmitted to the San Diego community. (14) In addition to
retransmitting distant signals otherwise unobtainable by San Diego
viewers, cable offered better picture clarity than over-the-air
reception. (15) Consequently, the three independent VHF stations in San
Diego were no longer competing just against each other for viewers but
also against the four Los Angeles stations. Because the increased
competition to local broadcasters would fragment the audience--and
therefore broadcasters' advertising revenue--cable was now an
economic threat to broadcasting. (16)
B. FCC Attempts to Protect Local Broadcasting from Cable
Carter Mountain Transmission Corporation (17) is often cited as the
beginning of must-carry obligations. (18) This was a 1962 ease dealing
with a CATV provider's attempt to gain permission to carry distant
signals. (19) The FCC denied Carter Mountain Transmission Corporation
permission to recast broadcast signals until the company could show that
the imported signals would not duplicate the programming of the local
broadcast station. (20)
Not long after the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC's jurisdiction
to deny the retransmission of broadcast signals, (21) the FCC was
formally petitioned by broadcasters to implement regulations on cable
systems. (22) Because the 1934 Communications Act gave the FCC the
jurisdiction to regulate the air waves, (23) the FCC believed that it
could regulate cable since doing so would be sufficiently ancillary to
the FCC's broadcasting authority. (24) In addition to ensuring the
survival of the present broadcast structure and UHF stations, the FCC
believed that regulation of cable was important to maintain fairness to
broadcasters. (25) After all, CATV systems were retransmitting signals
that they received for free over the air. Broadcasters, on the other
hand, had to pay considerable sums of money to produce and air the
content in the first place. (26)
In 1966, the FCC conducted its Economic Inquiry Report, (27) which
was an analysis of the economic relationship between cable and
broadcast. In the Report, the FCC admitted that it lacked sufficient
data to predict cable's impact on broadcast. (28) However, the
scenario described by ABC and other broadcasters--that cable may hurt
the public interest by leading to the death of many broadcast stations
(29)--seemed like a growing reality. (30) As a consequence, in order to
ensure that broadcasters were carried by the CATV without being
duplicated, the FCC asserted jurisdiction over CATV to protect
broadcasters. Later, the must-carry regulations would make official the
safety mechanism that ensured broadcasters would not be shutout by cable
companies' bottleneck technology. (31)
C. Objections to the Must-Carry Provisions
The FCC's actions received criticism from cable advocates in
the following decades. One critic of the FCC's actions toward cable
contended that "[t]here is considerable evidence that the
Commission has been more concerned with protecting the economic
interests of conventional broadcasters than with fully exploiting the
resources of cable technology." (32) In 1980, Turner Broadcasting
Systems, a cable programmer that had its programming displaced by the
must-carry regulations, petitioned the FCC to eliminate the regulations.
(33) The petition alleged that the must-carry rules violated the First
Amendment rights of cable programmers, cable operators, and the viewing
public. (34) Although the FCC denied Turner's appeal, the FCC
conceded that the must-carry rules deprived cable programmers access to
some audiences and that the compelled carriage of broadcast signals
displaces alternate programming for cable's subscribers. (35)
In Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit struck down the
FCC's must-carry rules under the O'Brien test. (36) The rules
at issue in Quincy Cable TV were very stringent compared to the current
rules. Without any regard to a cable system's capacity, they
required, inter alia, mandatory carriage of both all broadcast signals
in the local market and all significantly viewed commercial broadcast
stations. (37)
Under the O'Brien test, according to the Quincy Cable TV
court, regulations are invalid if they do not serve a substantial
government interest or are more intrusive than necessary to serve that
interest. (38) The Quincy Cable TV court believed that the must-carry
regulations violated both parts of this test. Because the rules could
not pass the O'Brien test, the court reasoned that there was no
need to consider whether a stricter First Amendment test was necessary.
(39)
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