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Weekly UpdatesWhile much recent attention has been given to the outsourcing of government services, little is known about the opposite situation in which private organizations retain the services of public workers. What do governmental workers have to offer the private labor market anyway? More importantly, why is government labor available for purchase by private interests? These questions are addressed within the context of the most active market for public personnel--the retention of off-duty municipal police officers by private employers.
The private employment of public police is not a new phenomenon. It predates the contemporary push for "entrepreneurial" and "businesslike" government by several decades. A number of factors dating back to the 1950s fueled the growth in the private employment of public police. (1) For one, rising crimes rates increased the desire for better personal and commercial security. Unable to meet the demand on its own, the private sector tapped into the existing pool of off-duty police officers. The mounting crime problem had another effect that indirectly led to greater demand for off-duty work. Police departments, overwhelmed by the increase in crime, began to shed activities deemed to be of lower priority, including much work previously performed for private interests (e.g., traffic control for weddings and funerals, security at sporting events). The emergence of collective bargaining and, more specifically, union demands for increased compensation also contributed to the rise in off-duty police work. Off-duty employment offered the benefits of greater public safety and higher wages without the need for direct public expenditure. According to Reiss, "A public good seemingly was supplied at private cost." (2) For cash-strapped municipalities, this was an irresistible opportunity that could not be passed up.
Why is there a private market for police services and not for other forms of public service? An important explanatory factor is the work schedule of officers. The shift schedules of police officer, like those of schoolteachers, college professors, and some medical professionals, provide extended periods of downtime for officers and create opportunities to hold second jobs. It is not uncommon for officers to work several 10-to 12-hour shifts in a row and then get three to four days off. (3)
The second distinctive feature of policing that promotes secondary employment is that officers have specialized training and law enforcement authority. Off-duty police officers can provide a wide range of services that are highly valued in both the public and the private spheres such as directing traffic, providing security, maintaining order, and deterring crime. Another issue relates to the culture of police organizations. Senior officers socialize new recruits to the practice of outside employment. Taken together, these factors create a fertile environment for multijobholding in policing.
An important aspect of police off-duty work that has not been explored is the unique public-private systems of administration that have developed to ensure that both public (collective) and private (individual) benefits are produced. Since police departments facilitate the temporary transfer of public personnel assets to private businesses, it is logical to try to learn more about how departments oversee the process. The purpose of this article is to explore how police departments regulate the off-duty employment of their officers and reconcile their own interests with those of the officers and the private employers.
After a brief summary of the existing literature on police off-duty employment, the potential benefits and shortcomings of police off-duty employment are considered. Methods for managing secondary employment are also introduced in the opening section of the article. This is followed by a description of the current state of secondary employment of police officers in a sample of large police departments in North Carolina. Particular attention is directed to the amount and types of work done by off-duty officers, program oversight, and efforts taken to navigate conflicts between public and private interests. The tension between public and private interests is made explicit, and suggestions are offered for improving departmental regulation of the practice.
Before proceeding further, it is important to note how key terms will be used throughout this article. Many expressions are used to describe police officer work outside of normal duty hours including secondary, outside, and off-duty employment. While individual agencies make distinctions between these concepts, there are no agreed upon definitions. As such, these terms will be used interchangeably. The focus here is on the outsourcing of public police resources to the private sector in such a way that officers perform duties related to their position and training as law enforcement professionals. Thus, officers operating a farming business or selling real estate on the side are not the subjects of inquiry here.
Literature Review
Extent of Multijobholding Within Policing
Most American workers do not take on second jobs. The national multijobholding rate was a mere 5.3% in 2003. (4) For the past decade and a half, the level of moonlighters has hovered between 5% and 6%.
How does public administration as an industry and police officers as an occupation class compare to these national norms? Public administration had the second highest moonlighting rate (9.2%) out of all industry categories in 1995. (5) The public administration numbers were bolstered in large measure by the high rate found in the Justice, Public Order, and Safety industry subcategory (11.9%). The propensity of police officers and firefighters to work second jobs helps explain public administration's elite status. According to these same national data, almost 11% of police officers and detectives were multijobholders.
The official government data significantly underreport the actual rate of police off-duty employment. In one of the earliest studies on police moonlighting, Miller, Presley, and Sniderman found that 39% of police officers in Wichita, Kansas, held second jobs. (6) Ninety-six percent of New Jersey state troopers and 92% of Atlanta Police Department officers said that they moonlighted (7) Why are official labor statistics at odds with other measures of multiple jobholding? Baba and Jamal postulate that survey respondents are more likely to respond truthfully to university rather than government researchers. (8) While this may explain some of the differential, a more compelling reason lies in the wording of the question. The Current Population Survey (CPS), the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' method for tracking moonlighting, only asks if the respondent worked a second job in the week prior to the survey. Depending on an officer's work schedule, there may have been few opportunities the preceding week to take on additional details. The CPS is probably a good indicator of which individuals hold regular second jobs. In policing, however, a large number of officers work off-duty on a less consistent basis (e.g., only working around the holidays to earn money to purchase gifts).
Potential Benefits and Problems Associated With Off-Duty Employment
Proponents of police officers' secondary employment cite a variety of positive outcomes that emerge from it. First, it supplements the low salaries paid to officers, especially newly hired ones. The promise of off-duty employment may even be offered as part of the recruiting package for new officers. (9) Also, police chiefs may institute a liberal off-duty policy in order to retain officers when normal appropriations are simply unavailable for critically needed salary enhancements. (10) Previous studies show that the primary reason why officers work off-duty is to increase their income to pay monthly expenses, reduce debt, or simply "make ends meet." (11) In this respect, police officers probably look like most other multijobholders who take second jobs to relieve economic hardship. (12)
Having more uniformed off-duty police officers in the community produces positive spillover effects. First, an argument can be made that public safety is enhanced by having more personnel in the field, especially at highly visible locations. Second, it produces a positive externality for the city. Officers working an off-duty detail at a shopping mall not only provide individual benefits for shopkeepers (e.g., by deterring shoplifters) but also produce a collective sense of safety among passersby. A police captain interviewed for this project noted that on any given weekend, his on-duty contingent is supplemented by upwards of 40 off-duty officers. In police parlance, off-duty employment is a force multiplier. In fact, officers working on-duty may actually be outnumbered by those working off-duty. As an added benefit, the resulting increase in real or perceived safety comes at little or no direct cost to the city.
While off-duty employment does produce some attractive benefits, there are a number of potential pitfalls when police officers work for private interests. These include the following:
* Tax Dodging. For many off-duty jobs, the officer is paid directly by the employer, typically in the form of cash or a check. If the officer is classified as a part-time employee by the business, then the usual withholding taxes are removed from wages. If the officer is considered a contractual employee, then he or she is obligated to pay both employer and employee taxes. No matter how the officer is classified or paid, all income generated through off-duty employment is taxable. If police officers exhibit behaviors similar to those found in the general population, then some may not be paying all the taxes they owe on off-duty wages. Averett found that individuals who held two jobs were much less likely to report their full incomes than were individuals who held just one job. (13) A small police department in Illinois witnessed the forced resignation of one half of its officers when it was revealed that those officers had not paid taxes on their off-duty earnings. (14)
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