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Weekly UpdatesThe large number of fire service personnel supplemented with the many other rescuers at the scene allowed the fire to be controlled and overhauled quickly. The bodies themselves were removed from the building at a rapid pace, so that by midnight that urgent task at hand was nearly complete. Bodies were removed from the Grove and laid out upon the street so rapidly that the transportation to the nearby hospitals and morgues could not begin to keep up with the high number of dead. Fire department officials forced entry into a garage across the street, making it a temporary morgue, laying out row upon row of bodies on the cold concrete floor.
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John Collins and the other Navy firefighters stayed until all the bodies were removed. In the early morning hours, they gathered together with their Lt. Commander and went to the nearby Mayfair Hotel to have coffee. The night was cold and the nearby hotels and other facilities had opened up, offering coffee, blankets, and anything else to help those working at this disaster.
"Afterwards as we talked, it seemed so unreal, almost as if it was a bad dream," Collins says.
With fatigue blending into reality, they gathered their equipment and went back to the Navy firefighting school in South Boston. In the early morning hours, they had showers and attempted to get back into their normal routine.
Like most of the people in Boston at that time, John Collins followed very closely the inquiries and activities that transpired after the fire. Convened the following day was a public hearing by the Boston Fire Department. This was chaired by Fire Commissioner Riley and was intended mainly to clarify fire department involvement. The final report from these provocative hearings would appear over a year later.
Another investigation began in the legal forum. Requiring more time to collect sufficient evidence to present to the grand jury, the state attorney general and the county district attorney's office were working on criminal indictments that would eventually be handed down to ten individuals. Nearly a month would pass before they would hand down these indictments.
The investigation by the Boston Fire Department began less than 24 hours after the disaster. Among the questioners with the Fire Commissioner were representatives of various municipal and state agencies, Army and Navy brass, and Federal Government representatives, including the FBI. Among the first witnesses called by Commissioner Riley was one of his own inspectors, Lt. Frank Linney.
Linney had inspected the Cocoanut Grove approximately a week before the fire and turned in the routine report, terming the Grove's safety conditions as "good." This entire single-page report was printed on the front pages of area newspapers. Now, despite having several commendations for heroism, Frank Linney found himself in every fire inspector's worst nightmare.
Linney was pressed to elaborate on his written report during the hearing. Another part of the report had stated glaringly that there were "no inflammable decorations." Linney indicated during the hearings that he had taken some of the fabric and tried to light it with a match after it had been removed. He found the material was very difficult to ignite. This was the normal procedure. The fallacy of these test methods would later be shown, but this unfortunately would not assist Linney during his testimony. John Collins followed the testimony of his comrade very closely.
Riley's hearings were meant to do nothing more than to bring forth public information as quickly as feasible, and would not result in any criminal actions. The fingers of blame pointed in many directions and even included Mayor Tobin himself. In other parts of Boston at the end of 1942, the grand jury handed over the criminal indictments. Among these indictments, charged with accessory after the fact of manslaughter and willful neglect of duty, was Lt. Frank Linney, inspector for the Boston Fire Department.
Linney went to trial in October, 1943. Defending Linney was an African-American lawyer by the name of Lewis, one of the top criminal lawyers in Boston at that time. Linney was a man of modest means and it was not clear to Collins how he had attained such prestigious legal defense.
John Collins went to one of the court sessions relating to the Cocoanut Grove fire, and this was when Frank Linney was being cross-examined by his own lawyer.
"I remember when Linney was on the witness stand and was being examined by Lewis. Lewis kept asking questions and rebuking him, making Linney look bad," says Collins.
Collins could not understand why Lewis was doing this, chastising his own client instead of defending him. Linney, though despondent, managed to keep pace with the relentless questioning.
"All of a sudden, Linney just fell apart and broke into tears. It was heart rendering," says Collins.
Lewis, the shrewd lawyer that he was, was able to demonstrate that Linney had never intentionally meant to do anyone harm and had only followed standard, albeit terribly inept, inspection procedures. Following the testimony, the jury deliberated three and a half hours. The verdict: not guilty.
The painful legacey of Frank Linney in the Cocoanut Grove disaster serves as a classic lesson for all who may find themselves involved in fire inspections. Years later John Collins would recall this lesson as he was walking to work one evening to Ladder 26 in Boston's Back Bay. In uniform, he was passing by Symphony Hall and noticed that a big show was about to go on for that evening. As he sometimes did, he would pass through Symphony hall, more for curiosity than anything else, gaining access as a fire department representative.
"It was a big show, and I was shocked to see that they had put chairs in the aisles blocking some of the exit paths," says Collins. "In my mind I wasn't sure what to do, I could've walked out and pretended that I had never seen any of it."
He didn't. Instead, he contacted the management and told them that they could not start the show until they corrected the problem. As expected, the management was furious, but they had no choice. The show was delayed momentarily while the chairs were cleared, and as a result, some of the patrons were removed from the audience.
"I thought of the Cocoanut Grove and I thought of Frank Linney, and I couldn't bring that upon myself. What he went through should never happen again," Collins says.
After his naval service, John Collins returned to the Boston Fire Department where he stayed until retirement. He ended his career as a Captain, serving as the department's public relation officer. In this capacity he appeared numerous times as the fire department representative on radio and television.
The Doctor
On November 28, 1942, Dr. Francis D. Moore was working as an assistant resident at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston. This was the third of his five years required for post medical work. That evening, he was one of the staff doctors on duty and would find himself thrust into the mist of an event that would become a milestone in the field of medical treatment.
"Charlie Burbank and I were in charge of the emergency room," says Moore. The evening was cold and the hospital had been very quiet. The first Grove patient arrived at Massachusetts General Hospital at approximately 10:35 p.m.
"I was upstairs and came down after hearing the sirens," says Moore.
This would be the beginning of an unprecedented onslaught of patients. But as bad as it would become, it would be worse at nearby Boston City Hospital. For every four victims sent to Boston City Hospital, only one went to Massachusetts General. Later, when City became badly overloaded, this ratio shifted so that about half of the victims went to Massachusetts General.
The victims that were brought in were wet from the fire hoses, dirty from the soot and grime and suffering from the rough handling necessary to get them out of the Grove. They presented with an assortment of afflictions, including burns, partial asphyxia, exposure to the cold, shock and fright. Some started blankly and said nothing. Others screamed and raved, flinging their arms and legs so violently that they had to be restrained.
The magnitude of the disaster became quickly evident as victims arrived in quick succession. Massachusetts General staff who could not immediately be assigned to medical work were asked to telephone doctors and nurses associated with the hospital.
Not long after the arrival of the first patients, Dr. Oliver Cope arrived. Cope headed an important National Research Council Project regarding the treatment of burns and walked straight into a crisis that would put the new burn treatment techniques that they had developed to an unparalleled test.
Also arriving in the early stages of the staff response was Dr. Nathaniel Faxon, the hospital administrator. He immediately ordered the full use of all phases of the war disaster plan, leading to activity in every wing of the giant hospital. Emergency equipment and extra supplies were assembled and rushed to the Cocoanut Grove Ward.
As staff was being mobilized, the accident floor was cleared of all non-Grove patients. Despite this action, victims continued to pour in and the hospital was running out of space quickly. Thus, patients on the sixth floor of the White Building were rolled, in their beds, to other wards. The entire floor was quickly converted into a Cocoanut Grove Ward.
"The first few hours were spent stabilizing the victims and clearing the dead," says Moore.
Within two hours after the fire, 114 Cocoanut Grove victims were delivered to Massachusetts General Hospital. Seventy-five were dead on arrival or before treatment could be given. This left 39 patients to be treated. Unlike the situation at Boston City Hospital, this was a number that could be effectively accommodated at Mass General. None of these patients showed any sign of drunkenness. Also, in spite of the wild panic, only a few were bruised and none had suffered broken bones.
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