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Weekly UpdatesIn 1944, reflecting on decisions confronting Navy leadership prior to the Second World War, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernie King identified the challenge associated with planning a military force for future events that are unknown and highly uncertain. Admira King stated:
During that "time of peace" that King noted, the nation had receded toward isolanism, and the world s largest Navy at the end of the First World War had become third-rate by the mid-1930s. In the Congress. Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs Carl Vinson decried the Navy's diminished size, and as limited defense dollars gave way to recovery programs during the Great Depression. he appealed to his colleagues that a naval construction program would dually serve to create jobs and build back the Navy.
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Unmoved. Chairman Vinson's counterpart on the House Appropriations Committee concluded: "Why should we build our Navy up ... ? No wars are on now and no war is in sight" (2)--this shortsighted remark despite Japan's occupation of Manchuria and the rise of a militant power in Germany.
Ultimately, after Germany and Japan had mobilized. Congress directed the Navy to review the need for additional ships, aircraft, and naval bases for purposes of national defense. The subsequent Two Ocean Navy Act doubled the authorized size of the fleet. Equally important, Congress provided the President broad Dowers to accelerate war production In effect, a 10-year ship construction program was authorized little more than a year before the nation entered the war. (3) As President Franklin Delano Roosevelt summed up. "We had to make up for a tot of lost time." (4)
Decades distance us from the Second World War; however, America's core interests and objectives have changed little since the nation's emergence as world leader by the war's end. Notably, with "Fortress America" an obsolete concept--even moreso now in the wake of 9/11--our security interests are global, and so too must be our defense posture.
In the years since the war, the National Security Strategy has provided the framework for shaping economic policy and determining the military strength required to protect the nation. Inarguably, the strength of our military is inseparable from the strength of our economy, which dictates that our country be fiscally responsible in allocating defense dollars. Fiscal responsibility is not to say that the budget is the final determinant of military requirements, else we risk that our national security will ebb and flow with the economy. Rather, the way the United States sizes, shapes, trains, equips, and operates its Armed Forces must reflect the level of risk accepted by our security strategy. That risk in turn must take into account the limits to our knowledge of our adversaries and, of course, the limits to the depth of our resources.
This ultimate need to balance resources and requirements harks back to the dilemma Admiral King described as facing the country prior to World War II. Admiral King stated that whether at peace or at war, the success of a national security strategy fundamentally hinges on how well we "decide what is and what is not the strength adequate to uphold national policies and interests,"
The Role of Congress
The United States Constitution dictates a central role for the Congress as the country makes difficult decisions about its military. Article I of the Constitution reserves to the Congress the power:
That same article reserves exclusively to the Congress the ultimate "power of the purse," thereby vesting in the legislative branch the responsibility to provide the resources for the nation's defense and the authority to conduct oversight of the executive branch. These provisions impart to the Congress an equal share of the government's preeminent responsibilities to protect the nation, take care of our men and women in uniform, and protect the taxpayer.
While responsibility for development and execution of the National Security Strategy resides with the executive branch, the constitutional role of the Congress dictates that support for the strategy must be garnered through cooperation between the President and members of the Congress. The separation of powers induces that cooperation by providing for a distinct and balanced division of authorities between the executive and the legislative branches. The role of the Congress and the effect of separation of powers are on display during the military budget process.
Shared Role in the Budget Process
Winston Churchill once remarked, "It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government ... except all the others that have been tried." A similar observation could well be made of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System that supports the Defense portion of the President's budget. The enormity of the formulation, review, and approval process leading up to submission of the President's budget request to Congress requires that the front end of the process for any fiscal year commence prior to enactment of two prior fiscal years' budgets. The resultant latency between generation of program budget estimates and review of the budget by Congress invariably leads to disparities between projected and actual performance on some programs.
Likewise, external events that transpire during the same period may affect the priority or urgency placed on programs (including unfunded programs). Despite these challenges, the military budget process provides the framework for resolving difficult questions about how much military is enough.
Within this framework, the House and the Senate committees on Armed Services look to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, both acting under the President's authority as Commander in Chief, to determine the military requirements to sup port the National Security Strategy. Congressional leaders then look to the Secretary of Defense to submit the Defense program that best meets these requirements.
Submission of the President's budget request signals completion of the Department's budget formulation and commencement of committee activities leading to the annual National Defense Authorization Act. Upon review of the budget and accompanying reports, consideration of testimony, numerous briefings, and independent assessments by other government agencies and private entities, the committees act to:
* Authorize Defense appropriations, personnel end strength, and programs and policies necessary to meet the nation's security requirements;
* Provide for the Armed Forces the right equipment, training, and support to perform their mission and provide for the members of our military the rights and benefits, pay, and promotions that they deserve;
* Regulate and oversee the administration of justice under military law; and
* Regulate and oversee procurement, evaluate program affordability and efficiency, and otherwise ensure the proper stewardship of taxpayers' dollars.
In acting on the President's budget request, adjustments are recommended based on an assessment of program performance, affordability, and risk in the context of Defense priorities and the limits of budget authority. Provisions affecting procurement policy are motivated by opportunities to improve efficiency, enhance oversight and accountability, or avoid repeating errors.
In general, the committee operates in accordance with enduring principles regarding the management of Defense programs. Specifically, the committee:
* Seeks to trace its actions to warfighter requirements
* Looks for joint solutions to common service requirements
* Emphasizes program stability--requirements, budget, and schedule--pursuant to program affordability
* Stresses well-conceived acquisition strategies, favors competition, and expects use of fixed-priced contracting for production programs
* Places great value on risk assessment and the plan to manage the risk
* Supports a healthy defense industrial base
In all its review, the committee strives to take the longer view in evaluating military needs, continually striking the balance between current and future readiness.
Recent Activities Illustrate Critical Role
The Global War on Terrorism has generated great urgency with regard to military budgets. This urgency is not without historical precedent, in his December 1941 statement of war production policy, President Roosevelt urged the Congress:
With singularity of purpose, President Roosevelt and the Congress moved legislation and funding necessary to match the crisis at hand. Similarly, and throughout the Global War on Terrorism, the committee has acted with resolve to move policy and procurement in the direction needed to take care of our men and women in uniform.
The Dignified Treatment of Wounded Warriors Act represents a case in point. There perhaps is no more important piece of legislation that Congress has considered. Revelations of gaps in the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs policies and practices for providing health care coverage for the severely wounded sparked prompt action by Congress in order to advance necessary reforms. This bipartisan committee initiative to make overdue improvements for our service personnel, their families, and our veterans--and to restore their trust--has moved quickly toward passage into law.
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) armored vehicles represent another case in point. In 2006, the United States ground forces were operating fewer than 200 M RAP vehicles in Iraq, using them for route clearance, explosive ordnance disposal, and other specialty missions. These vehicles quickly proved to be extremely effective at providing personnel protection against the greatest threats to our ground forces--improvised explosive devices and roadside bombs. As a result, the Marine Corps and Army generated an urgent requirement for as many as 20,000 vehicles in theater. Reminiscent of President Roosevelt's call to "achieve an all-out war production effort," President George W. Bush and the Congress united to move acquisition policy and critical funding and have worked with industry to increase production 25-fold to meet this urgent warfighter need.
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