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As Putnam (2000, p. 35) states, "Voting is by a substantial margin the most common form of political activity, and it embodies the most fundamental democratic principle of equality ... Moreover, like the canary in the mining pit, voting is an instructive proxy measure of broader social change." Indeed, Putnam (2000, p. 35) informs us that "... recent evidence suggests that the act of voting itself encourages volunteering and other forms of good citizenship."
No theory of voter behavior has received greater attention than the rational voter model introduced by Downs (1957). Since Downs (1957) first introduced this paradigm, numerous other studies have appeared to enhance or test the theory or variants, or implied dimensions thereof, including Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Buchanan (1968), Riker and Ordeshook (1968), Brazel and Silberberg (1973), Ashenfelter and Kelly (1975), Kafoglis and Cebula (1981), Cebula and Kafoglis (1983), Ledyard (1984), Durden and Gaynor (1987), Cox and Munger (1989), Morton (1991), Teixeira (1992), Aldrich (1993), Green and Shapiro (1994), Matsusaka (1995), Verba et al. (1995), Leighly (1996), Knack (1999), Matsusaka (2000), Copeland and Laband (2002), Barreto et al. (2004), Feddersen (2004), Matsusaka (2005), and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006). Concern over low voter participation rates for the U.S. is expressed frequently in the media and elsewhere. In the words of Putnam (2000, p. 31), "With the singular exception of voting, American rates of political participation compare favorably with those in other democracies ..." Putnam (2000, p. 31) further observes that "We are reminded each election year that fewer voters show up at the polls in America than in most other democracies ..."
In an effort to help provide further insight into the cost or benefit of voting decision calculus, the objective of this study is to determine whether "direct democracy" in the form of emotionally charged statewide legislative referenda influences the voter participation rate (VPR), which is measured here by the percentage of eligible voters who actually vote. As stated or argued in Waters (2003, p. xix), "For a century, the initiative and referendum process has been THE critical tool to check the power of unresponsive and unaccountable government ..." in the U.S. Arguably, the referendum process can energize the citizenry with a sense of political efficacy, thereby increasing the expected benefits of voting and voter turnout. As an extension of this argument, the present study endeavors to test the hypothesis that the placement of emotionally charged statewide legislative referenda on the ballot act to increase the VPR. The first form of emotionally charged referendum being investigated in this study is that dealing with same-sex marriage, i.e., the defining of a marriage as a union between a man and a woman. This issue received extensive attention during the 2006 election cycle and as a result a referendum of such a form was ultimately placed on the ballot in eight states. The first hypothesis expressly being tested here is that the placement of a statewide same-sex referendum on the ballot would act to increase voter turnout, ceteris paribus. The second hypothesis being tested is that referenda on another emotionally charged issue, the abortion issue, should also increase voter turnout, ceteris paribus.
The VPR is expected to increase in the presence of such referenda because it presumably enhances the power of voters to influence the governmental decision-making process in a matter that is emotionally charged. This form of direct democracy can be interpreted as potentially energizing eligible voters with a sense of political power. This enhancement implies increased expected gross benefits from voting, which in turn increases the expected net benefits from voting, ceteris paribus. In effect, this study tests, albeit narrowly, the Progressive Era proposition that the use of direct democracy can act to raise the VPR. Finally, this is the first study to empirically investigate formally whether the number of statewide legislative referenda on same-sex marriage and the number of statewide legislative referenda on abortion have influenced the VPR.
The model, which is provided in "The Framework" of the study, is a cost-benefit framework that parallels the rational voter model. "Empirical Analysis" provides the empirical analysis, which consists of a state-level data analysis of all 50 states in the 2006 general election. Estimates of several variations on the basic model are provided in this section of the study in order to demonstrate the consistency and robustness of the study's basic conclusions. "Conclusion: Direct Democracy Raises Voter Turnout" of the study provides a summary and overview.
The Framework
Paralleling in principle the rational voter model, it is hypothesized that the probability that a given eligible voter will actually vote, PROBV, is an increasing function of the expected gross benefits (EGB) associated with voting, ceteris paribus, and a decreasing function of the expected gross costs (EGC) associated with voting, ceteris paribus. Thus, it follows that:
PROBV = f(EGB, EGC), [f.sub.EGB] > 0, [f.sub.EGC] > 0; [f.sub.(EGB-EGC)] > 0 (1)
The first central hypothesis being tested in this study addresses whether, by increasing the power of voters, the number of statewide legislative referenda dealing with the issue of same-sex marriage (REFSAMESEX) increases EGB and (EGBEGC) and hence, in the aggregate, increase the voter participation rate (VPR), ceteris paribus. In other words, the presence of a REFSAMESEX on the ballot (due to an increased sense of political empowerment) implies a greater EGB and hence a greater (EGB-EGC), which in turn increases the VPR, ceteris paribus.
On the other hand, it can in principle be argued that when voters face a referendum, they are confronted with possible transactions costs of learning enough about that referendum so that they can cast intelligent, informed votes in the ballot booth. In theory, this consideration would imply an increased EGC and a decreased (EGB-EGC), ceteris paribus. Related to this issue, however, consider the observations by Matsusaka (2005, p. 198), who argues that "... voters do not need a detailed understanding of a measure to register their preferences accurately in the voting booth. They may be able to cast a vote that reflects their underlying interests and values by using information cues or shortcuts, such as recommendations from trusted individuals or organizations." Citing studies supportive of his arguments by Lupia (1994) and Bowler and Donovan (1998), Matsusaka (2005, p. 198) proceeds to state that "In fact, the evidence suggests that information cues are fairly effective in allowing voters to make reasoned choices in the voting booth." Based on this perspective, it is hypothesized here that, on balance, the VPR is an increasing function of REFSAMESEX, ceteris paribus.
Aside from REFSAMESEX, other factors influence the voters' EGBs and EGCs, including fundamentally economic factors. For instance, it is also expected that the more poorly the economy is performing, e.g., the higher the unemployment rate (UR), the greater the interest the public (eligible voters) may have in the outcome of a major election. As Cebula (2005, p. 162) argues, if "... the unemployment rate ... is rising, the public may wish to express their various fears and concerns about ... unemployment and/or their feelings for a need for economic policy changes." Therefore, the greater the UR, the greater may be the expected benefits from voting as the public uses voting to express their feelings (Copeland and Laband 2002), i.e., their fears and concerns regarding actual and potential job loss and/or desires for more efficacious government economic policies. Hence, it is hypothesized here that the greater the UR, the greater the VPR, ceteris paribus.
Another economic factor that may influence the expected benefits of voting is median family income (MFI). That persons with higher incomes per capita are expected to be more likely to vote is certainly not a new idea. For example, Campbell et al. (1960) found that persons with higher incomes (and higher educational attainment) tended to be especially aware of the potential benefits of voting and the economic stakes that were potentially at issue as a result of the voting process. Allegedly, higher income persons tend to be better informed than lower income persons on campaign issues and political party platforms, as well as the potential benefits of voting. Ergo, it is hypothesized here that the higher the median family income (MFI) in a state, the higher the VPR in that state, ceteris paribus.
Furthermore, again as in Campbell et al. (1960), it is hypothesized in this study that the higher the average level of educational attainment in a state, the higher may be the expected benefits from voting, ceteris paribus. Arguably, the greater the level of one's educational attainment, the greater may be one's knowledge of and appreciation of the significance of participating in the voting dimension of the democratic process. Furthermore, higher levels of educational attainment could well (a) engender a higher level of understanding of those issues being decided by or at least influenced through the act of voting or (b) result in a better informed electorate in terms of candidates' qualifications, character, and prior voting records and political philosophies. Cebula and Toma (2006, p. 35) even argue that "Greater average levels of education may lead to the subjective evaluation that voting per se yields ... benefits ... insofar as voting may serve to ... create the feeling of helping to maintain the vitality and survival of the democratic process ..." Indeed, higher levels of educational achievement could very well help to enhance the degree to which voters derive subjective benefits from fulfilling their civic duty in the voting booth. Accordingly, it is hypothesized in this study that the greater the percentage of the population in a state with at least a high school diploma (HSANDMORE), the higher the VPR in the state, ceteris paribus.
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