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Weekly UpdatesWe Don't Make Widgets: Overcoming the Myths That Keep Government from Radically Improving
By Ken Miller
Governing Books
2007; 124 pages; $24,95
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We Don't Make Widgets is geared toward middle and senior-level managers in state and local governments. Ken Miller's wits easy-to-read book offers a fresh look at how departments and organizations measure success. Miller shares many change management success stories and explains the myths that he believes are limiting improvement within the public sector: 1) We don't make widgets; 2) We don't have customers; and 3) We are not here to make a profit. Miller's mission is to dispel these myths and explain that governments actually do make widgets, they do have customers, and they are here to make a profit. His thesis is that government agencies can and should be managed in the same way as private organizations, meaning that they should strive for profitability, whether the profit be revenue or results. We Don't Make Widgets provides valuable how-to and how-not-to examples and arms managers with the mindset and tools needed to understand and overcome these myths.
Private-sector entities continuously search for improvement through innovation and efficiency, efforts which encourage citizens to insist that government agencies improve their efficiency as well. This translates into pressure on governments to cut costs, improve customer satisfaction, be less bureaucratic, work faster, and show results. Miller believes the public sector could respond to these demands better if the three limiting beliefs he identified were de-bunked. The myths prevent managers from realizing that their organizations are a collection of systems that must be refined in order to improve.
Miller's model for improving any organization is what he calls the "system of work," a theory that applies to all organizations, private and public. The model focuses on four main components: the factory;, the widget, the customers, and the outcomes. Miller colorfully explains the system of work, likening the process to the production of a car in an automotive factory;, and then comparing the same system of work to a child abuse investigation report. In the first example, the suppliers provide parts to the factory, which then produces the widget: the car. The car is then sold to the customers, who drive the outcome of profitability for the automotive factory. The government system-of-work example is a report produced by a human services agency after an investigation of suspected child abuse. In this case, the "factory" is the investigation, the widget is the report, and the customers of the report are the prosecutors, who drive the outcome: successful prosecution of a case and a safe environment for the child.
Understanding widgets and identifying the many widgets within government agencies is crucial to grasping Miller's theory In Chapter 3, Miller suggests that most government managers do not see the widgets that are produced within their factory, or they do not grasp that their permits, tax returns, county fair, and restaurant inspection reports are widgets, so they do not have the opportunity to improve the systems. Widgets, as explained by Miller, are specific deliverables that can be counted. Examples of typical widgets are permits, filled potholes, approved purchase orders, budget recommendations, investigation reports, or filled vacancies. Once managers and executives understand what their widgets are, the myth that "we don't make widgets" is removed, and the opportunity to make better widgets and improve efficiencies can be realized.
Government managers and executives also struggle to embrace the idea that they do in fact have customers, a point Miller covers in Chapter 4. In the wide spectrum of government agencies, different terms are used to refer to customers, including applicant, recipient, and citizen. Miller suggests that the key to understanding customers is to define them as the end-users of the widgets that are being produced.
In Chapter 5, Miller supports his argument against the "we're not here to make a profit" myth, starting with a loose analogy that taxpayers are to government agencies what investors are to the private sector. "Taxpayers would like to earn higher results on their investments ..." he says. "We are here to make a profit--it's just not measured in dollars. Instead, it's measured in increased job creation, reduced recidivism, and higher quality of life. It's our responsibility to achieve a higher return for investors by making better widgets for customers in more efficient factories."
Once government groups are able to see their agencies as factories that produce widgets, performance measurements can be mined, improvement opportunities identified, and positive results rewarded. Championing his quest for meaningful measurements, Miller says, "Measures reveal our values. Measures drive behavior. Measures can inspire us, and measures help us learn." In the book, Miller points out that just taking measures isn't enough--they have to be the right measurements, and interpreted correctly He provides an example of measurements being used badly, citing a call center where the only metrics being tracked were how many calls each agent handled and how long each call lasted. It was not surprising that agents were answering as many calls as possible and keeping the call times as short as possible. These measurements cultivated actions that led to poor customer satisfaction, low employee morale, and a higher-than-necessary call volume. If customer satisfaction had been the intended measure from the onset, the call center could have been measuring customer-satisfaction levels.
In addition to debunking the myths, defining the system of work, and highlighting the power of accurate analytics, Miller also describes some potential pitfalls, such as the call center's experience. He outlines some common ways in which agencies make attempts at improving efficiency that do not lead to actual progress. One example is creating special panels and/or hiring consultants who do not understand the systems in the agency or department. Miller also notes that agencies often try to improve through reorganizations, with limited success. Reorganizations "are the inevitable recommendation of every blue-ribbon commission. The problem with the reorganizing is that it doesn't improve the system of the agency. It just changes where those potentially dysfunctional systems reside," Miller says. Because the individuals involved with the improvement initiatives do not see the systems that exist in the agency--the factory--they are unable to address problems with the widgets produced, so the reorganizations are ineffective. Another common pitfall is focusing on individuals, reminding the reader that "poor performance can usually be traced to the system." Before accountability becomes an agency's new mantra, the system must be running like a well-oiled machine, with all obstacles removed from the employee's path.
We Don't Make Widgets offers a novel approach to analyzing systems, identifying improvements, and implementing change. The book is loaded with specific examples of Miller's encounters with the three myths he identifies and contains well-rounded instances of both wins and losses. Miller also touches on other interesting topics, including intrinsic motivation, the value of focus groups and end-user feedback, a look at what drives customers, a discussion of survey shortcomings, and the importance of staying innovative. In all, We Don't Make Widgets brews excitement about the potential and opportunities at hand.
EVA M. OLSAKER is a senior manager in the GFOA's Research and Consulting Center in Chicago, Illinois.
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