Second, we challenge the general validity of the 'self-interest' assumption in transaction costs and contract theory. Following Das & Teng (2001), a key premise of our research is that economic exchange also incorporates social elements that are built on personal foundations in which reciprocity and affection as well as self-interest play a role.

Recent empirical studies confirm this by showing that about half of the people are completely selfish, whereas the other half exhibit egalitarian or even altruistic preferences. In other words, the assumption that actors have an intrinsic tendency to keep promises is as true as their likelihood to behave opportunistically (Chen 2000). We plead for future research that looks at how the study of interorganizational governance (contract, control, trust) changes if these different assumptions of human behaviour are taken as point of departure.

Third, we believe that our results have implications for the ongoing trust-control discussion (Ryall & Sampson 2006). In many studies trust and formal contracts are often seen in contradiction--economists advocate the superiority of formal control mechanisms and social scientists maintain the crucial importance of trust and social capital in governing relationships. Our research methods could open a new path that allows a combination of these two perspectives.

Future research may also account for demographic characteristics such as firm tenure and age as well as contract management skills of the alliance manager or characteristics of the top management team (Finkelstein & Hambrick 1996). These may also determine the role and content of contracts in (high-tech) alliances.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We thank the editor for the helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier release of this paper. We benefited greatly from discussions with Reinhard Bachmann, Bart Nooteboom, Mari Sako and Peter Smith Ring. All errors are ours.

Received 17 December 2007 Accepted 28 August 2008

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GJALT DE JONG

Senior Lecturer/Researcher, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

ROSALINDE JA KLEIN WOOLTHUIS

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