Things have been turning bad for Iraq in recent weeks, particularly over the issue of Kirkuk in the north and Basra in the south. Both of these petroleum-rich areas are becoming flash-points in new cycle of violence which has affected the other parts of Iraq.
Compounding these problems, on May 2 Iranian Parliament Speaker 'Ali Larijani gave a strong warning that the Shi'ite theocracy will retaliate fiercely in Iraq and elsewhere in the region in the event of any moves by the US in the coming weeks or months, such as "crippling sanctions" on Iran. A White House-backed bill in Congress, called The Iran Sanctions Enhancement Act, had just been introduced by a bi-partisan group of US senators. The bill says its purpose is "to enhance US diplomatic efforts with respect to Iran by expanding economic sanctions against Iran to include refined petroleum, and for other purposes".
An US-based Iranian analyst on May 2 wrote that, while the move would cause "significant disruption in the Iranian economy", this would cause Iran to "retaliate...in the region by threatening US interests where they are the weakest" - i.e., the Arab side of the Gulf and AfPak.
The US and UNSC have already imposed several rounds of sanctions on Tehran over its nuclear ambitions which Iran's Sunni neighbours including Saudi Arabia say are threatening them directly. There is also the prospect of an oil price war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, though this would be the last resort if all Saudi diplomatic efforts to get Tehran to curb its nuclear and regional ambitions fail (as explained in omt18IraqProspctMay4-09).
April was the deadliest month in Iraq for the US, Iraqis and Iranian pilgrims for quite sometime. At least 371 Iraqis were killed - in addition to 80 Iranian pilgrims - in violence in April. The US death toll for April rose to 18, making it the deadliest in seven months for American forces in Iraq. The sharp increase from the previous month came as a series of Sunni/Neo-Salafi bombings pushed Iraqi deaths to their highest level this year (see rim4IrqAutonomyApr27-09).
In an April 30 ceremony outside Basra, the British military honoured its soldiers who died during more than six years of war in Iraq. That was part of preparations for the withdrawal of the last British forces from Iraq.
The departing troops will leave a memorial wall for the 179 British personnel who died since the US-led invasion in March 2003. British commanders are in the process of handing over responsibility of the oil-rich region. Iraqi security forces are taking the front-line roles, but US troop strength in the south is increasing before the planned British pull-out this spring. The US says it will end its combat role in Iraq in August 2010 and have troops out by end-2011.
However, the return of violence and renewed tension with Iran may force the Obama administration to re-think its exist strategy in Iraq. American military experts on May 2 were quoted as saying Washington will not allow for the US to be leaving Iraq as a defeated invader, suggesting that Obama might be compelled to postpone the pull-out to well beyond 2011.
The Shi'ite-led government of Iraq has been trying to re-assert central control by uniting communities in Baghdad, which for centuries used to be the capital of the Sunni-led Muslim world and later became the capital of the Arabs. Under a new master-plan for the capital ordered in 2008, the remaking of this capital means the most serious phase of Iraq's reconstruction may have begun. Baghdad will host the Arab League's 23rd summit conference in late March 2011. Plans for the remaking of Baghdad already have begun attracting large delegations into this country from the Western powers (see Part 37 in ood4BaghdadApr20-09).
The government is tackling two huge problems: a mountain of financial debts which has resulted from the behaviour of Saddam's Sunni/Ba'thist dictatorship since the 1980s, including its invasion of and brief occupation of Kuwait; and the behaviour of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the oil-rich north which, among other things, has adopted an oil policy independent from that of Baghdad and based on exploration and production sharing agreements (EPSAs) - while the central Oil Ministry says such deals are illegal and wants the KRG to shift to 20-year technical support agreements (TSAs) based on service fees to IOCs. The two problems need urgent remedies for several reasons. The main one is a global recession caused by an unprecedented credit crunch which has led to a collapse of crude oil prices (see Part 36 in ood3IraqDebt&KurdsMar16-09).
The US Options To Prevent Sunni-Shi'ite War: With the situation deteriorating and with indications that Baghdad might ask the US to extend the presence of its combat troops beyond 2011, some voices in Washington have raised warnings that the Obama administration's policy on Iraq is drifting. But in Washington attention focuses more on danger zones elsewhere - including Afghanistan and Pakistan, with India threatening to attack before the Taliban and al-Qaeda move on Islamabad and get hold of the latter's atomic bombs.
Kenneth Pollack, director of research at the Brookings Institution's Saban Centre for Middle East Policy, argues that the Bush administration moved away from Afghanistan to Iraq prematurely and with tragic consequences. But he says the Obama administration is turning away too early from Iraq to Afghanistan, and this, too, could have disastrous consequences. He says: "Iraq is one of several dozen issues on the agenda, and it doesn't stand out".
The recent spate of Sunni/Neo-Salafi bombings in Shi'ite areas appear designed to re-ignite a new round of sectarian bloodshed. While tragic, the violence is not unexpected. US commanders have never claimed victory. Indeed, they have consistently made clear that the gains in Iraq are fragile. American experts say nor should the attacks deter the US from pushing ahead with its military withdrawal plans.
The FT on April 1, quoted Anthony Cordesman, a leading Iraq expert at the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, as saying: "At some point we cannot stop the insurgency from carrying out attacks. People who favour violence adapt, just like those vying for security adapt".
Iraq is still haunted by a series of intractable problems, many of which have the potential to reverse recent gains or fuel new cycles of violence. Financial aid is drying up at a time when oil revenues have fallen, constraining a government which is, by far, the largest employer in the country. Holding pacified parts of Iraq becomes all the more difficult without the ability to create jobs and deploy massive investment.
The capabilities of Iraq's security forces are only now being tested, as the US draws down its own troops. If Iraqi forces fail to end the new wave of bombings, Shi'ite militias could reappear and extract revenge from Sunni/Neo-Salafi insurgents. A crisis over Kirkuk and Basra is also looming. Will Baghdad and the KRG use the UN recommendations on Kirkuk (see details in rim4IrqAutonomyApr27-09) to launch a process of negotiations or entrench their positions further? In Basra, renewed talk of local autonomy and Iranian influences have made the situation in the south more complicated (see below).
Then there is the fate of the US-founded wakening councils (ACs), the mainly Sunni Arab tribal groups who include former Sunni insurgents. With US support and funding, the ACs fought al-Qaeda and other Neo-Salafi groups as well as Saddam Ba'thist fighters. But now the ACs are having to deal with, and be paid by, a reluctant Shi'ite-led government.
PM Nuri al-Maleki, leader of a faction of al-Da'wa al-Islamiya movement - a major Shi'ite organisation mostly backed by the Iranian theocracy, never trusted the ACs and his government has arrested many of their members and has refused provide others with jobs as he had promised to the US military in 2008. Some of these ACs include many thugs - as in the case of most Iran-backed Shi'ite militia groups such as Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JaM).
Many ACs have already disintegrated and rejoined the insurgency, thus confirming Maleki's argument with US military commanders. Other AC members have clashed with Maleki's mainly Shi'ite security forces.
Maleki has made some progress. He has been willing to confront violent groups within his Shi'ite camp, such as JaM. And he has cleverly promoted a more national agenda which has undermined religious parties.
The US, however, faces a big dilemma. A new president in Washington who had consistently stood against the Iraq war and now is eager to turn the page on the occupation wants Iraqis to assume control of their own affairs. So some US distance from Baghdad is needed. American leverage, in any case, is also reduced. But even as it seeks to normalise its dealings with Iraq, the FT on May 1 warned: "the US has to recognise that it still has a lot at stake - including thousands of troops, at least for two years - and that it remains the most powerful outside party on the Iraqi scene, capable of mediating between factions. It continues to have both the ability and the responsibility to exercise that leverage".




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