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Weekly UpdatesNORMATIVE DECISION MAKING REVISITED
Decision making is the science of choosing the best alternative. The problem with classical normative decision models lies in intractable constraints, particularly a lack of time, staff, and resources for search, evaluation, and selection of alternatives (Abelson and Levi, 1985; Bazerman, 2005). Normative theorists argue decision making during natural disasters should be more rational due to fewer constraints--immense government resources, foreseeable problems, and highly motivated decision-makers fearing for their jobs (McCarthy, 2003). Common steps in the decision making processes in crisis situations include: preparation, needs analysis, search for alternatives, evaluating alternatives, authorization, and selection, communication and implementation, explanation and justification, and finally, retrospective evaluation (Dennis, 1995; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1989; Turner, 1978). Descriptive theorists warn that high uncertainty can either constrain rational processes, or even undermine them to the point they become irrelevant (Bazerman, 2005; Heracleous, 1994, Quarantelli, 1988; Rosenthal, 1998). Combining moderating constraints with likely arational mediating factors yields Figure 1:
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1. Preparation consists of contingency planning followed by simulations and stockpiling, both of resources and redundant systems (Quarantelli, 1988; Turner, 1978). Effective response to a widespread disaster requires an interdependent, inter-organizational effort between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Guard, the Department of Defense, and a host of state and local agencies. Senate and Congressional committees investigating the Hurricane Katrina disaster both concluded that this catastrophe was both predicted and predictable (Gelbspan, 2005; Marek, 2006b). In New Orleans there were three areas of preparation, all requiring significant resources: (1) the levy system designed to prevent flooding, (2) FEMA equipment, supplies, and resources stockpiled for relief efforts, and (3) disaster planning and simulation exercises to coordinate relief efforts following the disaster. Unfortunately, political patronage undermined preparation efforts by shifting resource allocation elsewhere. The levee system was never designed to withstand anything more than a weak hurricane and Washington repeatedly refused to allocate the resources necessary for upgrades (Brinkley, 2006; Gelbspan, 2005). Similarly, FEMA's pitiful performance is not surprising, given its chronic underfunding and understaffing as resources were shifted away towards homeland security issues. FEMA never received funding to be prepared for anything more than minor disasters (Marek, 2006b; Singer, 2006).
2. Needs analysis ensures the most important problems are being addressed. Usually expert panels identify critical issues, verify feedback and information, and maximize objectivity and quality (Bazerman, 2005; Rosenthal, 1998). Needs analysis should result in a decision process cycle which continues until either reaching the objective or discounting the need for the objective (Ableson and Levi, 1985; Harrison, 1999). Obviously in a disaster scenario, there is neither the time nor the information for an optimal needs analysis. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, however, needs analysis opportunities were needlessly squandered. In Congressional testimony, FEMA officials blamed response problems on poor coordination and communication, particularly conflicting and contradictory reports on the extent of the disaster and who needed help (Marek, 2006a; Singer, 2006). Here the lack of adequate preparation in terms of communications equipment and redundant communications channels cost relief efforts dearly. In some cases, communications were so delayed and flawed that DHS decision makers relied on media reports, such as when DHS leaders confused reports of the convention center with the Superdome until media documented the deplorable conditions at the center (Brinkley, 2006).
However, beyond preparation lies decision premises--the paradigm and ideologies to sort through information determine what is worth paying attention to and what can be safely marginalized or ignored (Simon, 1957). Decision premises are often distorted by (a) previous commitments to past choices, and tendencies to escalate that commitment, (b) avoidance of negative information and the defense of prior choices, (c) illusions of control over random and uncontrollable events, and (d) wishful thinking, where unpleasant contingencies are arbitrarily dismissed as improbable, while pleasant contingencies are unrealistically embraced as likely (Abelson and Levi, 1985; Bazerman, 2005). In Katrina, decision makers often embraced dangerously faulty decision premises. On the local level, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin portrayed a cowboy mentality of "this is just another storm to ride out" upon hearing news of the impending hurricane Further, crony "Big Easy" contractors delivered levees of such poor quality they have been accused of malfeasance (Brinkley, 2006). Similarly, levee district funds were diverted away from inspectors and maintenance in favor of casinos, airports, and Mardi Gras statues (Marek, 2006b). The trick is to rationalize the need and tweak the criteria used to define that need until political objectives fit the standard. On the federal level, the Senate Committee condemned DHS's reliance on unverified media reports as the basis for relief decisions. The media gravitated towards news of the spectacular, resulting in accounts of violence, looting, and other anarchy that were often exaggerated (Brinkley, 2006; Marek 2006b).
3. Search for alternatives involves scanning the internal organization and external environment for information on relevant alternatives which are likely to fulfill the objectives settled upon in the needs analysis. Searches are bounded by (a) the perceived importance of the decision, (b) the cost of additional information, (c) the linkage between the decision and the decision maker's level of aspiration, and (d) the desirability of the outcome (Harrison, 1999; Taylor, 1984). On the federal, state, and local levels, most agencies had extensive contingency plans with a variety of disaster alternatives (Cillufo, 2006; Brinkley, 2006). Unfortunately, the planning did not extend to effective implementation. Congressional investigations concluded that FEMA decision makers understood internal FEMA roles and responsibilities, but not how to effectively collaborate with other agencies, even when they were formally written into the plan (Brinkley, 2006). Consequently alternatives involving other agencies, such as Amtrack and the Department of the Interior, were neglected (Brinkley, 2006; Marek, 2006a). FEMA was geared towards alternatives involving FEMA personnel using FEMA vehicles following FEMA procedures, and had difficulty understanding how to effectively integrate alternatives outside of that scope of operations. As is often the case in crisis, the systems of systems coordination and communication network broke down (Quarantelli, 1988).
Chronic resource allocation shortfalls undermining disaster preparation and contingency plans in favor of other priorities were present on every level of disaster mediation. Beyond FEMA's problems, on the federal level, Senate Hearings concluded that the wording of the plan was so obtuse, confusing, and complex, many DHS decision makers did not understand it (Marek, 2006a). Instead of improving and testing federal state and local plans, they sat on the shelf as a token gesture reassuring the public that preparations had been made. Further, Louisiana's plan was not comprehensive, with detailed contingencies for those with vehicles, but not for the infirm with age, health, or mental problems (Marek 2006b). While the City of New Orleans did have a detailed disaster plan, the mayor's office had not widely shared it, so it did not matter (Brinkley, 2006). Priorities focused elsewhere, making contingency planning more of a ceremonial or ritual exercise than reliable preparation.
4. Evaluation of alternatives involves an assessment of potential to reach the decision objective. Using formal criteria based on expert advice and forecasts of feasibility and informal criteria such as decision maker preferences, the likelihood of cause and effect relations of success is assessed (Harrison, 1999). Evaluation usually continues in cycles, with each cycle including more information and detail allowing for better evaluation. The number of cycles usually corresponds with the perceived importance of the decision and the quality of the evaluation (Abelson and Levi, 1985; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Thoret, 1976). Any forecasting process is only as good as the quality of information and communication which provided the data. In post-disaster chaos, the failure of formal channels prompted decision makers to rely on informal or public channels, which provided unverified information of dubious quality. Informal processes tend to focus on simplistic information and alternatives that are easy to understand, on alternatives that reflect what power-holders and influence leaders want to hear, and on alternatives that are compatible with preferred political agendas (Bazerman, 2005; Harrison, 1999; Taylor, 1984).
Senate fact finders have concluded that most of the attention of certain key decision makers focused on office and inter-office politics (Marek 2006b). On the federal level, FEMA director Brown and DHS Secretary Chertoff began a series of miscommunications that culminated with Brown ignoring Chertoff and communicating directly with the White House instead. Insiders note that Brown's ouster from FEMA was officially attributed to incompetence, but unofficially attributed to Brown's failure to talk his boss up with the media and with other government contacts and publicly credit Chertoff with any successes in the relief effort (Singer, 2006). On the state level, there was bad blood between Mayor Nagin and Governor Blanco, with mistrust and miscommunication contributing to an agonizingly slow and indecisive decision making process in the Governor's suite. Instead of mobilizing the Louisiana National Guard to maintain order, Blanco spent days engaged in partisan bickering and finger pointing (Brinkley, 2006). When the focus of evaluation is on issues of personal exposure and culpability for mistakes, then a conservative bias towards risk-taking sets in. For example, in the days preceding the Hurricane, some decision makers in New Orleans attempted to round up the city's fleet of school buses and use them as evacuation vehicles, but no one was willing to accept responsibility for the insurance issues and fuel costs (Brinkley, 2006).
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