A missed chance? Obama on democracy in Egypt.(MIDDLE EAST)(Barack Obama)

In his typically cautious fashion, US President Barack Obama gave a speech in Cairo in June that touched on Islamic extremism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nuclear weapons, and human rights, without wading into any policy detail. It was public diplomacy at its finest--just enough specifics to placate the audience, but nothing Obama could be pinned down to. But in one significant regard, the speech confirmed a major shift in US policy from the Bush administration--the minimal focus on democracy promotion. Obama declared his "commitment ... to governments that reflect the will of the people." But he never explicitly criticized the regime of Hosni Mubarak, as George W. Bush had done, and he was quick to add that "America does not presume to know what is best for everyone." No one doubts that Obama's agenda is already full. But does Obama's brief treatment of the democracy question signal a deprioritization within his administration? And what would this mean for the many Egyptians who were hoping for some encouragement of their democratic aspirations?

In a broader sense, much of Obama's foreign policy has been a movement away from Bush's neoconservative idealism--especially prominent in Bush's first term, when he "liberated" Iraq and talked tough to Mubarak--and toward a realist assessment of US aims. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has downplayed the human rights question in her talks with China, while Obama was reluctant to criticize the Iranian election results in June, as he planned to talk directly to whoever won. In Egypt, Obama needs Hosni Mubarak's support to resume Middle East peace talks, and many worry that too much pressure on democracy could upset the relationship. Advocates of democracy-promotion, however, note that much of the Arab world's antipathy towards the United States comes from US support of autocrats like Mubarak, and argue that Obama must not sacrifice long-term transformations for short-term gains.

Both arguments have their flaws. On the one hand, it is not impossible for the administration to pressure the Mubarak regime to democratize while simultaneously collaborating with them on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After all, Bush was fairly aggressive from 2003-05 in pushing Egypt to liberalize, even while the two countries were cooperating on the Palestine issue. Bush shifted large parts of the US$1.7 billion aid package away from economic development and towards democracy promotion, and threatened to withhold more if Mubarak did not embark on real reform. Even with this democratization campaign, though, Mubarak continued to participate in the peace process, agreeing in February 2005 to return an ambassador to Israel at the close of the Second Intifada. Nor is Mubarak by any means the most intransigent actor in the process today. On the contrary: Egypt's visceral opposition to Hamas has led it to take a vocal leadership role in the "accommodationist" camp of Arab states. So it is certainly possible for Obama to push Mubarak on democracy and pull him along on a regional peace initiative.

What advocates for pressuring Mubarak often gloss over, however, is the sheer magnitude of the barriers to democratization in Egypt. A look at Bush's experience with democracy promotion will be instructive. The president succeeded in forcing an opening in Egypt's repressive political system. Mubarak allowed other candidates to add their names to the ballot for the 2005 presidential election; dissidents found they could speak more openly against the regime. That year, signs of democratization also appeared across the Arab world, with the Iraqi elections and the anti-Syrian demonstrations in Lebanon. But what Western observers had hopefully called the "Arab spring" soon ended--Hezbollah won the Palestinian elections in 2006, violence in Iraq increased and Mubarak stage-managed his September 2005 reelection. After receiving initial praise from Egyptians for putting the pressure on Mubarak, Bush was later criticized for backing off his democracy push and adopting a more realist foreign policy in the latter part of his second term.

While it is true that sustained US democracy promotion could blunt the harsher edges of Mubarak's rule--like its detentions of dissidents--it is only a true change of regime that would fundamentally change Egyptian politics. And that may be easier said than done. At 81 years old, Mubarak must step down eventually, and the likely choice for his successor is his own son Gamal--a 45-year old MBA with a passion for economic reform but no real support among the Egyptian population. Gamal's stance on liberalization is unclear, but if recent father-son successions in Syria, Jordan and Morocco are any guide, the change between administration will likely be more cosmetic than substantive. The prospect of Gamal's succession is denied by the ruling party, but considered inevitable by the population. Given the mixed record of American-induced liberalization on issues such as detention policy and censorship, Obama has little hope for influencing the succession, which goes right to the heart of the regime.

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So Obama's administration has three basic options with regard to Egypt and democratization. The first, which Obama seems to have chosen, is one of minimal pressure and focus; one cannot expect much "change" to come out of this strategy. The second, Bush's post-2003 approach, involves diplomatic assertiveness and some conditioning of aid, although both Bush and Obama have refused to condition military aid upon liberalization. This strategy, it would seem, is unlikely to significantly weaken Egyptian cooperation on regional issues, but its payoff in terms of political opening should not be overstated. Finally, the Obama administration could aggressively pursue full democratization in Egypt, conditioning military aid upon truly competitive elections and an end to security service intimidation. It would be hitherto unexplored territory for the US-Egypt relationship, and Egypt's willingness to work on regional issues would almost certainly dissipate. In a region with too many high-stakes issues to keep track of, Obama will surely play it safe on the democratization question--but he may be underestimating his own power.

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