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Weekly UpdatesINTRODUCTION
Numerous studies have found that expansions in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) led to increases in employment for single mothers (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000, 2001). Less is known about the possible effect of the EITC on longer-term earnings growth for those women--that is, do single mothers who are pulled into employment by the EITC improve their labor market outcomes through increased earnings over time or do they remain stuck in low-earning jobs? On the one hand, we might expect increases in earnings over time. Evidence suggests that even among less-skilled groups, the returns to labor market experience are large (Gladden and Taber, 2000, 2006). On the other hand, we might not expect increases in earnings over time if the employment opportunities available to such single mothers are limited to "dead-end" jobs that have little potential for future earnings growth.
This study examines the effect of the EITC expansions in the early 1990s on the earnings growth of single mothers. We focus on single mothers both because they are a group likely to receive the EITC and because previous research found employment increases for this group following EITC expansions (e.g., Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000, 2001). (1) We measure the annual earnings of single mothers using administrative earnings records from the Social Security Administration (SSA) linked to several panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPp). (2) We exploit the longitudinal nature of the administrative records and employ a difference-in-differences strategy to identify the effects of the EITC on earnings growth and employment. In doing so, we are following the strategy Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz (2005) used to identify employment effects of the EITC on welfare recipients in California, though we extend the analysis of employment effects to a nationally representative sample of single mothers and include an analysis of earnings growth effects.
We examine the one-, three-, and five-year growth rates in earnings for single mothers with two or more children--who were particularly affected by the 1993-1996 EITC expansions--relative to those for single mothers with exactly one child--who were less affected by the expansions--in both years prior to and following the EITC expansions. As with previous studies, disentangling the effects of the EITC from those of welfare reform and a changing work environment remains a challenge.
By 1997, one year after the EITC expansions, we find that single mothers with two or more children increased their employment rates relative to single mothers with one child. Their one-, three-, and five-year growth rates in earnings also increased relative to single mothers with one child. Finally, we find no evidence that the EITC led single mothers to take "dead-end" jobs.
BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide some background information on the EITC. We focus on how the expansions in the early 1990s affected single mothers with two or more children to a much greater extent than single mothers with one child, as our identification strategy hinges on that difference. We then briefly review other research that examines the effects of the EITC on employment, marriage, and fertility, and on the likelihood that government programs lead people to take "dead-end" jobs.
EITC Background
The EITC is a refundable tax credit that provides cash to lower income working parents and individuals through the federal income tax system. (3) The credit was established in 1975 and was greatly expanded in the 1990s. Today, the program is a major component of federal efforts to reduce poverty. In 2007, EITC refunds (the amounts by which EITCs exceeded tax liability) were $38.3 billion. That year, food stamp outlays were $34.9 billion and TANF outlays were $16.9 billion (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2008). (4)
The amount of credit the worker receives is based on the taxpayer's earnings and income (which in the case of joint filers includes income from both spouses), number of children, and marital status. In 2007, the maximum EITC was $428 for workers without qualifying children, $2,853 for working families with one qualifying child, and $4,716 for working families with two or more qualifying children. The amount of the credit initially increases as earnings increase until the maximum credit is achieved. After earnings exceed a certain level, the amount of the credit first remains constant and then decreases. Figure I displays how the amount of the EITC varied with earned income for non-joint filers by number of qualifying children in 2007.
As mentioned earlier, our identification strategy hinges on the differential treatment in the EITC of single mothers with one qualifying child and those with two or more qualifying children. Prior to the EITC expansions of the early 1990s, the treatment of parents with one child was virtually identical to those with two or more children. In 1994 the EITC increased for both groups, but more so for those with two or more children (Figure 2). And between 1994-1997 the EITC continued to increase for those with two or more children while remaining relatively unchanged (in real terms) for those with one child (Figure 3). For example, in 1994 the maximum credit available to single mothers with one child was $2,819 (in 2007 dollars) while that available to single mothers with two or more children was $3,497. By 1997, the maximum credit available to single mothers with one child increased by $27 to $2,847 (in 2007 dollars) while the maximum credit available to single mothers with two or more children increased by substantially more--by $1,212 to $4,709.
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The Effects of the EITC on Employment, Marriage, and Fertility
Research has found that the EITC encourages work among single mothers, especially those with less education. There is no conclusive evidence that the substantial marriage penalty inherent in the structure of the EITC discourages marriage. Nor is there evidence to suggest that the structure of the EITC encourages births.
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Hotz and Scholz (2003) provide an excellent treatment of the behavioral effects of the EITC, examining both the theoretical underpinnings as well as the empirical evidence available.
Effects on Employment of Single Mothers
The EITC, by increasing the returns to work, unambiguously encourages employment for low-income single parents. Numerous empirical studies have found evidence that the EITC does, in fact, encourage work among single mothers, especially those with less education (e.g., Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000, 2001). Examining the 1987 expansion of the EITC and using a difference-in-differences strategy similar to that used in this analysis, Eissa and Liebman (1996) find an increase in labor force participation, but no change in hours of work, among women with children relative to women without children. Similarly, by comparing single women with children to those without children, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000, 2001) find that a substantial portion of the increase in employment of single women with children between 1991-1996 was the result of the EITC. In the paper most closely related to ours, Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz (2005) employ a difference-in--differences strategy in which the changes in employment of single mothers with two or more children are compared to those with exactly one child. Examining welfare recipients in California, they find that the EITC expansion of the early 1990s increased the employment of single mothers with two or more children relative to those with one child in the late 1990s.
Marital Decisions
The structure of the EITC may penalize marriage for many low-income single mothers who work. If a working mother who is eligible for the EITC marries a man with earnings of his own, the combination of their earnings may reduce the EITC benefit received by the household. (5) This may occur through a reduction in the credit received (if the combined earnings place the family in the phase-out range) or a complete elimination of the credit (if the combined earnings place the family outside of the EITC range). The fact that the EITC can create such marriage penalties has been well documented (Holtzblatt and Rebelein, 2000; Dickert--Conlin and Houser, 1998; Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 1997), though empirical evidence suggests that the marriage penalties associated with the EITC for single women are not large enough to affect marital decisions (Ellwood, 2000; Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 2002). (6)
If the EITC did discourage marriage among single mothers, then the larger increases in the EITC for single mothers with two or more children would induce more of those women to remain single mothers, thus changing the composition of single mothers with two or more children relative to those with one child over time. While it is unclear what the direction of the bias from this compositional change would be (Heckman, 1996), it is possible that if the EITC differentially discouraged marriage among single mothers with two or more children relative to single mothers with one child, we might see higher earnings growth among single mothers with two or more children due to composition effects alone. However, the empirical evidence indicates that the EITC does not discourage single mothers from marrying, and thus provides support that our results are unlikely to be affected by compositional shifts (driven by marriage) in the group of women who are single mothers.
Fertility Decisions
The structure of the EITC, with higher payments to single parents with two or more children than those with one child, might encourage single mothers with one child to have additional children. Again, to the extent that this incentive translated into actual increases in higher-order fertility, the composition of our two comparison groups would be shifting over time. However, the available empirical evidence on the effects of the EITC on higher-order fertility suggests that this is not a cause for concern. Single mothers with one child do not appear to respond to the modest incentives in the EITC structure to have additional children. In fact, Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (forthcoming) find that the early 1990s expansions of the EITC were associated with "extremely small reductions in higher-order fertility among white women." (7)
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