This comment concerns two main issues that have been presented and
discussed by Chen and Dodd (2001). Firstly, epistemologically, economic
value added (EVA) is of dubious worth because it is construct deficient
in an efficient market hypothesis (EMH) world and also in a
non-efficient market hypothesis (non-EMH) world. This has important
implications for valuations and value creation. Moreover, the
transmission mechanism of EVA into market value added (MVA) is
problematic. Secondly, contrary to the importance that Chen and Dodd
(2001) ascribe to the relevance of accounting information, there is a
growing body of research that shows that accounting information is
becoming progressively less relevant to stock returns and stock price
changes, and this trend is expected to continue.
THE EMH, EPISTEMICS AND EVA
Epistemologically, EVA is a non sequitur because it is construct
deficient in both EMH and non-EMH-worlds. Furthermore, the fundamental
economic and financial factors that constitute the main drivers of EVA
have been shown to have only a minor impact on changes in share price,
and hence share returns.
EVA in an EMH-World--a Financial Fiction
In an EMH-world, where assets plot on the Security Market Line
(SML) or Capital Market Line (CML), and asset prices (market prices)
correspond to asset values (intrinsic values), it is not possible to
meaningfully talk about a measure such as EVA. On the SML and CML, by
definition net present value (NPV) equals zero and the required rate of
return (PER) or cost of capital equals the internal rate of return
(IRR), in which case EVA must equal zero. Since EVA measures the
difference between RRR and IRR, in an EMH-world EVA is attempting to
measure a quantum that by definition cannot exist, except perhaps as
noise. Arbitrage and competitive action ensure that abnormal profit
cannot consistently occur. If the phenomenon of EVA were to be observed,
its occurrence would be random, statistically non-significant, would not
be serially correlated and, on the average, positive-EVA would be offset
by negative-EVA. In an EMH-world, it is not possible to consistently
earn excess returns (i.e., abnormal or super-profits) e xcept at the
price of higher risk, measured by the beta coefficient. Thus, within the
logic of the EMH, EVA is a fiction.
In an EMH-world, EVA would be impounded in an unbiased way into
stock prices so that prices corresponded to intrinsic value. In other
words, the market would recognize the impact of EVA and would impound it
into stock price. The increase in stock price would create market value
and is known as MVA. If EVA, an internal metric of performance, is not
transmitted into MVA, an external metric of performance, shareholders do
not benefit from improvements in EVA as far as asset pricing is
concerned. The question of the transmission of EVA into MVA is an area
that requires additional research. Since EVA is concerned with economic
and financial fundamentals, it is important to know to what extent
changes in EVA will move stock price. The question of what moves stock
prices has been investigated for a considerable period of time, and the
findings suggest that financial and economic fundamentals play only a
minor role in the changes in asset prices (Cutler et al,, 1989; Haugen
et al., 1991; Shiller, 1981; Roll, 1984, 19 88; Frankel and Meese,
1989).
EVA in a Non-EMH-World
There are three issues I would like to raise with regards to EVA in
a nonEMH-world, namely, the validity of using the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM) and beta, the matter of what moves stock prices and hence
MVA, and the matter of dividends and earnings in relation to stock
price.
The validity of using the CAPM. In a non-EMH world, the validity of
using the CAPM as the basis for the calculation of EVA is questionable
because the CAPM is derived from the EMH and is dependant upon the
existence and functioning of the EMH. In a non-EMH world, the CAPM and
beta should not be used to calculate the cost of equity that forms part
of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Numerous studies over
more than a decade have shown that using the GAPM and beta is an
undesirable way of calculating the cost of capital and should not be
used for valuation purposes, and this sentiment has been very clearly
and unambiguously stated by Fama and French (1992, 1996). Thus, an
important part of the basis for the calculation of EVA, namely CAPM, has
been rejected because of the poor relationship between the cross section
of returns and the systematic risk coefficient, beta.
The uninspiring performance of traditional asset pricing models
such as the CAPM and arbitrage pricing theory (APT) has given an impetus
to behavioral finance because the traditional asset pricing models
require that all of the predictable patterns in asset returns, both
short and long run, be traceable to differences in loadings in
economically meaningful risk factors. There is little evidence to show
that this can be done (Hong and Stein, 1999).
What Drives Share Price? Extensive empirical research has shown
that an equilibrium pricing theory, such as the EMH, is not a
satisfactory descriptor of the real world. Market price seldom
corresponds to intrinsic value and this disequilibrium can continue for
extensive periods of time. Moreover, whereas economic and financial
fundamentals will affect value, they are not the main movers of stock
prices. In this regard, Fama (1981) found that a substantial fraction of
return variation cannot be explained by macroeconomic news. Roll (1984)
found that news about weather conditions, the principal source of
variation in the price of orange juice, explains only about 10% of the
movement in orange juice futures prices. Roll (1988) further found that
it is difficult to account for more than one-third of the monthly
variation in individual stock returns on the basis of systematic
economic influences. When investigating which factors moved share price,
Cutler et al. (1989) found that macroeconomic news explains only ab out
one-fifth of the movement in stock prices, and they state: "The
view that movement in stock prices reflect something other than news
about fundamental values is consistent with evidence on the correlates
of ex post returns (1989: 9). Haugen et al. (1991) established that the
main driver of stock returns was changes in volatility, and that
fundamental economic and financial factors were not the main drivers of
changes in volatility. In fact, they found that as few as one-quarter of
the volatility shifts are associated with the release of significant
(financial and economic) information.
For EVA to deliver the beef in terms of stock returns, market price
must recognize in an unbiased way the value creation process that
derives from implementing NPV positive (i.e., EVA positive) investment,
financing, and dividend decisions. Empirical evidence shows that notable
drivers of price include volatility (Shiller, 1989, 2000; Cutler et at.,
1989; Haugen et at., 1991), momentum (Chan et al., 1996; Moskowitz and
Grinblatt, 1999; Hong and Stein, 1999; Hong et al., 2000; Lee and
Swaminathan, 2000) and financial herding (Graham, 1999).
Research into volatility itself has stimulated research into
momentum and financial herding. Grinblatt et al. (1995), and Wermers
(1999) came to the conclusion that a large part of herding behaviour
occurs when investors "momentum-follow," and Nofsinger and
Sias (1999) found evidence that implicates the use of momentum
strategies by growth-oriented funds as an important source of herding.
What is worthy of note is that momentum and herding have a notable
impact on market price that is not related to economic or financial
fundamentals.
When volatility, herding and momentum are substantially present, as
so often seems to be the case, and when these phenomena have a much
greater impact on stock prices and stock returns than fundamental
economic and financial factors, a number of problems emerge for EVA.
Firstly, market values will not correspond to intrinsic values because
pricing is being driven by non-fundamental factors. Secondly, the use of
WACC, based as it is on market values and weights, is a highly
questionable practice, because of the manic-depressive nature of market
prices (Hagstrom, 1995; Loewenstein, 1995). In this regard, consider the
excesses of the Nikkei-Dow in the 1980s and early 1990s in comparison
with its levels in 2001. Consider also the excesses of the NASDAQ in
1999 and early 2000 in comparison with its levels in 2001, and the
gyrations of US blue chip stocks as reflected in the DJIA in recent
times.
In short, without a reliable CAPM and without a reliable WACC, how
can EVA be determined and implemented and associated with changes in
stock returns via MVA?
Dividends and Earnings. Fama and French (2001) report that the
proportion of firms paying cash dividends has declined from 66.5% in
1978 to 20.8% in 1999, and that the evidence shows this to be part of a
long-term process. For example, in every year from 1943 to 1962, more
than 82% of NYSE firms paid dividends; in 1951 and 1952 more than 90%
paid dividends, but with the addition of AMEX in 1963 the proportion of
dividend payers declined to 69.3%. This decline continued with the
addition of NASDAQ in 1973 (Fama and French, 2001). Clearly,
unprofitable firms and those with low earnings cannot pay dividends,
Investors have become more willing to hold the shares of small,
relatively unprofitable growth companies (Fama and French, 2001). As
dividends diminish, stocks returns are being driven increasingly by
swings in capital values.
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