It is no exaggeration to say that "modernity" has
suffered the death of a thousand cuts over the last few decades. Few who
spend much time thinking about how history instructs the present have
any stake in defending "modernity" as the sign of progress and
civility, and even the most Whiggish of those who plow the narrow fields
of academic politics ought to have at least a few reservations about the
way the last few centuries have unfolded. In other words, it is not
always easy to love the intellectual stance of the Enlightenment, which
while standing for reason and freedom in principle also stood for
arrogance and cynicism in practice, especially towards those ideas or
peoples whose principles or skins would not or could not be enlightened.
I will not rehearse the case against modernity -- and for the
uninitiated these papers provide some very good starting points -- but I
would like to comment on four key strands as they apply to the concept
of management, strands which, helpfully, the four papers in their t urns
have targeted: science, economy, politics, and ethics. After that, I
will take up the question that readers who have worked through these
papers might still be asking: So what must be done?
Science
"Management and Its Discontents" reaches back to the
stirrings of the Enlightenment ambition -- to conquer nature through
practical power. All of modernity -- the good and the bad -- emerges
from the productive arrogance that comes from this conceit, namely, that
God created an intelligible and rule-governed world for us to interpret
and remake. According to Bacon [1960: 39] in his central work, Novum
Organon, "Nature to be commanded must be obeyed." The goal of
the pioneer of scientific thought was to develop a rigorous method by
which one could leverage a knowledge of nature into a predictive
science, which in turn could be used to exert control over outcomes.
Knowledge for its own sake was rarely the point; the point was
instrumental knowledge, i.e., knowledge that had a view toward power and
works. But the problem with such a view, as we realize some 400 years
on, is that science is not founded on natural law but rather on natural
law as filtered through human thought and language. No matter how well
our descriptive models appear to latch onto the things themselves, human
desires, emotions, and imperatives are as much part of those
formulations as molecules and magnetic fields. This means that science
cannot be presumed to be "purer" than other areas of human
thought and endeavour; while it is doubtlessly the model for objective
and disinterested investigation -- science is nothing if not relentless
in its assertion of its own impartiality -- it only models that stance.
Science is made by humans; it does not make itself. By extension,
science cannot tell us how to manage nature or people -- although there
are plenty of managers who try to rise above the messiness of ideology
by buttressing their own ideology with the authority of neutral science.
Economics
The connection between science and another Enlightenment product,
capitalism, is the focus of "Branches for Roots." This essay
asks us to think what environmental management would look like if it
aimed at monitoring and sustaining the relationships between human and
non-human. Oh? Is that not exactly what it does do? Not really:
management aims at monitoring and sustaining the non-human for its
use-value to humans; it places all questions of the non-human within the
framework of a historically specific economic organization used to
distribute scarce goods. As Gifford Pinchot [1987: 325] rather coldly
observed, "There are just two things on this material earth --
people and natural resources." One thing modernity has done is make
it increasingly hard to imagine the "not-people" part of the
world as anything but resources -- fungible, tradable, liquid. When
everything can be bought and sold eventually everything will. Another
thing modernity has done is make the circulation of capital appear to be
a natural pro cess. So to conceive of "resources" as
non-resources is, first of all next to impossible, given that the market
works assiduously to affix all the world's contents with price
tags; and second, counterproductive, given that the market has become
the only mechanism by which those contents might be valued highly enough
to save them from the market. A perverse but coherent program, one that
the dismal science claims only to observe but in fact promulgates
remorselessly.
Politics
If the Project of Reason made democracy possible, it also sowed the
seeds for democracy's irrelevance. The complexity of modem
techno-society, with its vast networks of communication, finance,
information, and so on, required the emergence of a managerial class
that could take on the day-to-day running of the system. As a result of
complexity, fewer and fewer significant planning decisions are taken by
the polity or its elected representatives because the sorts of
deliberations suitable for such bodies cannot include those that are
time-sensitive or unconformable with the yea/nay coding structure of the
political system. As for the rest -- in other words, just about every
decision that counts -- on them the managerial sub-structure of the
political system goes to work. Autarchic bodies such as the WTO or the
IMF are the most visible incarnations of the management regime, but
behind the scenes in every jurisdiction are the silent bureaucracies
that churn out the reports and analyses, the rules and regulations that
so palpably affect the quotidian existences of humans and non-humans
alike. To the extent that green theory and practice participate in this
bureaucratization of the political imagination, to that extent they are
committed to business-as-usual. "The Obscured Potential of
Environmental Politics" argues that this consensual quietism can be
invigorated only by a rededication to the actual sources of open and
robust democracy: antagonism, partisanship, and dissensus. Environmental
activists should never work within the system to make it, so to speak,
see green; rather, they must work at the system to rearticulate the
bases of democratic decision-making. Without that kind of radicalism,
environmental politics comes to look much like what we see today: a
Potemkin village hiding the ongoing failure of activists to achieve
anything except at the edges of the environmental crisis.
Ethics
Zygmunt Bauman's sustained reflection on what it means to live
in a world without solid grounds -- a "modernity without
illusions," as he puts it -- is exemplary of the way we must think
through not just the possibility of management in a postmodern world but
how to formulate its ethics. Ethics -- the standards by which we measure
the good -- are at the heart of the management problem, for management
is always carried out with some version of the good in mind. When the
pursuit of the good is overshadowed by the pressures to implement
decisions things get especially confusing: then the imperative to
"get something done" eclipses the reasons why decisions were
to be taken in the first place. Process is important, but process
unmoored from rigorous attention to its ethical content -- no matter
that today this content is itself unmoored -- is by definition immoral.
Reading Bauman, for example, might prompt us to ask, What is the ethical
content of imagining the non-human world as a basket of natural
resources, or society as a basket of human resources? Although it is
easy to forget, those terms are metaphors -- and metaphors are never
innocent. To paraphrase Heidegger, metaphors speak, not the man. As the
Nazis showed, once people come to live by a metaphor as seductively
simple as "society is a garden," the injunction to begin
"weeding" can follow all-too easily. Some readers might find
tough to swallow Bauman's notion that the progressive
rationalization of the West really leads to the concentration camp; they
would prefer to believe that Hitler and Stalin's management
practices were aberrant, and they would point to non-Western despots
such as Pol Pot or Mao to refute the argument that embedded in the
metaphors of command and control are totalitarian predispositions. They
are right to point that out. But I would say what is far more
significant and disturbing is that the progressive rationalization of
the West did not make the concentration camp unthinkable. The march of
reason could easily conform to the gooseste p because there is no
ethical content to reason itself. That may come as a surprise to
scientists and managers alike who suppose their rationalizing goals
coincide with the evolution of the good. ("We come to know more
about how the universe hangs together; ergo, we are better people for
it.") But while Bacon said that a true science proceeds by
progressive correction, and while our understanding of nature will no
doubt continue to improve, what does not appear amenable to correction
-- at least not via the path of reason alone -- are the latencies of
power and arrogance that stand behind human motivations themselves. How
to be good to other people and the world is not a question the project
of reason can reasonably answer. The simple fact is that human societies
at a fundamental level are always at odds with their outside, whether
that outside is nature, another society, or the outside elements within
society. To put a finer point on it: society has yet to learn how it
might develop its own projects and capa cities without impoverishing
itself or its Others. Although there are millions of ways to soften the
human impact, that still leaves millions of impacts.
And So...
And so if after digesting this set of essay readers of Environments
ask themselves, How do we rid ourselves of this debilitating management
paradigm? then, albeit with the best of intentions, they are asking
themselves the wrong question. For "management" is not
something we can dispense with, despite the ills we have seen are
associated with it. To change from a management regime based on
confident control of natural or human resources to a regime that
explicitly denounced, overturned, or otherwise revolutionized the
concept of control tout court would not constitute the abolition of
management: we can only move from one form of management to another. But
a management regime that gave more than passing attention to its own
fallibility would be salutary, for it would be grounded in
humankind's boundless ignorance rather than its fragmentary and
fleeting knowledge. As these four papers have suggested, such a regime
would offer coping strategies rather than command and control; it would
open itself to the produ ctive clamor of dissensus; and it would parlay
its knowledge-gaps into humbleness and restraint before a universe that
continues to surprise. Ignorance, at least in the case of management, is
indeed strength.
In the case of environmental and resources management, already we
have seen long-reigning modern values (that gave us wise usage, prudent
stewardship, and steady-state modeling) giving way before postmodern
perspectives, which relieve managers of the obligation of being
All-Seeing Eyes but at the same time open up the troubling possibility
that sometimes the best management strategy is no management at all.
More searchingly, resources management has turned reflexively on itself
and discovered, belatedly, that to manage resources means that one has
already determined that they are to be used. Management becomes like the
doctor who rushes everywhere to help victims of an epidemic -- only to
discover that he himself is the plague-carrier. Therefore, the paradigm
shift required is not about doing this or that function better or
applying a new and improved set of yardsticks to the problems at hand.
Rather, it is about stepping back from a world we reduce in complexity
by our every intervention; it is about combati ng those forces within
management that make it an instrument not of environmental health but of
human avarice. To renounce instrumental reason goes against the grain:
it may entail knowing but not doing, or not knowing but still doing.
Either way, management as a predictive science has become much more
risky. But in bowing to its own ignorance it gives up its pose of
mastery, which is the very worst standpoint from which to manage the
world.
References
Bacon, Francis 1960 11620] The New Organon and Related Writings,
Fulton Anderson, ed. New York: The Liberal Arts Press.
Pinchot, Gifford 1987 [1947] Breaking New Ground Washington D.C.:
Island Press.
Andrew McMurry is an assistant professor of English at the
University of Waterloo
He specializes in American literature and the rhetoric of the
environment. He is the author of Environmental Renaissance: Emerson,
Thoreau, and the Systems of Nature (Georgia, 2003).
COPYRIGHT 2002 Wilfrid Laurier
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