Abstract
The participation of First Nations in New Brunswick forestry
involves complex issues, many of which stem from Aboriginal and
Euro-Canadian epistemological constructions of natural resources. Since
practice is closely related to mental constructs, the correspondence
between these structures has important political implications. Many in
the Aboriginal community believe their former existence was in harmony
with the natural environment but as Euro-Canadian constructs were
imposed, practice was drastically altered. Strategies emerged as various
groups chose different ways to deal with the changes. This paper
examines the strategies of traditional and contemporary Aboriginal
loggers, as well as provincial and Aboriginal governments' attempts
to exert control over the management of New Brunswick forests.
Au Nouveau-Brunswick, la participation des Premieres nations a la
foresterie s'accompagne de problemes complexes, souvent causes par
les constructions epistemologiques autochtones et euro-canadiennes de ce
que sont les ressources naturelles. Etant donne que la pratique est
etroitement associee aux constructions mentales, le lien entre ces
structures a d'importantes implications politiques. Dans la
collectivite autochtone, nombreux sont ceux qui croient que leur vie
passee etait en harmonie avec l'environnement naturel mais que la
pratique s'est considerablement modifiee lorsque les constructions
eurocanadiennes se sont imposees. Des strategies ont surgi,
correspondant aux facons de traiter avec ces changements des differents
groupes. Cet article examine les strategies des forestiers autochtones
traditionnels et contemporains, ainsi que les tentatives des
gouvernements provincial et autochtones d'exercer un controle sur
la gestion des forets du Nouveau-Brunswick.
Keywords
Aboriginal forestry, forest policy, First Nations,
Aboriginal-Euro-Canadian relations, epistemologies
Introduction
Since the 1990s, the management of natural resources in the
Maritimes has become the focus of much attention. In November 1997, an
appeal by the Province of New Brunswick, Regina v. Paul, ruled that the
provincial Crown lands were reserved for Aboriginal people and that they
have the right to harvest Crown resources. In April of 1998, the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal reversed the November decision and the
Aboriginal loggers were ordered to stop cutting. While the case
continues to be appealed in the Supreme Court of Canada, many Aboriginal
groups in New Brunswick have agreed to interim logging agreements with
the province that allow them to harvest 5% of the forest industry's
annual allowable cut on Crown land.
Constructions of the environment influence the ways in which
natural resources--such as forests--are managed. This paper examines how
traditional Aboriginal and Euro-Canadian constructions of the
environment developed and what occurred when Euro-Canadian constructs
were imposed on Mi'kmaq and Maliseet people. The paper also sets
the historical context behind the confusion and conflict seen in the
Aboriginal forestry practices of one first nation community. In
particular, through the example of one community, this paper highlights
the tensions that emerge as contemporary Aboriginal people struggle with
emerging and contradictory constructions of the environment, while set
within a context formed by the still dominant Euro-Canadian
construction. Finally, the paper offers recommendations for Aboriginal
forestry policy in New Brunswick.
Theoretical Perspectives
The ways in which groups of people perceive their natural
environment are socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann 1966) and
shaped by cultural traditions, beliefs, economics and, more recently, by
scientific management. As different groups live and work in their
respective environments, responding and adapting to the flow of seasons,
various ways and means of relating to the land emerge, producing
commonly sensed worlds. Interactions with other groups that have similar
beliefs and practices allow socially constructed relations with the
environment to gain objective status through the consensus of meaning
and practice. Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples inhabit, alter and
systematize their landscapes differently. Understandings of the land,
empowered by knowledge of rituals connected with particular sites, often
vary among those of different culture, age, education and gender
(Rapoport 1994), and these perceptions are not static. Although a
community's range of choices are initially shaped by the
environment, the culture then reshapes the environment in response to
those choices. The new, reshaped environment allows a different set of
possibilities for the reproduction of culture and new cycles of mutual
determination. Thus changes occur both in the cultural and ecological
relationships of particular places (Cronon 1983). However, these changes
are not random. Social systems bring order, understanding and
cohesiveness to practices through beliefs, societal norms and values.
New ideas and strategies may be incorporated but only if they fit into
the wider context of traditional practices (Berkes 1999). Innovative
practices and technology may be successfully adopted if social
organization and institutions remain in place (Wenzel 1991) but
inappropriate change
can bring disastrous results for both the social and ecological
order.
There are several examples of research relating to indigenous and
European relations to the land (Brody 1981, 1975; Cronon 1983) and to
the clash that occurs when European-based systems are imposed on
indigenous peoples (Tester and Kulchyski 1994, Povinelli 1993). In
addition, there is a growing body of information on contemporary
indigenous management systems (Davidson-Hunt et al. 2001, Berkes 1999,
Berkes and Folke 1998). Despite this growing literature very little
information exists regarding Aboriginal resource management practice on
the east coast of Canada. This paper helps to fill that gap. The
following sections briefly review the traditional Aboriginal
construction of land and resources, contrast this with the Euro-Canadian
construction of natural resources and then describe the tensions that
emerge in contemporary Aboriginal constructions.
Traditional Aboriginal belief and practice
For thousands of years, the Mi'kmaq and Maliseet people lived
within the area now known as the province of New Brunswick. As
predominately hunting and gathering societies, they actively managed
their resources with subsistence strategies maintained through
socio/political controls, reinforced through symbols and rituals
(Williams and Hunn 1982). Under traditional government, all major
decisions were made by consensus through the clans and were overseen by
a council of elders who gave guidance. Usufruct rights determined which
clan-based group used, and had responsibility for, their traditional
territories. Clan leaders were chosen for life and were responsible for
the long-term effects of resource use. Hunting, fishing and harvesting
by outsiders without permission was strongly resented and at times led
to altercations.
The traditional relationship between the people and the land relied
on the acquisition of knowledge and practices passed down over time and
across space. Oral traditions contained important information that was
communicated through "culturally coded interpretations of personal
and collective experience" abstracted from everyday situations
(Riddington 1990). Mythic events were perceived as essential truths that
established connections or associations and allowed an intimate
identification to take place. As a result there was and continues to be
a consistent and central belief among Mi'kmaq and Maliseet that the
Earth is a living, conscious being that must be treated with respect and
care. Oral culture, in the form of environmental myths and beliefs,
serves as a control mechanism that promotes the conservation of
resources as opposed to hoarding and the accumulation of wealth. Many
traditional Aboriginal people in the Maritimes believe that disease and
calamity are the result of the mistreatment of the environment and
disrespect shown to the beings that inhabit it.
The second source of traditional Aboriginal knowledge is everyday
experience or practice. Structured within the boundaries set by nature,
lifestyles and long-term strategies were established in which lands and
resources were cared for and improved while leaving minimum impact on
the diversity of forest lands. Through practical experience,
associations and interrelationships among species and environment were
noticed and added to local Aboriginal environmental knowledge. For
example, one Mi'kmaq elder explained,
... the old people say that when the choke cherry trees
blossom, the bass is coming in. And also when the fresh sea
trout is coming in the alder bush buds are the size of a
mouse's ear ... when the salmon come in the lightening bugs
follow them up river ... (Mi'kmaq elder, from interview
transcripts, 1997)
Environmental knowledge was applied to the natural environment and
aided in the utilization of many forest products. The Mi'kmaq and
Maliseet transplanted trees and fruits brought north from Massachusetts
and from Nova Scotia, thus promoting diversity and new growth.
Aboriginal people actively altered and improved the quality of the bark
from birch trees by periodically peeling off large sheets which would
result in the smooth quality of successive bark development used for
traditional purposes. Speck and Dexter (1951) record that Mi'kmaq
and Maliseet peoples had extensive knowledge and made use of an
impressive amount of timber and non-timber forest products. The forest
supplied food, clothing, shelter, transportation equipment, hunting and
trapping gear, cooking utensils, medicines, ceremonial supplies, leisure
materials and ornamental supplies. At times, Aboriginal peoples
manipulated the natural cycles through the use of fire to improve the
lands and quantity of the game present.
Euro-Canadian belief and practice
While the oral tradition and foundational myths of Aboriginal
people fostered attitudes of respect and conservation toward the
environment, the dominant Euro-Canadian foundational myth shaped a
different set of relationships. Foundational passages in the Bible
promote the idea that the natural world was made primarily for humans
who were to subdue and gain mastery over every plant and creature.
Humans alone were made in the image of God, while nature was seen as
being devoid of spirit and lacking in a transcendent quality. Following
from this view, it became acceptable to exploit nature without concern
for the feelings of natural beings (White 1973). As Europeans came to
the New World, this idea of nature as exploitable object expanded as the
secular and the sacred were fused in order for capitalism to succeed
(Weber 1905). By the late eighteenth century, theology gave way to a
belief in science. Nature was seen as being mechanical and without
anything comparable to the rational, moral or conscious qualities
ascribed to humans (Kinsley 1995). Europeans sought to know and control
the universal laws that ordered a thoroughly mechanized nature. The
resulting change was interpreted as progress, and North American history
was seen as a gradual conquest of the wilderness and a growing mastery
over its natural resources (Cronon 1983, Opie and Elliot 1996).
In the 20th century, instrumental rationality and science replaced
preexisting ways of knowing. Rationalization involved several
institutional factors. Science and technology systematically and
calculatively expanded the means available to understand and manipulate
nature. Science and technology required the use of specialized knowledge
and a reliance on experts. A stable workforce was created that was free
from tradition and sentiment in market transactions, and motivated by
calculated self-interest. Formal hierarchical and centralized
organizations transformed social action into organized, rational action.
As scientific rationality became fused to technology in the goal to gain
mastery over nature, the natural world came to be seen as malleable and
humans were released to (re)construct it to meet human needs and
capitalist economic objectives (Simmons 1993, Murphy 1994). These
processes can be seen in the Euro-Canadian scientific management of New
Brunswick forests. Forest harvesting activities began with a quest to
procure white pine for ship masts, and then moved to timber and
lumber-based industries (Regier and Baskerville 1986). Today the New
Brunswick forest industry focuses on pulp and paper.
When settlers came to New Brunswick in the 1600s, there was little
socio-economic differentiation and most participated in an
unspecialized, mixed economy. However, when trade with Britain became
the foundation of economic prosperity, lumber barons established berths
along major rivers to restrict the access of others and to monopolize
access to forest resources. With the expansion of sawmills and the cost
of investing in new technologies, a marked differentiation between the
workers and the mill owners became established (Wynn 1981). Gradually a
few well-connected and capitalized entrepreneurs came to dominate the
industry and provincial administrators maximized the efficiency of these
corporations by restricting opportunities for small entrepreneurs in
favour of large-scale capitalists (Parenteau 1994).
By the 1920s, a newly centralized and concentrated pulp and paper
industry had emerged. To attract modern industry, the government
realized that a high level of government sponsorship was required, even
if these expenditures meant stifling the development of other
industries. The forest industry required governments that were
supportive of corporate strategies. These industrial firms demanded and
received more tenure and control over forest and water resources. By the
middle of the century, more than two-thirds of New Brunswick's
Crown land had passed into the control of six multinational corporations
(Parenteau 1994). The pulp and paper companies owned by the corporations
came to hold incredible power in communities because of high levels of
unemployment and a severe lack of alternative employment opportunities
(Sandberg 1992: 11).
Contemporary Aboriginal strategies of forest management
Traditional Aboriginal and Euro-Canadian strategies merge in
varying degrees within the complex constructs of contemporary
Mi'kmaq and Maliseet people. Traditional Aboriginal management
strategies changed when Euro-Canadians created the concept of "the
Indian" and imposed the Indian Act in an effort to accelerate the
'civilization' and assimilation of Aboriginal people into
Euro-Canadian society (Miller 1991). Before the Indian Act, native
subsistence and management strategies remained relatively stable
resulting in the production of a commonly experienced and enacted world.
As Euro-Canadian structures were forced upon Aboriginal societies,
two somewhat distinct strategies of thought and practice emerged and
continue to operate today. The first is a reconstructed traditional
strategy that advocates a return to natural law and the values of the
elders, emphasizing respect toward the environment and subsequently
promoting the conservation of natural resources and ecological
diversity. This strategy presents Aboriginal people as the
"original conservationists".
The second set of strategies revolves around the historical
circumstances associated with the term "Indian." In exchange
for the use of natural resources on what is now designated as Crown
land, the government--in acknowledgment of its fiduciary responsibility
to Aboriginal people--provides federal money to reserves in the form of
annual payments. The lack of independent economic resources and services
on reserves fosters a dependence on aid and compensation programs from
the federal government, which are used to provide services and
employment (Ginnish 1993). Once Aboriginal people become reliant on such
outside funding, the federal government is able to manipulate band
politics, for example, by withholding funds in election years, by
causing turnovers in the elected leadership, and by forcing band
councils to sign controversial agreements (Blakney 1998).
With the imposition of the Indian Act, traditional ways, such as
holistic thinking, consensual decision-making, and an emphasis on
homogeneity of knowledge and skills were suppressed. In its place came
an emphasis on process, specialization, centralization, hierarchical
government, accounting and efficiency. This meant that
"Indians" had to learn and respond to Euro-Canadian
rationalization strategies. The imposition of Euro-Canadian structures
continues to distort Aboriginal societies and relations. Chiefs and
councils are caught between two worlds, left with no reasonable way in
which to handle the many contradictory situations they are presented
with. Both strategies, the reconstructed traditional person and the
"Indian," operate together on federally-created reserves with
each strategy dominating at different times and in different
circumstances, often within the same individual. The playing out of
these strategies creates a confusing paradox for both the Aboriginal
people experiencing it and for the non-native observer.
Many contemporary Mi'kmaq and Maliseet people understand
themselves as the original inhabitants of the land. They also understand
that land is essential to the sustainability of their way of life,
including the protection of their culture, language and resources. They
describe themselves as citizens of New Brunswick and of North America,
yet they do not consider themselves to be Canadian. Rather, they are
part of the Algonquin Nation that spreads down as far as the Delaware
region in the United States, and they do not recognize the US/Canadian
border. This relationship, they maintain, has never been legally
altered. All lands in New Brunswick still belong to their Aboriginal
inhabitants because there have been no treaties in which land has been
formally ceded. There have only been friendship treaties.
Many Mi'kmaq and Maliseet people maintain that they were
alienated from the land when they became wards of the federal
government. Since the provincial government had no jurisdiction or
responsibility to Aboriginal people, they became outcasts in the
province. Since the 1980s, Aboriginal frustration with the provincial
government has resulted in a move toward civil disobedience in order to
attempt to change the laws and to draw attention to their situation. In
particular, exclusion from the lucrative forest industry has led to an
effort to bring about change. In 1995, following an act of protest,
Thomas Peter Paul was charged with illegally harvesting bird's-eye
maple on Crown land. Although the charge was eventually dismissed, the
province was dissatisfied with the outcome and appealed the decision. In
November of 1997, Justice John Turnbull ruled in Regina v. Paul, that
the provincial Crown lands were reserved for the Mi'kmaq and
Maliseet of New Brunswick and that they had the right to harvest Crown
resources.
After the announcement of the Turnbull decision in November of
1997, two to three hundred Aboriginal people in New Brunswick began to
harvest wood on Crown land. They purchased machinery and sub-contracted
machinery and skills of non-Aboriginals, anticipating a prosperous
future in which they would be able to economically provide for their
families. Unfortunately, during this period of sudden access, the
Aboriginal community did not have the chance to institute proper social
or economic regulations, guidelines, or training programs for wood
harvesters. Some Aboriginal harvesters were cutting wherever they
wanted, indiscriminately felling all types of trees.
The reaction of the Euro-Canadian community was swift. Opposition
was mounted by the large forestry corporations, some of which refused to
buy wood cut by Aboriginal loggers. Threats of physical violence against
Aboriginal loggers and confiscation of their trucks and equipment were
common (Kennedy 1998). Non-native tempers flared and a provincial
Minister made an improbable announcement that in the space of a few
months, native loggers had undone 16 years of forest development and
management undertaken in partnership by his department and the forest
industry (Graham 1998). As First Nation chiefs met with the Premier in
an attempt to develop a Forest Management Strategy, groups of
independent native logger associations sprung up, jostling for the
opportunity to represent the interests of Aboriginal people.
This confusing period ended prematurely when the question of rights
was decided by the courts in another ruling. In April of 1998, the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal reversed the November decision and the
Aboriginal loggers were ordered to cease cutting (The Telegraph Journal
1998). In a statement by the Premier's office (Government of New
Brunswick 1998) Aboriginal people were urged to negotiate an agreement
whereby the Mi'kmaq and Maliseet communities would be allotted 5%
of the annual cut, which would be deducted from the wood supply of New
Brunswick's forestry companies. Through this 5% plan an estimated
14 million dollars would be injected into 15 Aboriginal communities
within the province. Several First Nation communities negotiated
agreements with the province and experienced varying degrees of success.
The remainder of this paper discusses the forestry experiences of one
reserve that encountered unanticipated difficulties from conflicting
constructions of natural resources that emerged on federally-created
reserves. The discussion illustrates the contradictions that
contemporary Aboriginals face in coping with the two worlds. Names and
numerical data specific to the First Nation have been altered to protect
their privacy. However, names of Aboriginal cultural groups
(Mi'kmaq and Maliseet) and provincial government officials are
unchanged.
Methods
In the fall of 1998, I was contacted by the councillor in charge of
lands and forests at Two Rivers First Nation (2) and asked to conduct
research on the current forestry situation under the interim logging
agreement, to document recent events, and make recommendations toward
the development of an Aboriginal forestry program. The active
collaboration of the people at Two Rivers was sought in the research and
complementary information and interviews were also obtained from
traditional people and natural resources personnel from two other
Maritime reserves. First-hand observations and interviews were conducted
with those involved in Aboriginal forestry at Two Rivers. Those
interviewed included: traditional leaders who provided knowledge
regarding their Aboriginal relationships to the land and methods of
forest management; members of the band council who were involved in the
implementation of forestry activities under the Interim Agreement; the
coordinators from Two Rivers and the Department of Natural Resources;
Two Rivers loggers; the regional Warrior chief; and an enforcement
officer from the RCMP. The information gathered from interviews and
observations was supplemented with an extensive literature review of
both published and unpublished materials pertaining to Mi'kmaq and
Maliseet relationships to the land and to forestry in New Brunswick.
Two Rivers First Nation: their story (3)
In mid 1998, Two Rivers negotiated a 'Without Prejudice'
Interim Harvesting Agreement to help calm the dispute while awaiting the
final outcome of the Supreme Court decision. (4) Two Rivers gained
access to 45,000 cubic metres of Crown timber with an estimated value of
$2.5 million. Although the chief and councillors were uncomfortable
negotiating with the province, some council members thought the
agreement would facilitate a move towards sustainability and
co-management of the resource. These councillors wanted their leaders to
make careful plans regarding the harvesting of forest resources in
cooperation with provincial forestry strategies.
After the agreement was negotiated, First Nation Forestry (5) was
established and operated out of the Two Rivers band office. Two
coordinators were to be appointed, one representing New Brunswick's
Department of Natural Resources (DNR), the other an Aboriginal person
from Two Rivers. Two Rivers had appointed an experienced coordinator
earlier, during the Turnbull cutting period. However, once an agreement
had been signed and logging had been opened up to all individuals, the
appointment of a coordinator became a highly politicized issue. Both the
career loggers and the new loggers pressured the band council to appoint
different coordinators who would represent their respective goals and
interests. Chief Peters felt pressure from the DNR to appoint a
coordinator quickly. According to the band councillors, this pressure
resulted in Peters making a quick and uninformed decision to appoint a
close relative as coordinator. The chief's relative was also on the
band council and one of the new loggers. As occurs on many reserves,
positions of power are often occupied by close family members (Ginnish
1993), which can be seen as a carryover from times when clan-based
governments were responsible for major decisions. Chief Peters claimed
that he never thought about conflict of interest or the improper
management practices that this appointment could produce. Several
decisions made during this time were done quickly and without proper
consultation and the results of these decisions caused problems
throughout the interim period.
Two regional forestry companies provided the coordinators with
forest blocks, which were scheduled for harvesting according to their 25
year Forest Management Plan. All blocks were predominately balsam fir
and designated for clear-cuts only. Aboriginal loggers were assigned
clear-cut blocks because many did not have cutting experience and the
DNR claimed they were concerned for the logger's safety. On this
premise a hasty decision was made to use delimbers; large, expensive
pieces of forestry equipment used for clear-cutting operations in order
to quickly remove limbs from trees. Due to the size and lack of
mobility, delimbers must remain on roadways and trees have to be hauled
out of the woods to the road for processing. Many people at Two Rivers
were uncomfortable with these decisions--they would have preferred to
use selective cutting practices, leaving smaller trees to mature. Some
community members complained that clear-cutting would leave nothing in
the woods for the future. Also the heavy machinery was expensive and
required specialized skills. However, many on the band council were
concerned that if they did not comply with the DNR's regulations,
clear-cutting and using the delimber, they would lose their share of the
provincial 5% allotment and the financial benefits that accompanied it.
Two Rivers' 45,000 cubic metre allotment was designed to
accommodate approximately 18 skidders, each with a three person crew,
for a period of ten months. During the first few weeks of the interim
agreement there were all--Aboriginal crews in the woods operating 11
skidders and chainsaws. While some Aboriginal logging crews had over 15
years of experience, some had no experience at all. Several new loggers
purchased skidders at a cost of $125,000-$150,000 each, financed through
banks on the basis of contracts that had been negotiated with the pulp
and paper companies. Councillors also ordered skidders under the name of
the Two Rivers band council.
Selling Aboriginal-cut wood to the companies was not considered to
be a problem. The DNR gave Mi'kmaq and Maliseet communities 5% of
the allowable Crown wood allocation, which came off another
licencee's allocation. Since the companies needed this 5% to keep
their mills running within the usual profit margin, it was in their best
interest to buy back the 5% from the Aboriginal loggers and not have to
purchase it elsewhere. Hardwood was especially lucrative and the larger
companies were willing to compete for it.
From the beginning of the agreement, some council members claimed
that they were uneasy because of the chief's lack of experience in
forestry and with forest policy.
The chief, he's not a technician. He's unaware of all the
forestry terminology and the jargon that's involved. He says
"Oh, yeah, we're going to sign the agreement, anybody can
cut in any red zone." But in the red zone, that's the wood that
has to be cut under the management plan of the province....
And those are areas that have to be cut over the next five
years. And so the chief says, "Oh yeah, when we sign this
agreement, you can work year round. And I want all the
people to get involved with the forestry, and I want that 5% to
be cut as soon as possible. Then we can get more land from
the province to cut. We want to prove to the province that 5%
is not enough. And I want everybody to get involved and I
want 50 skidders out there." And you know that was the
message. And we were telling the chief, "No, don't say that."
And he didn't know. He quoted and instructed the people and
they were all mistaken policies (Band Councillor, from
interview transcripts, 1999).
Several weeks into the agreement a request was made to have
seasoned non-Aboriginal loggers from Quebec come in and train the Two
Rivers loggers how to operate the skidders and how to use proper felling
techniques with chainsaws. Although some council members did not agree
with subcontracting to non-Aboriginals, they did not want to speak out
against those who did. Almost immediately, there was a dramatic increase
in non-Aboriginal loggers working the Two Rivers' allotments. Three
months into the agreement, the number of skidders increased from 11 to
36 despite clear statements that there would be no more allotments
assigned if the harvest was completed early. The councillor in charge of
Two Rivers land and forests tried to limit the number of non-Aboriginal
people involved in the harvest. He asked the DNR for help, but the DNR
coordinator claimed that the department decided not to challenge the
decision to allow the use of non-Aboriginal harvesters because the Human
Rights Commission would probably rule against them. The perceived
inaction on this issue and the lack of support from DNR was very
frustrating for several members of the council and for many Aboriginal
loggers.
Another problem was the issue of council members taking allotments
for themselves and then subcontracting the harvesting work to
non-Aboriginals. Council members normally bring home around $600 a week
for serving on the band council. When these members took allotments and
signed major contracts with non-native logging companies, it created
resentment among many community members. It was also suspected that
major forest corporations paid several Two River residents for the use
of their names and positions to get access to timber and then used
non-Aboriginal loggers to do all the cutting and hauling. Even when
non-Aboriginal loggers were doing the cutting and hauling Aboriginal
loggers had to stay on site in case there were any questions asked and
were required to spray the cut wood with identification markings.
Differing arrangements were made with the imported Quebec crews, some
contracts called for a 50/50 split, others for a 40/60 split. This meant
that 40% went for the skidder while 60% went to the Aboriginal cutter
who had to pay all of the crew members' wages, their travel costs,
the capital required for road building, bulldozing and loading charges.
The arrangement was especially difficult because the Quebec crews had
high expectations for their wages.
Near the end of the third month, a career cutter approached First
Nation Forestry and asked them to put a stop to the out-of-province
equipment and crews because most of the profit was going to "the
Quebeckers" and not benefiting Aboriginal people. In response to
this request a spokesperson for First Nation Forestry said that they did
not know how to ask the Quebec crews to leave without causing major
disruptions. This response resulted in the councillor in charge of Two
Rivers' lands and forests approaching Doug Tyler's office
(Minister of Natural Resources) to request an additional Aboriginal
allocation. The council knew that the band's allotment was near
completion and once again wondered about the possibility of securing the
allocations of other bands who had refused to enter into the interim
agreement. The minister reportedly entertained the idea of increasing
the Two Rivers allocation. However, at this time his office started to
receive complaints about the way the allocations were given out,
including accusations of favouritism, mismanagement and corruption. The
band councillors understood that the DNR would do nothing for Two Rivers
until the situation was rectified, but they did not know what action to
take or how to proceed.
In the last month of cutting, there were as many as 53 skidders
working in the woods. Once again, Doug Tyler's office was
contacted--this time by the regional Warrior chief who said, "If
you don't do something about the people that's working on the
Crown Land--the French people--we're going out there and we'll
get rid of them!" Warriors in the district had been put on
stand-by. The band council was divided down the middle on what should be
done. Half of the council said that they strongly disagreed with the
over-cutting, the amount of money going to off reserve harvesters and
the effects this was having on Aboriginal career loggers. They wanted
the Quebec crews removed legally without calling in the Warriors, but
they were concerned that the Department of Natural Resources would not
support them. However, several councillors, representing the views of
the other half of the council, were the ones who had hired the Quebec
crews and they were reluctant to call for their removal. Finally, the
regional Warrior chief gave the DNR an ultimatum: "get the Quebec
crews out or the Warriors will remove them." At that point the
Quebec crews decided to leave voluntarily without incident.
The following week, the DNR announced that 90% of the band's
allocation had been completed and that there would be only one week of
cutting left before the 1998 allocation would be finished. Since the DNR
specified the limit temporally instead of spatially, no limit was set on
the quantity of wood left to be cut. This resulted in harvesters putting
in longer days and substantially over-cutting the 5% allocation. (6)
Although the Two Rivers allotment was meant to last for 10 months,
all wood specified in the interim logging agreement had been harvested
after only four months. The early completion of the allotment did not
harm many of the new loggers who just began to work in the woods over
that summer. Many of the new loggers were on the band council and had
salaries coming in from other jobs. However, it did seriously affect the
career loggers who had spent most of their lives in the woods, and it
especially hurt those with heavy financial burdens from buying logging
equipment. Concern was expressed over what the career loggers were going
to do over the winter months. While career loggers tried to find work on
other reserves, the new harvesters with heavy financial burdens started
to cut the limited forest lands at Two Rivers. These loggers represented
the poor because the loggers who made large profits in the woods were in
a position to sit back and wait until the next allocation. However,
there were some reserve members who, although poor, were too
conscientious to cut on the reserve and others who did not cut for fear
of community reprisals.
The Interim Agreement: Aboriginal reflections
Aboriginal access to New Brunswick forestry under the "1998
'Without Prejudice' Interim Harvesting Agreement" turned
out to be a bitter-sweet experience for the people of Two Rivers.
Looking back, the members of the band council and Aboriginal logging
community felt the need to reflect on and analyze the various problems
and situations that emerged under the agreement in the hopes of being
better prepared for future arrangements with the Province of New
Brunswick. The following section represents their thoughts and
reflections as indicated in the interview transcripts.
The people of Two Rivers see the federal government as being
instrumental in the mismanagement of forestry under the interim
agreement because of the imposition of the Indian Act and the resulting
structure which continues to shape and constrain Aboriginal-federal
relations.
How did he [the government] get to legislate over us?
Through the Indian Act, when he declared us to be in the
same category as the insane. He's telling you, "you're all nuts.
Your opinion doesn't matter. We're the ones that are going to
make the laws that are going to govern you!". Well now he's
not just saying it--you're agreeing to it by putting your
signature on these agreements! No wonder you don't open
your mouth anymore. In it, it says that you can't hold Indian
Affairs responsible for anything that happens while this
agreement is in effect. The next clause says you can't even
hold the band councillors responsible. So who in heirs
responsible? Who are these people answerable to? (Two
Rivers female elder, interview transcripts, 1999).
This same elder noted that through the Indian Act the federal
government set up a welfare system for unemployed Aboriginal people, but
this was not welfare money. Many Mi'kmaq and Maliseet people
consider it to be treaty money. The friendship treaties were never
abolished and there was never a treaty surrendering sovereignty.
However, the elder quoted above contends that every time the chiefs and
councils sign agreements with the government they are agreeing that the
government has the power to legislate over them.
The provincial government and DNR are also seen by the chief and
council as major factors in the conflict. It is believed by many
Aboriginal people that the province does not want them to succeed and
achieve self-determination or self-government because the province would
lose control of the money generated by the forestry industry. This
situation means that the political will is not there to devise policies
that will allow Aboriginal people to have control over their economic
destiny. The role of the DNR under the agreement was to ensure that
Aboriginal people obtained forestry training, but no training occurred.
Instead highly specialized people and equipment were brought in from
Quebec and skills were kept in the hands of non-natives.
A major concern that presented itself was that the chief (and other
members of the council) had no practical experience in forestry.
However, despite this lack of practical skill, according to the Indian
Act, the duly elected chief is the only person with whom the government
will deal. The long-time loggers and members of the community said that
they should have had experienced people making decisions about the
forests and the allotment. Although knowledgeable people existed and
indeed some were on the council at Two Rivers, they were very hesitant
to go against the chief and the more powerful council members. On
reserves, everything is done by political appointment and the decision
makers are usually elected from the largest extended family group.
Traditionally, clan-based leaders were also chosen to make decisions,
but only in areas where they excelled. For example, the best hunter
within the family group was often chosen to make decisions relating to
hunting and trapping. Different leaders were chosen when other skills
were required. However, on many contemporary reserves, leaders are not
elected according to merit, but according to their perceived ability to
help the extended family and to deal with dominant governmental
structures. Therefore, it is possible for people with university degrees
in forestry or management to be supervised by those with no experience
in either, and there is little accountability to the people or the
federal and provincial governments for these decisions.
The loggers understood the chief and council to say in an open
meeting that the loggers could decide how the royalties from the
forestry were to be used. The loggers decided that it should go toward
the creation of new facilities and programs for elders, youth and the
disabled. However, no money went to those facilities and programs.
Instead, the chief reallocated the royalties to cover the band's
financial obligations. Forestry royalties went toward past debts
incurred for a daycare centre, winter supplements for heat and
electricity, and financial support for university students. This
allocation caused confusion and anger because loggers believed that the
royalties would go into new programs.
Within the forestry agreement, there were problems with conflicts
of interest and a general lack of accountability measures for band
council leaders. The forestry agreement did not include attention to the
institutional support needed to prevent abuse to the forests or an
equitable distribution of the economic benefits. Incidences, such as the
chief appointing a close relative as the interim coordinator (mentioned
earlier), the lack of training for new loggers and the unregulated
hiring of non-Aboriginal Quebec crews demonstrated a lack of
organization and support. This situation led to wide spread perceptions
that the elected officials and employees of the band were taking the
largest share of what was intended for their people.
Misunderstandings arose over the status of the Two Rivers loggers
and their salaries. According to the band council, all Aboriginal
loggers were independent. Information concerning an individual's
financial earnings was private. However, some band members understood
that the agreement was a communal arrangement, therefore the information
should have been public and the community as a whole should have
benefited.
Although many reserve members believed that all Crown lands
belonged to them, the Two Rivers' land and forests councillor
argued that some reserve members misunderstood the traditional
Aboriginal concept of inherent right. The councillor understood that
Aboriginal people had an inherent right to the land, but this right came
with a responsibility to ensure that it was sustained for future
generations. Aboriginal lands were to be held collectively and could not
become the property of individuals with the right to cut as they saw
fit. Rather, land use decisions were to be made collectively through
community-based consensus processes. However, some members of the
reserve interpreted their communal traditions through the lens of
representative democracy, arguing that it was the elected band officials
who had the responsibility to properly care for the woods and if they
failed in their custodial duties people had the right not to re-elect
them. Still other reserve members argued that consensus should be
reached through the clan system that forms the foundation of their
traditional government, while others adopted an individualist position
advocating for the rights of individual reserve members to decide what
should be done in their forest.
Conclusions and recommendations
New Brunswick Aboriginal forestry involves many complex issues.
Although the Turnbull decision catapulted the situation into public
consciousness, many of the factors that precipitated the crisis have
been in existence since the creation of the Indian Act--questions
concerning the legitimacy of the Canadian government to legislate over
Aboriginal people, tensions between traditional and elected leaders,
partial and reinterpreted views of traditional practices, racial
tensions between Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal groups, and ultimately the
control and management of natural resources.
The clash that resulted within New Brunswick forests is not simply
a collision between two realities (Euro-Canadian and traditional
Aboriginal) but of two hybrid realities--the reconstructed traditional
Aboriginal and the federal Indian. Traditional people want to adhere to
the values and teaching of the elders and are concerned with holistic
thinking, consensual decision-making, relatively egalitarian
relationships and an emphasis on traditional knowledge in the service of
the conservation and preservation of natural resources. On the other
hand, the Indian has to learn how to cope with a system characterized by
centralized hierarchical relationships, specialization, and economic
efficiency. Chiefs and councils are often caught between the federal
government and their own people, and are routinely forced to choose
between Euro-Canadian and traditional Aboriginal values and practices.
These socially constructed worlds and relations are not static but are
constantly subjected to new experiences that reshape conceptions of the
past and present and allow for moderate adaptations.
Although the experience of Two Rivers was tragic, it also holds
promise for future understanding and cooperation. As Aboriginal people
gain increasing access and control over their resources, two main
choices are becoming available. First, many Aboriginal communities are
entering into co-management agreements with industry or with the
provincial government. In most of these co-management agreements,
Aboriginal participation in the decision mak