Understanding strategy: why is strategy so difficult?

"Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy. "

--Clausewitz (1976: 178)

As academics, our first responsibility is to teach strategy to students who are then expected to use their skills out in the real world. A key concern we have recognized is that the word strategy means different things to different people. These differences in the meaning and conceptualization of strategy affect both academics as well as practitioners. According to Bongiorno (1993), there is neither a pattern in the way the subject is taught, nor is there any consensus on the definition of strategy. As Bongiorno (1993) points out, top universities in the country have entirely different methods of teaching strategy to business students. Some universities require MBA students to take a number of courses, while others require a single capstone course, and yet others have no strategy courses at all. The confusion surrounding the definition of strategy is another case in point.

In this paper, we do not aim to resolve all the differences that currently exist, nor do we make suggestions about how strategy should be imparted. Rather, we seek to highlight some of the difficulties that beset strategists in the field. Overall, we set ourselves two tasks in writing this paper. One is to have a better understanding as to why strategy is so inherently difficult. Two is to develop a framework at a fairly high level of abstraction from which strategizing can be conceptualized and extended. In order to develop the paper, we will (1) discuss learning and learning to learn; (2) examine the factors that make strategy so difficult; (3) the complexity, themes, and contexts of strategy; and finally (4) develop a framework to strategize. We end with a discussion section that summarizes the main points of this paper.

LEARNING AND LEARNING TO LEARN

In addition to differing definitions of strategy and the way the subject matter is taught, it is useful to examine the frameworks that have been popularized. Given that the field is highly dynamic, fluid, and complex, we take a critical view of the subject and examine some of the structures that the discipline leans on. To start with, we note that almost all strategy textbooks have a standardized way of presenting the discipline. The typical format starts with a general definition of strategy, followed by an examination of the internal and external environments, corporate strategy, portfolio management, business unit strategy, implementation, and control, and so on. Vital issues in the field like the internet, technology, globalization, domestic and foreign regulations, social forces, culture and history, the WTO, domestic and foreign interest groups, local and national politics in the international environment, and a host of relevant factors are either glossed over or simply not addressed. We do not pay enough attention about how to think about the thinking process itself.

The content of strategy that is taught does not address the many factors that exist in the real world. In the absence of an understanding of the impact of these vital issues, students are imparted a simplistic knowledge about how the world of business works. We do not create conditions to more fully incorporate the factors that take into account how the world works. Finally, we do not pay enough attention about how to think about the thinking process itself. Our knowledge, as a consequence is limited. It is important, at this point, to examine our knowledge of strategy, how it is taught, and how it is used.

From an epistemological point of view, work in cognitive psychology (Gaskins & Elliot, 1991; Palinscar & Brown, 1989; Liedtka & Rosenblum, 1998) has identified three distinct categories of knowledge. These categories are:

1. Content knowledge--How the world works;

2. Cognitive knowledge--How to think about how the world works; and

3. Metacognitive knowledge--How to think about the thinking process itself.

With its focus on content, the teaching of strategy has focused primarily on the first category with a lesser emphasis on the second, and almost none on the third. There has, therefore, been on a heavy reliance on teaching and mastering analytical techniques like SWOT analysis, portfolio management, competitor analysis, and industry structure analysis. A programmed approach to thinking has been taking place (Liedtka & Rosenblum, 1998), and the emphasis has been teaching students to think in terms of content knowledge in an essentially single-loop learning process (Argyris, 1985; Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985).

Strategy students tend to get the impression that all business strategy can be conceptualized and encapsulated within the content of the prevailing paradigm--an unlikely, inaccurate, and incomplete version of reality. Students expect business problems to be understood, explained, and controlled through the repertoire of the frameworks and models that they have assimilated. Students, consequently, conceptualize each technique to be discreet and "not as a part of an overall pattern of thinking" (Liedtka & Rosenblum, 1998:294). More importantly, strategy students develop a blind spot or are unable to correctly decipher those aspects of the business world that reside outside of their paradigm. This is especially critical because the fast-paced and complex environment of business bears little resemblance to the more artificial, organized, and simplified academic world. Changing contexts imply that managers must be ready to consider, develop, and implement different ways of managing (Dunbar, Garud, and Raghuram, 1996). Paradoxically, according to Dunbar et al. (1996), when managers face turbulence in the environment, their training is to assume contextual stability with a preference for incremental adjustments in keeping with this assumed stability. Dunbar et al. go on to state:

Works such as Porter's, for example, assume a particular type

of stable, institutional context. By assuming a stable context,

Porter can focus on a limited number of criteria for assessing

effectiveness and proceed to identify categories of variables that

may affect achievement according to these criteria. By being

repeatedly presented to students in MBA programs, to

executives in corporate training programs, and to participants at

academic conferences, such work establishes a frame defining

how people think, what they think about, and what they believe

they should be thinking about. Through these repeated diffusion

efforts, specific ways of thinking become gradually

institutionalized as being the generally recognized and the

appropriate way to see, assess and act. Repeated presentation of

Porter's work, for example, illustrates how a particular

approach to strategic decisions emphasizing profit making can

become institutionalized and significantly affect both practice

and research. (1996:24)

Metacognitive knowledge--how to think about the thinking process itself--is barely addressed or taught in most academic institutions. It is the most neglected category of the three distinct categories of knowledge that have been identified. We argue that we need to step out and step back from what we term as strategy and examine the field with all its complexity and interdependent forces. We believe that metacognitive knowledge is one solution to remedy the over-emphasis on content driven strategy. Metacognitive thinking, essentially double-loop learning (Argyris, 1985; Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985), suggests that students move beyond thinking about the design of strategies, and to think about the design of the process for thinking about those strategies. Double-loop learning moves the analytic techniques at the cognitive level, but connects them more powerfully to a context (Liedtka & Rosenblum, 1998). In addition to the double-loop insight, Dunbar et al. (1996) suggest that popular frames in strategy should be subject to deframing. Deframing is important because people generally do not know how to abandon the ways of thinking and acting that they have learned to rely on and are not even aware that it is an issue (Torbert, 1991).

WHY IS STRATEGY SO DIFFICULT?

In discussing the intractable and complex nature of strategy, we closely analyze the cognitive and metacognitive knowledge aspects of strategy. Consequently, we are constrained to think about how to think about how the world works, and also about how to think about the thinking process itself. However, in order to understand strategy better, we explore the roots from where the field has emerged and evolved--the military. In our search for material, we came across the work of Gray (1996, 1999a, 1999b) that provided us with a considerable insight into the subject. In developing this section, we borrow from Gray's work, and are indebted to his research. We examine the militaristic perspective of strategy presented by Gray, and adapt it, to the extent possible, to the world of business and competitive dynamics. In this section, we examine the complexity, themes, and contexts of strategy.

The Complexity of Strategy

Gray (1996, 1999a) mentions that superior strategic performance is hard to achieve, let alone sustain, because strategy is so complex. Gray (1996) suggests that there are a number of reasons why this is so. One, competence in strategy requires mastery of a particularly challenging complexity. The strategist needs to know what is tactically and operationally feasible in different (geographic and competitive) environments; what success or failure in each environment (or activity) contributes to performance in other environments; what it means for strategic performance; and the long-term impact on the viability of the organization.

Two, by its very nature, strategy is more complex and demanding on the intellect and imagination than any other functional or component level activity like logistics, production, marketing, inventory, or purchasing. The strategist has to transcend simple or functional categories of thought. The strategist's task is not to create wise policies or schemes of action, but rather to connect policy and action.

Three, it is very difficult to teach people to be competent, let alone outstanding, strategists. It is very difficult to have mastery over strategy (general management) as well as operational (functional) competence. This is, because it is extraordinarily difficult, perhaps impossible, to train strategists. Success in strategy calls for a quality of judgement that cannot be taught. There is scope for individual ability or aptitude at the tactical and operational levels where sound training for consistently superior performance can be provided. Strategic excellence cannot be taught the same way. Strategy inherently requires understanding of the two-way relationship between capability (resources and components) and purpose (the objective of the corporation). Strategy requires understanding of how different components can generate the effectiveness that will have useful consequences. The necessary truths about strategy are almost too easy to state; they are very difficult to put into consistently successful practice. In other words, the intellectual mastery of the principles of strategy is probably helpful, but is no guarantee of success (Jomini, 1992).

Four, strategy places unique physical and moral burdens on leaders. Potential physical and moral hindrances to sound performance increases with increased responsibility. Because strategy involves dealing with all aspects of the relevant environment, the maximum possible number of things can go wrong. In the world of strategists, as opposed to the world of tacticians, there is much more scope for error.

Five, is the role of friction. Strategists may overlook, underrecognize, or underestimate sources of friction, and the will, skill, and commitment of a determined and intelligent adversary. Friction is the only concept that distinguishes what is real from what is planned on paper (Clausewitz, 1976). It is the unpredicted and unwanted changes in state that are initially very small that can have massively non-linear consequences (Ruelle, 1991; Kellert, 1993). Clausewitz, the great military strategist suggests "Friction, as we choose to call it, is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult. Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war" (1976:119). The fundamental reason why friction can be so damaging at the strategic level is because, by definition, that level must accommodate, integrate, and direct all of the activities of the corporation. The strategist will encounter the effects of friction from the world of policy, and from all the geographically and functionally specialized components that are performing tactically, operationally, and logistically. At the strategic level of performance there is much that can go wrong.

The Themes in Strategy

The first fundamental theme of strategy is its ubiquity. All organizational activities are inherently connected with and by strategy to the essential unity, intent, and purpose of the enterprise. The outcome is independent of policy, motive, or vision. Poor, negative, or unintended strategic effect lies within the scope of strategy. Resources that are wasted on the expensive pursuit of unworthy tactical or operational objectives have an effect on the overall strategic outcome (Spector, 1993). Additionally, resources that are tactically misused may also be strategically wasted and may, in turn, have strategic implications.

The second important theme is that preparation for and conduct of strategy has to be pervasively joint (Powell, 1993)--that is it must be inter-unit, inter-discipline, inter-department, and inter-resource. In short, organizational activities have to be undertaken in an overall spirit of collaboration, coordination, and cooperation. The underlying implication is that all resources have to be appropriately and optimally combined in order to realize true synergies from joint planning and execution. This would suggest that certain elements would have to play a key role under particular circumstances, and that different units have salience as circumstances change (Warden, 1989). This becomes especially critical when the context demands that certain elements play a key role for strategic effectiveness. The interdependent nature of the organization's various components--its units, disciplines, departments, and resources--remains a critical variable in obtaining superior strategic performance. Interdependence of specialized components creates the ability to turn resources of many kinds into strategic effectiveness. This, in turn, requires excellence within a component's internal domain and excellence with a component's environmental or external domain.

Finally, each component in the organization has its distinctive advantages and limitations. And, while a joint approach is critical, each organizational component should be distinguishable and separately recognized. Pure or single-component solutions are tactical and relatively simplistic (Alger, 1985). However, at the strategic level, mixed- or multi-component solutions are generally necessary. Mixed solutions are usually stronger and have a longer term orientation in addressing complex problems.

The Contexts of Strategy

For strategy to be understood, it is very important to understand the contexts within which strategy operates. We develop the four contexts of strategy based on Gray's (1996) suggestions, & the contexts are presented in Figure 1.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

The first context is the complexity of the competitive environment. The second context is the promise and peril of interdependent activities.

Combining the first two contexts, one can appreciate the increased complexity of interactions that take place at three levels. One is the interacting of the many components within the internal environment of an organization. Coupled with this is the increased number of interacting components in an organization's external environment. Finally, are the interactions between the components of an organization's internal environment with the components in the organization's external environment (Emery & Trist, 1965).

The third context is the need to develop strategic effectiveness in order to make a strategic difference. An important requirement is to understand the adversary and to not underestimate the opposition. Here it is important to compare the organization's purpose with that of the competition. Does the focal organization have limited means and limited ends? How does this compare with the competition? Does the competition have unlimited means and unlimited ends? In order to develop strategic effectiveness, it would be important to be clear as to why something is started, what is expected from it, and how it will be conducted. Having an overall sense of the governing principle will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort, and make its influence felt throughout the organization.

The fourth context of strategy is understanding and processing information. The design of the overall information architecture is crucial, and includes the picking up of signals in the internal and external environments, the nature and number of information "sensors" in place, and the types of signals that are monitored and processed. There has to be an optimal balance between separating critical (signal) from trivial (noise) information, i.e., the understanding of information or the noise-to-signal ratio. This has to be followed by the appropriate level of processing of the identified information. Tushman and Nadler (1978) have suggested that effective organizational performance is a function between information processing demand and the organization's information processing capacity. The organization should strive to distinguish between critical and trivial information, and to not over-process trivial information or under-process vital information. This would require that the organization be able to distinguish between trivial and vital signals in the internal and external environments. The organization's information systems should then under-process trivial information and over-process vital information. The firm's mechanisms to process information (see Figure 2) from the environment should be optimally designed such that it does not needlessly capture and over-process trivial information, or fail to obtain and under-process critical information.

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

A Framework to Strategize

The discussion, so far, has been to contrast the more complex and intractable view of strategy against the relatively more narrow view of strategy taken by academics and practitioners. A narrower view of strategy is popular because it is more comfortable and more convenient to do so. This allows business problems to be analyzed from within the repertoire of existing models, frameworks, and paradigms. The intellectual challenges of stepping outside the narrow area of bounded knowledge are considerable. However, as we will discover in the discussion that follows in this section, strategizing necessarily has to be a dynamic process dealing with an unknown, ambiguous, and indeterminate set of variables that have an impact on an organization in an uncertain future. As a consequence, we must be prepared to question all assumptions, postulates, and theories. It does not mean we have to craft everything anew or discard existing knowledge, but to ascertain the validity of past theories and be open to new ways of thinking.

For example, when strategizing in business, a common approach is to examine the phenomenon of consumption through the lens of demand. Followers of Keynsian economics have subscribed to the axiom, "Demand creates its own supply." This is in contrast with Say's (1803) Law, which states "Supply creates its own demand." There has existed an ongoing debate in economics between classical economists and the followers of John Baptist Say, the insightful French economist. We do not plan to enter into this debate, but wish to sensitize the reader to the two viewpoints that frame our arguments in this section. Much of training in business has centered on the notion of consumption, and that economics is often thought of in consumptionist terms (http://www.friesian.com/sayslaw.htm). As a consequence, business and strategic orientation have focused on methods to increase demand, hence consumption.

This is a traditional and orthodox approach to strategizing. One needs to break away from this orthodoxy and approach the consumer from a radically different direction. This is not to suggest that the conventional approach is to be abandoned. Rather, the important point is to expand the way one conceptualizes and theorizes about business. Certainly, the conventional logic and existing frameworks, to which there is so much invested, should be treated with due respect. It is not only academics that have much at stake in current models, frameworks, and paradigms, but also organizations that have invested in their existing infrastructure. Organizations have an infrastructure that has to be leveraged profitably (Trunick, 1996). However, leveraging existing knowledge and infrastructure will result in making incremental movements from where an organization is currently located. Such incremental movements will result in better operational readiness and higher levels of tactical effectiveness. However, it is not by following existing models, frameworks, paradigms, or even infrastructure that radical differences will be made. The mental approach to making radical differences comes from the spirit of Say's (1803) Law that suggests that supply creates is own demand. Larry Mulkey, quoted in Trunick (1996), states, "Instead of building a system that is incrementally based on where you are now, you build backwards from where you want to be" (1996: 26).

How is it possible for supply to create its own demand? If not taken literally by the letter of Say's (1803) Law, but the spirit, we have to think of goods and services (products) that are delivered to the customer even before the customer actually articulates a specific need for the product. This is happening in many cases with products that are at the cutting edge of technology or based on emerging concepts. Strategists have to gain insights from the many discontinuities that are taking place. Recognizing and leveraging discontinuities is not possible from the mindset that is produced by examining standard models, frameworks, and paradigms. Hamel and Prahalad (1995: 15) mention that industry foresight is based on deep insights into the trends in technology, demographics, regulations, and lifestyles that can be harnessed to rewrite industry rules and create new competitive space.

It is possible for supply to create its own demand when strategists are no longer solely customer-led but are product-led. This would run against the grain of conventional thinking and practice. As Hamel and Prahalad mention, "It is much in vogue to be customer-led. From their bully pulpits, which today are likely to be worldwide satellite hookups, CEOs tell the troops that everything begins with the customer" (1994a: 67). The area of future opportunities is to look for openings and chances outside the arena of existing competition. To put the matter in perspective, most organizations are providing products that customers can clearly articulate, coupled with producers that have the ability to clearly respond to those articulations. Since the articulation is clear, the competition is most intensive, and the competitive space is crowded. However, in order to create new competitive space, producers have to move beyond what is clearly articulated by customers and producers.

Sony, one of the most formidable and innovative companies, follows the philosophy of being ahead of the customer. Sony's visionary former chairman, Akio Morita, had this to say, "Our plan is to lead the public with new products rather than ask them what kind of products they want. The public does not know what is possible, but we do. So, instead of doing a lot of market research, we refine our thinking on a product and its use and try to create a market for it by educating and communicating with the public." Masaru Ibuka, the company's co-founder agrees when he says, "Our emphasis has always been to make something out of nothing." Consequently, we feel that the areas unarticulated by customers and producers are where the maximum opportunities lie. Figure 3, adapted and modified from Hamel and Prahalad (1994b), presents the main features of our model.

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

On the vertical axis are the articulated and unarticulated needs of customers. On the horizontal axis are the articulated and unarticulated abilities of producers. Most academics and practitioners focus on quadrant 1, where clearly articulated needs of customers are coincident with the clearly articulated abilities of producers. Quadrant 1 typifies the conventional mindset that is trained on existing models, frameworks, and paradigms. Much of business knowledge is simply descriptive in that theories are used to understand the past and make sense of the past. The predictive component of business theory is relatively limited as existing theory is not a good predictor of the future. Many organizations feel competitive pressures from unpredictable sources. Music publishing companies did not feel the heat of competition from their well-established and well-identified rivals. Rather, they felt competitive pressures from Napster, an organization whose form, style, and composition the established music firms had never conceptualized and had no competitive response to, other than to take legal action. Similarly, established booksellers were outflanked by the activities of Amazon.com who competed on a front that established booksellers were either unaware of or were completely blindsided to. Competing in quadrant 1 can make an organization totally vulnerable to possibilities that may exist outside the obvious. More recently, CNN reported that young entrepreneurs in New York City are challenging Internet Service Providers (ISPs). These entrepreneurs are offering free Internet service in their neighborhoods because they have excess capacity from their cable modem connections. These entrepreneurs are trying to force ISPs to provide free Internet service in certain neighborhoods and public places like parks, subway stations, and libraries. These entrepreneurs, in seemingly guerilla-like operations, are creating competitive fronts for traditional ISPs in areas that ISP organizations had not conceived of. These challenges have to be met, as they are likely to affect the revenue flow and viability of otherwise profitable ISPs.

The areas of opportunities lie in quadrants 2, 3, and 4. Organizations (the producers of goods and services) need to make efforts to explore opportunities outside of quadrant 1. In quadrant 2, producers are ahead of customers and this usually happens when innovative and creative organizations (like Sony Corporation) deliver products that are outside the customers' articulated needs. Evidently, Sony Corporation is a clear follower of Say's Law in the way it has been introducing highly successful products for seemingly non-existent needs, and creating entirely new customer segments and customer types. Creativity and innovation allow certain organizations to succeed in quadrant 2. The 3.5-inch disk in place of the 5.25-inch disk is something producers launched in the market long before customers articulated a need for it. Higher processing speeds, greater data storage capacities, and more capable software are quadrant 2 products that are invariably ahead of customers. The linkage between Say's Law and quadrant 2 is obvious.

Quadrant 3 presents opportunities in entirely different ways. Here, customers have clearly articulated needs that have remained unfulfilled due to a number of constraints, including technology. Answers to disease and other medical conditions are being sought. The problems are well known, and the answers are awaited. Opportunities exist in being able to address well-articulated humans' needs. Medical products, pharmaceuticals, and certain biotech products, among others, would fit into quadrant 3. In quadrant 3, customers are ahead of producers, and opportunities lie in being able to mold products and services that address deep-seated but well-articulated customers' needs.

The quadrant of greatest interest is quadrant 4, the area that remains unarticulated by either customer or producer. There is the obvious difficulty of trying to articulate the yet unarticulated. The focus of strategy here is to create conditions from which an organization can move outward from quadrant 1 through other two quadrants toward quadrant 4. The requirement here is one of energy and unconventional thinking. Attempting to move out of quadrant 1 requires an approach that conventional training does not provide. However, organizations have to understand that new competitive spaces can be created only if the comfort of conventional and tradition knowledge is supplanted with new and insightful approaches. The Internet in its initial stages could have been classified as a quadrant 4 phenomenon till its shape, form, and influence could be given some meaning. Even today, the reach and the impact of the Internet is far from clear, and articulation both by customers and producers is still far from complete or accurate.

We continue to focus and emphasize the need for close attention to quadrant 4. We believe that those firms that look outward and beyond quadrant 1 are the ones that are most likely to benefit. Quadrant 4 represents the realm of possibilities, where all kinds of interactions of technology, communication, human nature, time, and space can possibly take place. This is the area where new products, fresh concepts, novel services, and unusual delivery platforms can take place. Here is the competitive space where first mover advantages may be profitably reaped. Minds and firms that are caught in the tactical and static world of quadrant 1 will miss the many opportunities that may be present in the spaces outside quadrant 1. The ability to conceptualize opportunities in quadrant 4 is possible when strategists think beyond content knowledge, and think in terms of cognitive knowledge and finally develop metacognitive knowledge (Gaskins & Elliot, 1991; Palinscar & Brown, 1989; Liedtka & Rosenblum, 1998). Strategists will necessarily have to expand their notions of strategy in order to fit the complexity, themes, and contexts of strategy into new competitive spaces.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Our aim in this paper is not to discount the value of existing knowledge of strategic management. Rather, it is to present to the readers the constraints that orthodox knowledge and theory may create toward more creative and innovative ways to strategize. We present the difficulties and limitations of imposing a structure and knowledge set that explains the past reasonably well, and makes the mistake of using what works for the past to understand an uncertain future. Conventional thinking will limit and constrain strategic activities to existing knowledge and infrastructure resources.

By applying metacognitive knowledge, academics and practitioners will be able to appreciate and comprehend the complexity, themes, and contexts of strategy (Gray, 1996, 1999a, 1999b). The complexity consists of mastering of strategy, its demanding nature, the difficulty of teaching it, the fact that it is burdensome, and the many frictions in strategy that can make it chaotic. The themes in strategy address the ubiquity of strategy, the fact that it is pervasively joint, and the distinctiveness of its various components. The contexts of strategy are its competitive environment, its interdependent nature, the notion of strategic effectiveness, and the importance of understanding and processing information. Metacognitive knowledge will set the stage for developing a radical approach to strategizing for the future (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994a, 1994b, 1995). The radical approach is to focus on the areas unarticulated by customers and producers, as existing competition essentially focuses on goods and services that are clearly articulated by customers and producers. Such a radical approach will allow organizations to achieve strategic readiness. It will challenge academics and practitioners to think beyond existing models, frameworks, and paradigms, and create conditions for organizations to leverage their existing infrastructure and investment.

REFERENCES

Alger, J. I. 1985. Definition and doctrine of the military art, past and present. Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing.

Argyris, C. 1985. Strategy, change, and defense routines. Marshfield, MA: Pitman.

Argyris, C., Putnam, R., & Smith, D. M. 1985. Action science. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Bongiorno, L. 1993. Raise your hands if you are sure if strategy is being taught in American business schools. Journal of Business Strategy, 14(5): 36-41.

Clausewitz, C. 1976. On war. Edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, first published 1832.

Dunbar, R. L. M., Garud, R., & Raghuram, S. 1996. A frame for deframing strategic analysis. Journal of Management Enquiry, 5(1): 23-34.

Emery, F. E., & Trist, E.L. 1965. The causal texture of organizational environments. Human Relations, 18(1): 21-32.

Gaskins, I., & Elliot, T. 1991. Implementing cognitive strategy instruction across the school. Brookline, MA: Brookline Books.

Gray, C. S. 1996. Explorations in strategy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Gray, C. S. 1999a. Why strategy is difficult. Joint Force Quarterly, Summer, 22: 6-12.

Gray, C.S. 1999b. Modern strategy. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C. K. 1994a. Seeing the future first. Fortune, Sep 5, 130 (5): 64-70.

Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C. K. 1994b. Competing for the future. Harvard Business Review, 72 (4): 122-128.

Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C. K. 1995. Seeing the future first. Executive Excellence, 12 (15): 15-16.

Jomini, A. H. 1993. The art of war. London, UK: Greenhill Books.

Kellert, S.H. 1993. In the wake of chaos: Unpredictable order in dynamical systems. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Liedtka, J. M., & Rosenblum, J. W. 1998. Teaching strategy by design: A report from the field. Journal of Management Education, 22(3): 285-303.

Palinscar, A., & Brown, A. 1989. Instruction for self-regulated reading. In L. Resnick and L. Klopfer (Eds.), Towards the thinking curriculum: Current cognitive research. Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development; 19-39.

Powell, C.L. 1993. A word from the chairman. Joint Force Quarterly, Summer, 1: 5.

Ruelle, D. 1991. Chance and chaos. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Say, J.B. 1803. A treatise on political economy.

Spector, R.H. 1993. After Tet: The bloodiest year in Vietnam. New York, NY: Free Press.

Trunick, P.A. 1996. Building the future from the future. Transport & Distribution, 37 (12): 26-27.

Tushman, M. L. & Nadler, D. A. 1978. Information processing as an integrating concept in organization design. Academy of Management Review, 3: 613-624.

Warden III, J.A. 1989. The air campaign: Planning for combat. Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's.

Ananda Mukherji and Jyotsna Mukherji are Assistant Professors in the College of Business Administration at Texas A&M International University, Laredo, TX 78041.