Risk analysis determines and evaluates the exposure of vital
records to specific risks. Its outcome provides the basis for protection
planning and other records management decisions. A thorough risk
analysis begins with the identification of threats and vulnerabilities
to which vital records are exposed. Once identified, threats and
vulnerabilities can be evaluated using qualitative or quantitative
approaches. Risk control is also an important component of any vital
records program. The purpose of risk control is to safeguard vital
records. Where vital records protection is part of a broader business
continuity and disaster recovery plan, risk control measures may also
safeguard facilities, computer hardware and software, laboratory
equipment, and other resources.
Identifying Risks
Threats to vital records are customarily divided into three broad
categories: (1) destruction, (2)loss, and (3) corruption. A fourth
category--threats associated with the improper disclosure of recorded
information--is typically outside the scope of records management
responsibility.
Protection of essential information against malicious or accidental
destruction is a well-established component of vital records planning.
Malicious destruction of recorded information may result from warfare or
warfare-related issues. Potentially catastrophic agents of accidental
destruction include natural disasters. Vital records can also be damaged
or destroyed by human-induced accidents such as fire or lack of
knowledge about the consequences of specific actions.
More likely causes of accidental records destruction are less
dramatic and more localized but no less catastrophic in their
consequences for mission-critical operations. Records in all formats can
be damaged by careless handling. Paper documents, for example, are
easily torn, damaged by spilled fluids, or otherwise mutilated.
Microforms, X-rays, and other photographic films can be scratched. With
very active records, the potential for such damage is intensified by
use. In many work environments, for example, valuable engineering
drawings subject to frequent retrieval are characteristically frayed and
dog-eared.
Information recorded on magnetic media and certain types of optical
disks can be erased by exposure to strong magnetic fields. Careless work
procedures, such as mounting magnetic tapes or diskettes without write
protection, can expose vital electronic records to accidental erasure by
overwriting. Mislabeled rewritable media may be inadvertently marked for
reuse, their contents being inappropriately replaced by new information.
Computer hardware and software failures can damage valuable information.
Electronic records may be accidentally deleted during database
reorganizations or by utility programs that consolidate disk space.
Records in all formats can be misfiled, misplaced, or stolen. Like
many business tasks, filing of paper records is subject to errors.
Documents can be placed into the wrong folders, and folders can be
placed into the wrong drawers or cabinets. Widely quoted sources claim
misfile rates ranging from one to ten percent for documents in office
files, but such claims are typically substantiated by anecdotal reports
rather than scientific studies that present detailed statistical data
about filing activity in specific work environments. Nonetheless, even a
very low misfiling rate can pose significant problems in large filing
installations. In a central filing area with 25 four-drawer cabinets,
for example, a misfiling rate of just one-half of one percent means that
more than 1,000 records are filed incorrectly. Of course, even a single
misfiled document can have serious consequences if it contains
information needed for an important business purpose.
Color-coded folders can simplify detection of misplaced folders,
but they are not applicable to every filing situation nor can they
identify individual documents filed in the wrong folder.
Microfilm's advocates claim that it will eliminate misfiles
associated with refilling activity. However, unless misfile detection is
performed during document preparation, pages can be microfilmed in the
wrong sequence, in which case misfiles are irreversible. Further,
individual microfiche, microfilm jackets, and aperture cards can
themselves be misfiled within cabinets or trays. With electronic
records, data entry errors are the counterparts of misfiles. Although
effective methods, such as double-keying of information, are available
for error detection and correction, they are not incorporated into all
data entry operations.
Like any valued asset, recorded information can be stolen for
financial gain or other motives, by intelligence operatives or by
disgruntled, compromised, or coerced employees. Traditionally,
espionage-related concerns have been most closely associated with
government and military records, but they apply to other work
environments as well. Commercial information brokers, for example, are
interested in names, addresses, telephone numbers, and other information
about an organization's employees, a company's customers, a
hospital's patients, an academic institution's students, and a
professional association's members. Trade secrets, product
specifications, manufacturing methods, marketing plans, pricing
strategies, and customer information are of great interest to a
company's competitors.
The threat of theft is greatest for records stored in users'
work areas where systematic handling procedures are seldom implemented
and security provisions may be weak or absent. Centralized repositories,
by contrast, tend to be more secure. Theft is a concern for records in
all formats; but microforms and electronic media are compact and more
easily concealed than paper documents, and their high storage densities
increase the amount of information affected by a single incident of
theft.
Tampering is a leading cause of corruption of recorded information,
but not all record formats are equally vulnerable. With microforms,
tampering is difficult and detectable. The contents of individual
microimages cannot be altered, and insertion or removal of images
requires splicing of film, which is readily apparent. By contrast,
information in paper documents can be added to, obliterated, or changed,
although such modifications can often be detected by smiled forensic
examiners. The potential for unauthorized tampering with electronic
records has been widely discussed in publications and at professional
meetings. Records stored on rewritable media--such as magnetic disks,
magnetic tapes, and certain optical disks--are subject to modification
by unauthorized persons in a manner that can prove very difficult to
detect. Such unauthorized modification may involve the deletion,
editing, or replacement of information. Further, viruses and other
malicious software can damage computer-stored records.
Qualitative Risk Assessment
Regardless of the specific threats involved, risk assessment may be
based on intuitive, relatively informal qualitative approaches or on
more structured, formalized quantitative methods. The methods are not
mutually exclusive; they can be used in combination to evaluate the
risks to which specific vital records are subject and to produce a
prioritized list of vital records for which protective measures are
recommended.
Qualitative risk assessment is the simpler of the two approaches.
It relies principally on group discussions involving knowledgeable
persons. Qualitative risk assessment is particularly useful for
identifying and categorizing physical security problems and other
vulnerabilities. A risk assessment team or committee, preferably led by
a records manager, identifies and evaluates the dangers to specific
vital records series from catastrophic events, theft, misfiling, or
other threats.
A qualitative risk assessment is usually based on a physical survey
of locations where vital records are stored, combined with a review of
security procedures already in place. Among items the risk assessment
team may consider are geophysical and political factors, reported
problems with destruction or loss of records, number and types of
employees who have access to records, records handling procedures that
may result in damage to or loss of records, physical security, building
construction, and access controls in records storage areas, the
proximity of records storage areas to laboratories, factories, or other
facilities that contain flammable materials or hazardous substances,
availability of fire control apparatus and fire department services, and
ability to reconstruct recorded information through backup procedures or
other methods.
Although the nature and frequency of destructive weather, misfiles,
theft of records, or other adverse events are examined and evaluated,
qualitative risk assessments do not estimate their statistical
probabilities or the financial impact of resulting losses. Instead,
consequences and probabilities are evaluated in general terms.
Consequences associated with the loss of specific records series, for
example, may be categorized as devastating, serious, limited, or
negligible. Similarly, the likelihood of significant information loss
associated with specific threats may be described as very low, low,
medium, high, or very high.
In the project team's assessment, these evaluative
designations should be accompanied by definitions or a clarifying
narrative. The greatest concern is for vital records with high exposure
to threats that have a high probability of occurrence with sudden,
unpredictable onset--for example, researchers' notebooks stored in
laboratory areas where flammable chemicals are routinely used in
scientific experiments, or confidential product specifications and
pricing information stored in file cabinets or left on desktops in
unsecured office areas.
Quantitative Risk Assessment
Quantitative risk assessment is based on concepts and methods
originally developed for product safety analysis and subsequently
adapted for computer security applications. Like its qualitative
counterpart, quantitative risk assessment relies on site visits,
discussions, and other systems analysis methodologies to identify risks,
but it uses numeric calculations to estimate the likelihood and impact
of losses associated with specific vital records series. The losses are
expressed as dollar amounts, which can be related to the cost of
proposed protection methods. Compared with qualitative methods,
quantitative risk assessment provides a more structured framework for
comparing exposures for different vital records series and prioritizing
vital records protection recommendations.
Although various quantitative assessment techniques have been
proposed by risk analysts and others, all are based on the general risk
assessment formula. The risk assessment formula measures risk, sometimes
called the annualized loss expectancy (ALE), as the probable annual
dollar loss associated with a specific vital records series. The total
expected annual loss to an organization is the sum of the expected
annualized losses calculated for each vital records series.
Quantitative risk assessment begins with the determination of
probabilities associated with specific extents and the calculation of
annualized loss multipliers based on those probabilities. Quantitative
risk assessment has a subjective component in so Ear as the qualitative
risk assessment approach is typically used to determine the
probabilities. Program unit personnel or others familiar with a given
records series are asked to estimate the likelihood of occurrence for
specific threats. Whenever possible, their estimates should be based on
the historical incidence of adverse events, which can be accurately
determined in some cases but only approximated in others. Reliable
frequency information is easiest and most conveniently obtained for
incidents such as burglaries, fires, power outages, equipment
malfunctions, software failures, network security breaches, and virus
attacks for which security reports, maintenance statistics, or other
documentation exists. The frequency of potentially destructive
geophysical or political events, such as hurricanes or terrorist
attacks, may likewise be documented in books, newspapers, or other
published sources.
In the absence of written evidence or experience, probability
estimates must be based on informed speculation by persons familiar with
the circumstances in which a given vital records series is maintained
and used. Often, a records manager must ask a series of probing
questions, followed by lengthy discussion, to obtain usable probability
estimates. As an example, the records manager may ask employees of a
human resources department whether the inability to locate essential
personnel files is likely to occur once a year. If the answer is yes,
the records manager should ask whether such an event is likely to occur
once every half year, once a quarter, once a month, and so on. This
procedure can be repeated until a satisfactorily specific response is
obtained.
Once probabilities are estimated, annual loss multipliers can be
calculated in any of several ways. Using one method, a calamitous threat
to vital records with a given probability of occurrence is assigned a
probability value of 1. Other threats are assigned higher or lower
values, based on their relative probability of occurrence.
Applying the formula given previously, the probability value is
multiplied by the estimated cost of the loss if the event occurs.
Factors that might be considered when determining costs associated with
the loss of vital records include, but are by no means limited to, the
following:
* The cost of file reconstruction, assuming that reconstruction is
possible
* The value of canceled customer orders, unbillable accounts, or
other business losses resulting from the inability to perform specific
business operations because needed records are unavailable
* The cost of defending against or otherwise settling legal actions
associated with the loss of vital records
Quantitative risk assessment is an aid to judgment not a substitute
for it. The risk assessment formula is an analytical tool that can help
records managers clarify their thinking and define protection priorities
for vital records.
Risk Control
Some recorded information may be reconstructable in the event of a
disaster, but the high cost of such reconstruction makes it a
last-resort component of risk control. Prevention is the first line of
defense against risk. Preventive measures are designed to minimize the
likelihood of damage to vital records from one or more of the threats
enumerated in the preceding discussion. Preventive measures apply to
both working copies and security, copies of vital records. By contrast,
protective measures typically apply only to security copies, sometimes
described as backup copies, of vital records. Protective measures permit
the reconstruction of essential information and the restoration of
business operations if one or more vital records series is destroyed,
damaged, or lost.
Whether prevention or protection is involved, risk control begins
with heightened security awareness formalized in organizational policy
and procedures, which must be communicated to every employee who works
with vital records. Information security should be the responsibility of
every employee. A directive from senior management to line managers or
other key personnel in individual program units should acknowledge the
mission-critical importance of vital records and emphasize the need to
safeguard them. Risk control guidelines should be conspicuously posted
in areas where vital records are stored or used. One person in each
program unit should be assigned specific responsibility for the
implementation of risk control guidelines. Ideally, that person will
also serve as the program unit's records management liaison.
Program unit managers should be instructed to review risk control
policies and procedures at staff meetings. The records manager should be
available as a resource person to address such meetings and clarify risk
control policies and procedures. To publicize the vital records
initiative, the records manager can prepare articles on vital records
and the importance of risk control for employee newsletters, intranet
web pages, or other in-house publications.
Preventive Measures
Preventive risk control measures address the physical environment
where vital records are stored and used. To the greatest extent
possible, storage facilities for vital records should be located in
areas where floods and destructive weather are unlikely. Locations near
chemical factories, utility plants, airport landing patterns, and other
potential hazards should also be avoided. Vital records repositories
should be situated away from high-traffic locations, preferably in
buildings or portions of buildings without windows. Often, records
managers have little control over the geographic locations where working
copies of vital records are maintained, but they can specify storage
locations for backup copies. Storage areas for vital records must be
properly constructed and include appropriate smoke detection and
fire-extinguishing equipment.
Protective Measures
Protective measures permit the reconstruction of vital records to
support the restoration of mission-critical operations in the event of a
disaster. Such measures have historically relied on specially designed
storage enclosures and purposeful duplication of records for offsite
storage. These measures are most effective when combined.
Specially designed filing cabinets, vaults, and other storage
enclosures provide onsite protection of vital records against certain
threats. Vital records can be protected against theft, for example, by
storing them in locked file cabinets, safes, or other containers,
although simple keylocks offer little resistance to a skilled intruder.
Containers with high-security keylocks or combination locks are
preferable.
Underwriters' Laboratories rates file cabinets, safes, and
other containers for their resistance to break-in by prying, drilling,
chiseling, hammering, sawing, or other means. Although tamperproof and
fire-resistant storage containers can prove useful in certain
situations, the most effective approach to vital records protection
involves the purposeful preparation of backup copies for storage at a
secure offsite location. Microfilming is usually the best practice for
production of backup copies of vital paper records. Compared to
full-size photocopies, microfilm copies are usually faster and cheaper
to produce, and they require less storage space at the offsite location,
which is an important consideration where backup copies will be housed
in a commercial records center that charges by the amount of space
consumed. When records are microfilmed for retention purposes,
additional backup copies can be produced at a small incremental cost.
The production of backup copies of essential electronic records at
predetermined intervals is routine operating procedure in most mainframe
and minicomputer installations and for information stored on network
servers. However, backup operations may be performed sporadically, if at
all, in desktop computer installations where procedures are typically
less routinized and users may be unaware of the need for backup copies.
For effective vital records protection, backup responsibilities must be
clearly delineated. Backup schedules must be established and rigidly
enforced.
Off-site storage repositories for vital records may be established
and operated by a business, government agency, or other organization on
its own behalf. Alternatively, a commercial records center or data vault
may be utilized for offsite storage. In either case, the offsite
facility must be secure.
Backup copies of vital records must be stored at a sufficient
distance from the working copies so that they are unaffected by the same
natural disasters or destructive events. The storage facility must be
close enough, however, for convenient delivery of vital records as well
as timely retrieval of backup copies to support disaster recovery. For
pickup and delivery of records, some in-house and commercial storage
facilities offer courier services equipped with environmentally
controlled trucks or vans. Some facilities also support electronic
vaulting in which backup copies of vital electronic records are
transmitted to off-site storage over high-speed telecommunications
facilities.
The typical vital records repository has suitable storage
facilities for paper documents, microforms, and electronic media,
although some data vaults exclude paper records to minimize the danger
of fire. Environmental specifications appropriate to the type of media
being stored and the retention period for recorded information must be
observed. Backup electrical generators should be available to maintain
environmental controls in the event of power outages.
Auditing for Compliance
Once vital records are identified and appropriate loss control
methods specified, the implementation of preventive and protective
measures for designated records series will usually be the
responsibility of personnel in the program unit that maintains the
records. Periodic audits should be performed to confirm compliance. Such
audits may be conducted by records management staff or delegated to
another organizational unit, such as an internal audit department, that
has other compliance-oriented responsibilities. In such cases, auditing
for vital records compliance can be coordinated with financial or other
auditing activities, thereby simplifying the scheduling of audits as
well as saving both time and labor. Internal auditors can report the
results of vital records compliance audits to the records manager for
follow-up and corrective action where indicated. To gain the attention
of top management, the internal audit reports should also be distributed
to those persons who receive reports of important financial audits.
At the Core
This article
* Looks at the qualitative and quantitative approachs to risk
analysis
* Reviews preventative and protective measures of control
* Discusses the importance of a compliance auditing program
Risk Assessment Formula
R = P x C
where:
R = the risk associated with the loss of a specific vital records
series due to a catastrophic event or other threat
P = the probability that such a threat will occur in any given year
C = the cost of the loss if the threat occurs
RELATED ARTICLE: Preventive risk control measures.
The following preventive risk control measures promote the physical
security of vital records against malicious destruction or unauthorized
access
* One storage location is easier to secure than many. In this
respect, centralized records repositories are preferable to
decentralized ones. Where vital records are maintained in user areas,
security is difficult to enforce and easily compromised.
* Access to vital records storage areas should be limited to a
single supervised entrance. Other doors should be configured as
emergency exits with strike bars and audible alarms.
* Access should be restricted to authorized individuals who have a
specific business reason for entering such areas. Badges should identify
authorized individuals.
* Employees should be instructed to challenge and report suspect
persons who enter vital records repositories.
* All containers should be examined on entry into or removal from
the vital records repository.
* Janitorial services in the vital records repository must be
performed in the presence of authorized employees.
* Areas where vital records are stored or used should never be
included in building tours.
* Vital records should be filed in locked drawers, cabinets, or
other metal containers until needed and returned to their filing
locations immediately after use.
* A "clean desk" policy is recommended. Vital records
must never be left unattended on work surfaces, and all vital records
must be put away at the end of the workday.
* Confidential personal data, trade secrets, or other sensitive
information should not be stored in mobile computing devices, which are
easily stolen. If using mobile devices is unavoidable, they must never
be left unattended.
* Vital electronic records stored on networked computers can be
accessed, and possibly damaged, by remote users. Physical security
measures must consequently be supplemented by safeguards against
electronic intrusion.
* Access to vital electronic records and their associated software
should be controlled by passwords or personal identification numbers.
* Access to computer workstations must be restricted to authorized
employees. Computer workstations should be turned off--and locked, if
possible--when not in use. They should never be left unattended while
operational. System software should automatically terminate a computer
session after a predetermined period of inactivity.
* Mission-critical applications and vital electronic records should
be isolated from publicly accessible computer resources in organizations
connected to the Internet.
William Saffady, Ph.D., is a Professor at the Palmer School of
Library and Information Science, Long Island University, where he
teaches courses on information management topics. He is the author of
more than three dozen books, including Records and Information
Management: Fundamentals of Professional Practice.
Records and Information Management: Fundamentals of Professional
Practice is available from the ARMA International Bookstore
(vwww.arma.org/bookstore).
COPYRIGHT 2005 Association of Records Managers &
Administrators (ARMA) Reproduced with permission of the copyright holder. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.
Copyright 2005, Gale Group. All rights
reserved. Gale Group is a Thomson Corporation Company.
NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.