SUMMARY
The present-day economy, characterised by a pattern of steady
technological and organisational change, has its roots in the so-called
information revolution of the late twentieth century. As this unique
period of recent history recedes, the benefits of hindsight make it
possible to deliver new perspectives on what really happened across
industries facing rapidly mutating global competitive settings. This
paper provides an analysis of the transformations that occurred in a
collection of technological capabilities nurtured by industrial sectors
as represented by nearly 500 of the world's largest industrial
corporations during the 1980s and 1990s. Using structural decomposition
analysis it shows how industries adapted under the strain of radical
shifts in the technological context with varying degrees of success.
KEY WORDS
structural decomposition analysis; patent indicator; manufacturing
sectors
1. INTRODUCTION
The last decades of the twentieth century were turbulent for the
capitalist economic system. These dramatic, hectic times were
characterised by the twin phenomena of global competition and
technological revolution. How industries reacted to, adapted to, and
took advantage of these intertwined and unfolding transformation
processes remains a poorly understood question.
This paper attempts to exploit the advantages of fresh hindsight to
shed some light on the knowledge dynamics of broadly defined industries
as characterised by the world's largest innovative companies over
the course of the 1980s and 1990s. As time moves on and we gain distance
from this defining period of recent history it becomes pertinent to
uncover new insights into what really happened across industries in
dynamic markets in the wake of rapidly mutating knowledge bases. To this
end, we mobilise data pertaining to over half a million patents by 463
globally oriented and technologically active US, European and Japanese
firms. To this raw material we apply a well known technique
traditionally applied in the field of empirical international economics,
but still largely under-utilised in the context of neo-Schumpeterian
analysis of technological capabilities: structural decomposition
analysis.
What we observe is evidence of a strongly stylised fact of
contemporary industrial change that has been captured in a number of
other investigations (e.g. Granstrand et al., 1997; Cantwell et al.,
2004): the knowledge base of large manufacturing companies across
industries has become more complex over time (Cantwell and Fai, 1999)
and the management of innovation itself has become more complex. The
sources of this complexity are attributed to the ever-increasing levels
of technical sophistication in products (Brusoni et al., 2001) processes
and the need to coordinate transnational networks of highly
heterogeneous and dynamic component suppliers (Mendonca, 2005).
Notwithstanding, what we begin to unveil are industry specific patterns
of response to the new technological challenges. Using structural
decomposition analysis (SDA) we are able to identify information and
communication technologies (ICTs), New Materials, and Pharmaceutical
& Biotechnology as the most subversive technologies to challenge the
a priori industrial knowledge profiles. We are also able to assess the
extent to which different industries facing this shifting technological
landscape responded by internally nurturing those disruptive new
technologies.
The next section sets the basic theoretical underpinnings upon
which this research rests. Section 3 describes the data, section 4 the
methodology, and section 5 discusses the results. The novelty of paper
consists in the application on the SDA method to unpacking the
technology diversification phenomenon (subsection 5.1), and in the
specific application of the method to the technology fields (subsection
5.2). Section 6 offers some concluding comments.
2. TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY FOR SCHUMPETERIAN SELECTIVE ENVIRONMENTS
Simply stated this paper sees the large global innovating
industrial firm as a system of technologies evolving in different
directions and at different rates. Building on Freeman's (1987) and
Lundvall's (1992) systemic view of technical change, we assume that
innovative business organisations may be regarded as open systems of
innovation. For the strict purposes of this paper, a corporate
innovation system will be understood as the intertwined set of
activities and interactions that allow the organisation as whole to
develop new technologies, products, markets and new ways of conducting
business.
This general framework is given empirical substance by a body of
applied work which has denoted the major business organisations of the
contemporary economy as multi-technological corporations. The key
observation in this literature, pioneered by Granstrand and Sjolander
(1990) and Patel and Pavitt (1994), is that modern industrial firms are
characterised by internal variety in their technological capabilities,
harbouring technologies that go well beyond those directly related to
their major product lines. It follows that large, technologically
competitive manufacturing firms typically develop an array of
distributed competences, rather than concentrating exclusively on core
competences as a source of advantage in international markets
(Granstrand et al., 1997). Companies have maintained higher levels of
technological diversity than product diversity in the past century
(Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998; Andersen and Walsh, 2000; Piscitello,
2004), and this trend seems to have deepened under the impact of the
technologies of the information age (Fai, 2003; Mendonca, 2006).
At the same time, research on technological diversification has
stressed that the composition of corporate technological capabilities is
complex but still is stable, and that the direction of search follows
path-dependent dynamics demarcated by the fields of knowledge required
by their primary product focus, i.e. chemical firms will tend to search
in chemical technologies--industry matters (Patel and Pavitt, 1997).
This strong association of core technologies with specific industries
indicates path-dependency in the evolution of an industry's
technological trajectory and has led to claims that creative
accumulation prevails over creative destruction at the level of the
firm, i.e., inside the organisation the emergence of new technological
fields are linked to established ones in a complementary fashion and
evolution in technological mastery takes a long time to establish
(Granstrand, 1998; Pavitt, 1998).
However, our findings suggest much more than conservative
accumulation along given trajectories seems to be happening when
business organisations face historically unique, technologically
turbulent, and fast changing competitive environments. In fact, the
technological profiles of industries may be idiosyncratic, but changes
may be more dramatic than previously though. There are indications that
the scope of corporate technological diversification in the late
twentieth century turned out to be significantly greater than earlier
periods (Fai and von Tunzelmann, 2001a, 2001b). In particular, the
rising tide of ICTs, biotechnologies and other new technologies may be
said to have affected all industries, although to different degrees
(Mendonca, 2004) being felt both in 'high-tech' and
'low-tech' sectors (Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998; von
Tunzelmann 2003). In other words, whilst the broader technological
environment faced by all industries was changing radically at the end of
the twentieth century, firms too were internally changing their
technological profiles.
This paper attempts to cast some light on how different industries
reconfigured their knowledge profiles (measured by their patent
portfolios) against, or in line with, the movement of structural change
occurring in the broader technological environment. We broadly interpret
the development of economically relevant technological knowledge through
the resource-based or capability-perspective, but tentatively
extrapolate from the firm to the industry level. Multi-technology
studies have found (e.g. Patel and Pavitt, 1997) that large innovative
firms in the same principal product areas seem to be characterised by
similar technological profiles. Thus, in this exploratory industry level
study we will broadly assume that individual firms in the industry
tended to adapt themselves in roughly the same way to technological
opportunities. Within firms, intangible idiosyncratic competitive assets
emerge as a result of organizational processes that build on, and
attempt to go beyond, previously accumulated cognitive capabilities
(e.g. Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003). Within industries, we assert
that intangible idiosyncratic industrial assets emerge as a result of
inter-organizational and inter-institutional processes that build on,
and attempt to go beyond, previously accumulated cognitive capabilities.
The phenomenon to be addressed is the evolution of industrial
knowledge distribution and their adaptation in a fast moving knowledge
landscape (shaken by a technological revolution). We wish to examine the
evolution of industries in the context of a shifting knowledge landscape
in which different technologies develop in different ways at different
speeds. We would hypothesise that the distribution of the technology
portfolios within corporations is being skewed by the attractiveness of
certain fields such as ICT, Pharmaceutical and Biotech and New
Materials, in spite of all the inertia that derives from the slow and
localised learning processes that normally take place in firms and this
is reflected at the industry level.
3. DATA
The following analysis is based on data extracted from the SPRU
database using US Patent Office (USPTO) information. Our database
reports accumulated patent counts for 463 of the world's largest
manufacturing companies across 14 in dustries and 34 technology classes
for the years 1981-85, 1985-90, and 1991-96. Patents were assigned to
the primary class for which they were granted by the examiners. These
were then allocated to one of 34 broader patent classes of the SPRU
database (see Appendix 1).
Some patent classes were a simple process of aggregation i.e. where
a USPTO class clearly fell into a single class within the broader SPRU
classification scheme e.g. patents registered under US Patent Class 435
Chemistry: Molecular Biology and Microbiology were allocated to the SPRU
category 7 Drugs and Bioengineering in their entirety. However,
occasionally patents within a USPTO class were split and allocated to
two or more broader SPRU categories e.g. some of the patents registered
under US Patent Class 424 Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating
Compositions were allocated to SPRU class 3 Agricultural Chemicals, and
others were assigned to class 7 Drugs and Bioengineering where
appropriate.
The construction of the industry data involved a tremendous effort
of consolidation of 4500 subsidiaries and divisions of firms: different
assignee names, kept or bought by the 463 up to 1992, were identified
using Whom Owns Whom of 1992 as a basis for allocation to their parent
companies. The parent companies have then been allocated to one of
SPRU's 14 industrial classes (see Appendix 2) according to their
primary production output.
Although patents have become a hugely popular innovation indicator
their proper use remains a non-trivial matter. The problems of this
indicator are significant, but will not be discussed here. The concerned
reader is directed to the methodologically oriented literature, now
quite mature and extensive (Pavitt, 1985; Narin and Olivastro, 1988;
Griliches, 1990; Smith 2005).
Following the multi-technology literature we know that large
industrial firms are technologically active (i.e. they claim patentable
knowledge at the frontier of given knowledge fields) even outside their
core domains traditionally linked to the generation of their industrial
output. Table 1 illustrates the correspondence between industrial sector
and core and non-core technological fields within the SPRU patent
database. The final column of the Table 1 shows the proportion of
patents registered by firms in each industry in technological fields
outside of those identified as core to each industry. For instance,
whilst ICTs related technologies are core technical fields for the
Computer and Electrical/Electronics industries, 25.1% and 39.3% of
patents are taken out in other technologies such as drugs and
bioengineering by firms in these two sectors respectively. Thus, we have
a way to measure the extent and dynamics of the technological
diversification behaviour.
Figure 1 presents the same data with an inter-temporal perspective.
The Computer and Electrical/ Electronics sectors, appear to be
registering fewer patents in technologies outside of their core fields,
or equivalently, are focusing more on their core technological
competencies, over time. In contrast, Photography and Photocopy
demonstrate a sharp increase in the patents granted outside its core
technical fields. We interpret this as a transition towards a richer
ensemble of technological activities and hence a broadening of the
knowledge base of this industry. Other industries displaying similar
tendencies include: Motor Vehicles and Parts, Machinery,
Pharmaceuticals, and so a more limited extent, Food, Drink and Tobacco.
Despite cross-industry variability in the level and rhythms of
technological diversification, almost half of the patents generated by
our population are generated outside each industry's core domain of
technological expertise (Mendonca, 2003).
4. METHOD
The patent data is analysed using structural decomposition analysis
(SDA). SDA is derived from constant market share analysis as used in
empirical studies of trade (Tyszynski, 1951; Fagerberg and Sollie, 1987;
Laursen 1999). Tyszynski (1951) looked at change in the export
performance of a nation in terms of its market shares at the end of the
period compared to that at the start. He broke this down into two
elements. He calculated what the nation's market share of exports
would have been at the end of the period if the nation's initial
shares across the basket of commodities did not change over time (i.e.
using Laspeyres weighted indices). The difference between the initial
share and this hypothetical end share is the structural effect because
it reflected the changes in a nation's share of trade that was
attributable to structural changes in its trading environment. The
residual, or remaining difference between the hypothetical end share and
the actual end share (i.e. Paasche weighted index) he put down to a
competitiveness effect because it reflected changes in a nation's
share of trade that was attributable the nation's changing
competitive strength.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Fagerberg and Sollie (1987) strengthen Tyszynski's basic
analysis and demonstrate that by using initial weight (Laspeyres)
indices throughout their methodology, the residual effect which
Tyszynski attributed entirely to the competitiveness effect can actually
be broken up in to two separate effects: the reported competitiveness
effect, but also a commodity adaptation effect. In other words, this
third effect allows for the possibility that a nation's export
performance might improve overtime because it can alter the composition
of its 'basket' of export commodities so as to adapt with any
changes in the broader composition of commodities in world export
markets. Laursen (1999) borrows this methodology and applies it not only
to export markets but also sectors of technological opportunity. This
paper in turn borrows from Laursen's (1999) application of the
methodology to technological opportunity but brings it down to an
industry-level analysis. The logic of the methodology is given below:
i = a technological field (1 ... 34)
j = an industry (1 ... 14)
t-1, t = subscripts for initial year and final year of the period
under consideration
Let
M = industry j's share of all patents
a = industry j's share of all patents in technology i
b = technology i's share of all patents
M can be written as the inner product of the vector a and vector b:
M = ab or,
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
The change in industry j's share of patents in an industry
over time is:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
Where the third term in the final line indicates the degree to
which an industry has succeeded in adapting its own technological
profile to the changes in the broader technological environment in which
it operates. It is the technology adaptation effect.
Fagerberg and Sollie caution that a zero technology adaptation
effect does not indicate that no adaptation occurred, but that the rate
of the industry's adaptation is exactly the same as the rate at
which the broader environment's technological profile is changing.
Thus a positive adaptation effect suggests the industry is adapting well
relative to the pace of change in the environment and a negative
adaptation effect suggest it is not adapting well. However, following
Laursen (1999), the reason for a positive value of the adaptation effect
has two bases: the industry appears to be adapting well because it is
entering areas of growing technological opportunity, or because it is
leaving areas of stagnating opportunity. Laursen therefore breaks up the
third term--technology adaptation effect, into two parts: the
technological growth adaptation effect which is positive if the industry
moves into technological areas providing more opportunities for growth
and the technological stagnation adaptation effect which is positive if
the industry moves out of areas of declining opportunities. Thus
following on from above, the full equation for the structural
decomposition model is given by:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
Thus, the change in a firm's patent share consists of four
elements:
(TS) the technology share effect isolates the extent to which an
industry has gained or lost shares of total patents through its
endogenous patent growth into new areas, assuming a fixed technological
structure at the broader technological environment level across the
period.
(ST) the structural technology effect isolates the extent to which
an industry has gained or lost shares of total patents because the
technological structure of the broader environment has shifted to more
closely or less closely resemble the balance of the industry's own
technological composition as it was at the start of the period.
(GA) the technology Growth Adaptation measures the extent to which
an industry has gained shares of total patents through the movement into
the 'right' or more influential technological fields (positive
sign), or equivalently, out of the 'right' technological
fields (represented with a negative sign).
(SA) the technology Stagnation Adaptation effect isolates the
extent to which an industry has benefited from moving out of the
'wrong' or stagnating technological fields (positive sign), or
equivalently, into stagnating technological fields (negative sign).
We examine the evolution of each industrial group of firms with
respect to the changes in the technologies produced (patents obtained)
by the entire group of 463 firms. Thus, this study takes technological
development in this population of
463 firms as an approximation of the relevant technological
landscape. We acknowledge that the entire technological landscape
extends well beyond the horizon provided by these organisations alone to
include contributions by small high-tech firms, innovation consortia,
public and private research institutions, universities, etc. Similarly,
the variable propensity to patent across industries means that our
reliance on patent data as a proxy provides, at best, a limited picture
of the technological landscape. These constitute limitations of the
present analysis, nevertheless, studies have shown that the correlation
between inventions and patents is stronger for large firms than small
firms (Acs and Audretsch, 1988) and that whilst patent protection is a
limited motivation for the introduction of a commercial invention,
corporations from all industries nevertheless utilise the patent system
extensively for patentable inventions (Mansfield 1986). Moreover, Cohen
et al. (2000) found that patents maybe relied upon more heavily by large
firms in the late twentieth century than they were in the 1980s which
corresponds with our period of analysis. As such we utilise patent data
of the 463 firms here as a proxy for the technological developments at
the industry level albeit with caution and acknowledging its
shortcomings.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Today it is well recognised that something revolutionary happened
in the world economy in the last two decades of the twentieth century.
Several authors describe this moment as the third industrial revolution,
the information revolution (Freeman and Louca, 2001), setting the stage
for an ICT paradigm (Freeman, 2007), an era of informational capitalism
(Castells, 2000). In this new age it is argued that the factors for
competitiveness have become more dynamic and ever more dependent on
knowledge and intangibles. What matters, are those capabilities that
explore new knowledge and which gather, recombine and exploit, old
knowledge.
Statistical evidence of the economic significance of this
revolution is usually sought in the changing industrial composition of
the economy. For instance, evidence of this stylised fact can be found
in the rise of ICT-based firms in the top two hundred US firms of the
Fortune magazine in the 1970s and 1980s (Louca and Mendonca, 2002).
However, the process of adjustment taking place within industries (or
firms) themselves is a form of structural change which occurs
'under the radar' and for which evidence in the extant
literature is less abundant. The following analysis tries to fill this
gap.
5.1 Industry analysis
Table 2 reports the result of the SDA described earlier and orders
the industries according to growth in patent share over the period
1981/85 to 1991/96. It confirms that the fastest growing industries are
Computers, Photography & Photocopying and Electrical/Electronics and
the slowest are mining and Petroleum, Chemicals and Materials.
Strikingly every industry outside the top three, suffers falling patent
growth if their existing technological profiles are held constant in the
face of a changing technological environment (ST effect is negative).
Among the top three industries, the TS effect indicates that
computers and photography & photocopy both would have experienced
internal growth in patent shares in the absence of any change in their
technological environment suggesting that their core technological areas
(as indicated in Table 1) provided them with many opportunities for
growth. All three of the industries with the greatest technological
growth benefited from a favourable change in the technological
environment (the ST effect) i.e. the environment altered to provide
these industries with more opportunities for growth. We can also see
from the combined GA and SA effects that computers, photography &
photocopy grew in areas of technological opportunity (positive GA),
whilst electrical/electronics benefited for a different reason, moving
out of the technological areas offering fewer opportunities (positive
SA); notably out of the more mature field of electrical devices.
At the opposite end, whilst the core technologies in the chemical
industry continue to offer some opportunities for growth (TS=0.54) it
suffers because the general technological environment does not favour it
(negative ST). Similarly the environment does not favour Materials nor
Mining & Petroleum, but they suffer also because their own internal
growth is negative. All three have negative GA effects suggesting they
failed to move into, or worse, moved out of the more influential
technological fields of this period although Materials and Mining &
Petroleum do also move out of stagnating technological fields to some
degree (positive SA).
5.2 Technological field analysis
For this part of the analysis we apply the SD analysis to the
technological fields in our database. It now traces how the
technological fields themselves performed across industries in the face
of a changing industrial structure rather than vice versa as above. In
particular, we are interested in how the non-core technological fields
in each industry, performed as a proportion of industrial shares of
patents. However, being non-core technologies, changes in their
industrial distribution can be quite small, therefore we have aggregated
the 34 technologies of the SPRU dataset (based directly on the USPTO
original patent classes) into 9 broader technological groupings
(constructed on the basis of technological proximity) to give movements
greater visibility in our findings (such aggregation procedures are
often crude but can yield very interesting results, e.g. Robertson and
Patel, 2007). Table 3 illustrates our aggregation of the technological
fields, into broader technological groups according to technological
similarity. For instance, under the ICT label we cluster technological
areas that have been strongly underpinned by the advent of the microchip
and that incorporate a strong digital element (for more details on this
re-grouping see Mendonca, 2003).
Tables 4 and 5 apply the SD analysis to the aggregated technology
groups in our database. Previous work has observed that the last two
decades of the twentieth century were marked by an explosively uneven
change in technological opportunity across the spectrum of patent
classes (Mendonca, 2006). The last column in both Tables 4 and 5 shows
how these broad technological groups grew in the total portfolio of all
industries from the 1980s into the early 1990s and confirms these
findings. Although with some variability over time, we observe that
ICTs, New Materials and Pharmaceuticals & Biotech grew in importance
over the entire period. (1) The same cannot be said about the other
technologies. Moreover, given our focus on only patents registered in
non-core technical fields, this strongly signals that these technologies
were offering the most vibrant technological prospects for all
industries, not just the sectors having the new technologies as their
core technologies.
The SDA confirms that industries other than the industries in which
the new technologies originated and emerged, also aggressively pursued
the cluster of revolutionary new technologies. To illustrate, in the
1980s whilst the TS effect dominates, the ST effect in the technologies
associated with the third technological revolution (ICT, Materials and
Pharmaceutical & Biotech) also has a positive influence. In other
words, even in 1981/5 to 1986/90 we see that these technologies are also
being picked up by other industries outside of those with which they
would be most closely associated. These technologies extend their reach
beyond the boundaries of their industrial origin. Furthermore, with the
exception of Pharmaceuticals & Biotech, this influence grows
stronger in the later period (Table 4) where the ST effects are greater
in magnitude than the earlier period. This phenomenon shows the
pervasiveness of the technologies of the third technological revolution
across industrial boundaries from their industries of origin to the
industries of use (Scherer, 1982).
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper focused on how new technologies are modifying the
profile of technological competencies of industries as represented by
large US, European and Japanese manufacturing firms. Inter-sectoral
structural change is commonly acknowledged as an important phenomenon in
face of technological shifts, as industries rise and fall in terms of
relative dynamism. But we still do not understand many things about the
internal aspects, namely the intra-sectoral dimensions, of technological
evolution. By using a structural decomposition approach, we have made an
attempt to reveal some of the dynamics of endogenous knowledge
diversification when technologies are of uneven attractiveness and when
some technologies (ICT, Pharmaceuticals and Biotech, new Materials)
offer more opportunities for creative accumulation than others by being
combined with pre-existing competences.
The first part of our analysis allowed us to demonstrate that the
industries of computers, photography & photocopying and
electrical/electronics were among the fastest growing at the edge of the
21st century. This appeared to leave the other industries behind
revealing them as laggards, taken unawares of the technological fate
that was to befall them. However, the second part of our analysis
demonstrated how the technological groups themselves were distributed
across industrial sectors. This showed that even in the early
1980's, as the new technologies were in their infancy, some of
their influence was already being felt in industries beyond the ones of
their birth. Non-specialist industries were taking advantage of the
potential enhancing effects of ICT, Materials and Pharmaceutical &
Biotech technologies for their development enabling the creation of more
complex products.
In this industry level study we found indications that something
revolutionary challenged the cognitive inertia of firms across many
industries rather than just a few rapidly changing ones and the
locally-bound nature of technological search. Our findings suggest that
large firms from all industries started to patent in the new promising
areas of the technological revolution and in doing so, extended the
lifecycle and scope of application of their own previously established
technological profiles. Technological revolutions can be embraced as a
means to extend the life of more mature corporations and industries
rather than rejected as a threat to the status quo. To be aware of major
new, potentially revolutionary technological developments, and to find a
way to bring them into organisational practices can sometimes be of
benefit to all.
APPENDIX 1: SPRU DATABASE PATENT CLASSES
1 Inorganic Chemicals
2 Organic Chemicals
3 Agricultural Chemicals
4 Chemical Processes
5 Hydrocarbons, mineral oils, fuels and igniting
devices
6 Bleaching Dyeing and Disinfecting
7 Drugs and Bioengineering
8 Plastic and rubber products
9 Materials (inc. glass and ceramics)
10 Food and Tobacco (processes and products)
11 Metallurgical and Metal Treatment processes
12 Apparatus for chemicals, food, glass, etc.
13 General Non-electrical Industrial Equipment
14 General Electrical Industrial Apparatus
15 Non-electrical specialized industrial equipment
16 Metallurgical and metal working equipment
17 Assembling and material handling apparatus
18 Induced Nuclear Reactions: systems and elements
19 Power Plants
20 Road vehicles and engines
21 Other transport equipment (exc. aircraft)
22 Aircraft
23 Mining and wells machinery and processes
24 Telecommunications
25 Semiconductors
26 Electrical devices and systems
27 Calculators, computers, and other office
equipment
28 Image and sound equipment
29 Photography and photocopy
30 Instruments and controls
31 Miscellaneous metal products
32 Textile, clothing, leather, wood products
33 Dentistry and Surgery
34 Other--Ammunitions and weapons, etc.
APPENDIX 2: SPRU DATABASE INDUSTRIES
Number
Principal product group of firms Examples of firms in the database
Aerospace 16 Boeing, Lockheed, BAE, Societe
Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale
Chemicals 69 BASF, Hoescht, Dow Chemical, ICI,
Sumitomo Chemical
Computers 15 Apple, Bull, Fujitsu, HP, IBM,
Olivetti, Toshiba
Electrical/Electronics 74 Fuji Electric, GE, Hitachi,
Phillips, Raytheon, Sharp,
Westinghouse
Food, Drink & Tobacco 18 Ajinomoto, Borden, General Mills,
Nestle, Quaker Oats, Pepsico
Machinery 72 Ahlstrom, Black & Decker, Deere,
Dragerwerk, Schindler, Komatsu
Materials 15 Asahi Glass, Corning, Lafarge,
Saint-Gobain, Toray, Ube,
Unitika
Metals 39 Alcan Aluminum, Bethlehem Steel,
Kobe Steel, Metallgesellschaft
Mining & Petroleum 25 Amoco, ENI, Exxon, Petrofina,
Shell, Total
Motor Vehicles & Parts 47 Dana, Ford, Honda, Mazda,
Navistar, Pegeut, Toyota
Paper 16 Kimberly-Clark, Svenska Cellulosa
Aktiebolaget, Weyerhauser
Pharmaceuticals 34 Abbot, Merck, Novo Nordisk,
Pfizer, Roche, Tanabe Seiyaku
Photography & Photocopy 14 Canon, Carl Zeiss Stiftung,
Essilor, Konica, Ricoh, Olympus
Rubber & Plastics 9 Bridgestone, Continental,
Goodyear, Michelin, Pirelli
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Keld Laursen and an anonymous referee for
their comments on our method and results. Limitations of the analysis
are responsibility of authors.
Received 14 March 2007 Accepted 9 October 2007
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SANDRO MENDONCA
Department of Economics
ISCTE Lisbon University
Institute, Spain, and SPRU, University of Sussex, England
FELICIA FAI
School of Management
University of Bath, England
Endnote
(1) The aggregated technology classification used here does not
distinguish between Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology. Had a lower level
of technological classification been employed, a more significant growth
in biotechnology is likely to have been detected. We thank the anonymous
reviewer for bringing this point to our attention.
TABLE 1: CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL SECTOR AND CORE
TECHNOLOGICAL FIELD
Patents
outside
CTFs (1991
Industry Core Technical Fields (CTFs) /96) (%)
Aerospace Aircraft, General Non-electrical 74.0
Industrial Equipment, Power Plants
Chemicals Organic Chemicals, Agricultural 47.0
Chemicals, Drugs & Bioengineering
Computers Computers, Semiconductors, 25.1
Telecommunications, Image & Sound
Equipment
Electrical/ Telecommunications, Semiconductors, 39.3
Electronics Electrical Devices, Computers, Image &
Sound Equipment
Food, Drink Food & Tobacco, Chemical Processes, 42.6
& Tobacco Drugs & Bioengineering
Machinery General Non-electrical Industrial 62.0
Equipment, Metallurgical & Metal
Working Equipment, Chemical Apparatus,
Vehicles Engineering, Mining Machinery
Materials Materials 69.5
Metals Metallurgical & Metal Treatment
Processes, Materials, Metallurgical 66.5
& Metal Working Equipment
Mining & Organic Chemicals, Inorganic Chemicals, 58.3
Petroleum Mining Machinery
Motor Vehicles Vehicles Engineering, General Non-
& Parts electrical Industrial Equipment, Other 63.6
transport Equipment
Paper Materials, Specialised Machinery 57.7
Pharmaceuticals Organic Chemicals, Drugs & 30.2
Bioengineering
Photography Photography & Photocopy, Instruments & 65.3
& Photocopy Controls
Rubber & Plastics & Rubber Products, Materials 45.1
Plastics
All industries Core technical fields 48.3
Source: SPRU database, own calculations. Note: Correspondence between
industries and 'core technical fields' drawn from Patel (1999).
TABLE 2: STRUCTURAL DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS ACROSS INDUSTRIES 1981/85
TO 1991/96
Industry TS ST GA SA [DELTA]Mj
Computers 1.68 2.62 0.46 -0.06 4.69
Photography & Photocopy 2.61 1.18 0.55 -0.23 4.1
Electrical/Electronics -2.18 4.15 -0.67 0.12 1.43
Machinery 1.03 -0.62 0.02 -0.24 0.19
Food, Drink & Tobacco 0.39 -0.26 0.01 -0.08 0.05
Paper -0.12 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 -0.21
Rubber & Plastics -0.12 -0.14 -0.01 0.02 -0.25
Metals -0.32 -0.48 0.04 0.09 -0.67
Aerospace -0.49 -0.20 -0.16 0.04 -0.80
Pharmaceuticals -0.70 -0.29 0.01 0.15 -0.83
Motor Vehicles & Parts 0.16 -1.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.93
Materials -0.98 -0.19 -0.04 0.15 -1.06
Chemicals 0.54 -2.77 -0.04 -0.17 -2.44
Mining & Petroleum -1.51 -1.87 -0.12 0.23 -3.27
Source: SPRU database, own calculations.
TABLE 3: BROAD TECHNOLOGY GROUPS
Fine
Chemicals Chem Pharm Materials
InOrChem OrgCh Drugs Materials
AgrCh ChePro
Hydroc
Bleach
Plastic
ChemApp
Chemicals Mechanical Transport ICT
InOrChem NonElMach VehiEngi Telecoms
AgrCh SpecMach OthTran Semicond
Hydroc MetalWEq Aircraft Computers
Bleach AssHandApp Image&Sou
Plastic Mining
ChemApp
Electrical
&
Chemicals Instruments Other
InOrChem Instrumen Medical
AgrCh Photog&C MiscMetProd
Hydroc ElectrDevi Metallu Pro
Bleach ElEquip Nuclear
Plastic PowerP
ChemApp Food&T
TextWood
etc.
Other (weap
etc.)
TABLE 4: DIVERSIFIED TECHNOLOGIES' STRUCTURAL DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS,
1981/85 TO 1986/90
Technologies TS ST GA SA [DELTA]Mj
ICT 2,37 1,54 0,51 -0,11 4,31
Other 1,33 0,13 0,04 -0,04 1,46
Materials 0,97 0,10 0,08 -0,09 1,07
Elect & Inst 0,38 0,22 -0,08 -0,05 0,47
Transport 0,02 -0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01
Pharmaceutical &
Biotech 0,04 0,02 -0,05 -0,03 -0,02
Mechanical -0,96 -0,01 -0,08 0,06 -1,00
Chemicals -1,89 -1,15 -0,09 0,16 -2,97
Fine Chem -2,25 -0,84 -0,31 0,08 -3,32
Source: SPRU database, own calculations.
TABLE 5: DIVERSIFIED TECHNOLOGIES' STRUCTURAL DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS,
1986/90 TO 1991/96
Technologies TS ST GA SA [DELTA]Mj
ICT 1,22 1,96 0,09 -0,06 3,21
Fine Chem 1,44 -0,34 0,05 -0,16 1,00
Materials 0,38 0,29 -0,07 -0,02 0,58
Pharmaceutical &
Biotech 0,22 -0,03 0,01 -0,02 0,18
Transport 0,00 -0,09 -0,01 -0,01 -0,10
Chemicals 0,04 -0,56 -0,01 -0,03 -0,56
Elect & Inst -0,22 -0,62 -0,03 0,01 -0,87
Other -1,25 -0,22 -0,03 0,12 -1,38
Mechanical -1,82 -0,40 0,00 0,17 -2,05
Source: SPRU database, own calculations.
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