Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl. From Corn Laws to Free Trade: Interests,
Ideas, and Institutions in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2006, 426 pp., $47.50. IBSN: 0-262-19543-7.
This book, by political scientist Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, is a
carefully researched, thorough and well-documented analysis of the
famous and problematical 1846 decision by Prime Minister Robert Peel to
repeal the British "Corn Laws" (agricultural tariffs). The
Parliamentary decision championed by him is famous because it
transformed the conventional role of Britain's Conservatives as
guardians of a landed aristocracy, moving them politically toward
support of the manufacturing classes, who opposed protection. As The
Economist recently observed, this made Peel the "father of
globalization." It is problematical (and was then for Peel) because
of the complex politics and economics involved in the reforms. It is of
major contemporary interest to economists interested in trade and
agriculture because so many of today's policy challenges,
especially the Doha Round, revolve around the politics of agricultural
protection.
Peel's January, 1846 speech to Parliament provided a complex
set of explanations for repeal: what might now be called a "shotgun
approach." First, Peel argued that it would allow Britain to retain
a dominant position in world trade. Second, even if other countries
failed to follow suit, Peel adopted the neoclassical argument that
Britain would still be better off. Third, resulting economic growth
combined with new income taxes would offset lost tariff revenues.
Finally, Peel drew on the prosperity following a less dramatic 1842
reduction in duties to suggest that further reductions would mean more
of the same.
To explain Peel's ultimate policy "success," the
author draws on the political economy and endogenous protection
literature to argue for the combined role of "interests, ideas and
institutions." She thus follows closely approaches to protection in
agricultural economics by Hayami and Anderson in The Political Economy
of Agricultural Protection (1986) and Runge and von Witzke in
Institutional Change in the Common Agricultural Policy of the European
Community (1986). Interests were those of free trade industrialists
versus protectionist landowners, and the shifting balance of power
resulting from the concentration of textile manufacturers in Lancashire
and the spread of exporting firms nationally. But while interests
describe "the force that drove repeal to the doors of
Parliament," they are necessary but not sufficient to explain the
1846 vote. Ideas were important too--especially the anti-aristocratic,
morally righteous arguments of the Anti-Corn Law League, inspired by
popular demands to democratize Parliament. Finally, adopting Douglass
North's definition of institutions as rules of the game that
constrain human behavior, the author notes that the Reform Act of 1932
led to demands for more democratic representation and changed the
parameters within which Conservatives and Liberals maneuvered.
The immediate context of the Corn Law debate was Cobdan's
Anti-Corn Law League and the rise of manufacturing and export interests
as a threat to the political control of the landed aristocracy. But
behind these shifts were more profound changes in the global economy
traceable to the late fifteenth and sixteenth century voyages of
discovery: the exploitation of New World agricultural land. As developed
in O'Rourke and Williamson's 1999 Globalization and History,
the discovery of the New World effectively increased the land-per-capita
ratio for each inhabitant of continental Europe sixfold. The eventual
realization of its bounty in nineteenth century grain exports from North
America doomed grain production in the Old World to both absolute and
comparative disadvantage. Only Great Britain, however, seemed prepared
to abandon mercantilism and protection in recognition of this altered
reality, which turned North America into the dominant agricultural
exporter of the next 150 years (a position it may now be losing to
Brazil).
After setting the terms of argument around interests, ideas, and
institutions, the author develops an eclectic set of empirical tests of
the demand and supply sides of trade policy reform. Chapters 3-6 focus
on demand side pressures for change, beginning with the role of both
concentrated and dispersed interests that put political pressure on
Parliament to
end agricultural tariff protection. On the one hand, the textile
industry's concentration in and around Lancashire from 1825 to 1850
allowed for both an economic and political "pole de
croissance." Correspondingly, Lancashire towns such as Liverpool
and Manchester recorded especially high membership in the Anti-Corn Law
League. At the same time, the overall export sector was becoming more
dispersed, allowing for expanded political influence in Parliamentary
jurisdictions across England. From 1825 to 1846, British Customs records
noted 154 new categories of exports, especially of semi-finished
products such as yarn, iron girders, and processed wool, cotton and
hides.
Chapter 4 focuses on the ideas and interest groups that pressed for
freer trade by "nationalizing" the argument. Freer trade
advocates argued that liberalization would result in positive external
effects; they drove this argument with a clear organizational focus; and
they made use of a conducive institutional environment. The Anti-Corn
Law League popularized its themes of national prosperity, righteous
indignation at protectionists, and an anti-aristocratic ideology. Set
against the institutional background of the preceding 1842
liberalization, shifting allegiances in the Conservative and Liberal
parties, and support for freer trade in the Board of Trade itself, the
League won many converts.
Chapters 5 and 6 consider how purely economic explanations of the
shifting balance between landlords and manufacturers fail without more
subtle interpretations of how agricultural interests hedged their bets
by becoming capitalists themselves. A Ricardo-Viner specific factors
model draws a stark contrast between landowners as losers from
liberalization and manufacturing exporters as winners. But when
portfolio diversity and capital flows are considered, empirical and
statistical evidence shows that landowners were early and active
investors in railroad shares and other securities linked to emerging
export-manufacturing industries. The author tests the hypothesis that
members of Parliament representing areas with more diversified economic
activity were more likely to vote in favor of free trade, and finds it
supported. Chapter 6 dissects numerous votes in Parliament ending in
liberalization to distinguish two factions in the Conservative party:
diehard, landowning non-Peelites who tenaciously clung to the Corn Laws,
and Peelites who could be pried away from protectionism as their
constituencies shifted beneath them toward a more diversified and
export-oriented economic base.
Chapters 7-10 turn to the supply side, relying on analysis of
Parliamentary speeches to identify themes leading to the final vote to
repeal on May 15, 1846. The author uses recent developments in
"content analysis," based on the co-occurrence of various
words and phrases, to discern patterns and trends. Speeches are also
analyzed in historical context, reaching back from 1846 to the
Parliamentary debates of 1814-1815, 1826-1828, and 1842--44. While
rather tedious, these reviews yield interesting insights into the key
role of changes in the British economy and the makeup of Parliamentary
constituencies as the main drivers of a shift in ideas about free trade.
As the author concludes, "economic interests led Britain to repeal,
but ideas and institutions delivered the final outcome."
Stylistically, the book is quite academic: ponderous and a bit
stilted. If it was not the author's dissertation, it reads like it.
This deficiency is widespread in the social sciences, however, and the
book is no worse than average. Such deficits are overcome by the
inherent interest of her subject, and the logical and creative methods
she brings to it, blending economics and political science. For the
practical analyst of trade policy and protection, it offers many useful
historical lessons relevant to today's challenges.
C. Ford Runge
University of Minnesota
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