ABSTRACT. Housing companies manage a considerable proportion of
urban open green space in Sweden. This article explores how 62 Swedish
housing companies, municipal and private, organise their open space
maintenance and the reasons behind organisational structure. Here,
organisational structure covers three aspects of open space maintenance:
(1) whether performed in-house or by a contractor, (2) whether performed
by local managers or circulating teams, and (3) whether and how
residents are involved in management. The organisational structures
varied widely among the housing companies studied. Mixed structures were
common. Formal resident involvement processes were almost only found in
municipally owned areas with local managers. The arguments could be
derived from two general management approaches, prioritising either
customer relations more or economic efficiency. The conclusion was that
management approach might be important in choosing organisational
structure.
KEYWORDS: Green open space; Maintenance; Organisational structure;
Rental housing; Resident involvement
SANTRAUKA
Svedijos miestuose nemaza dali atviru zaliuju plotu tvarko namq
administravimo imones. Siame straipsnyje nagrinejama, kaip 62
(savivaldybiu it privacios) namu administravimo jmones organizuoja
atviru plotu prieziura Svedijoje it kokios priezastys lemia organizacine
struktura. Cia organizacine struktura apima tris atviru plotu prieziuros
aspektus: (1) plotus tvarko pacios ar samdo kitus, (2) tvarko vietiniai
vadybininkai ar laikinos komandos, (3) ar prie tvarkymo prisideda ir
kaip prisideda gyventojai. Nagrinetose namu administravimo imonese rasta
labai skirtingu organizaciniu strukturu. Misrios strukturos
populiariausios. Formalus gyventoju itraukimo procesai aptikti beveik
isskirtinai tik savivaldybems priklausanciose zonose su vietiniais
tvarkytojais. Irodymu buvo galima gauti is dvieju pagrindiniu vadybos
poziuriu, prioriteta suteikiant rysiams su klientais arba ekonominiam
efektyvumui. Prieita prie isvados, kad vadybos poziuris gali buti
svarbus renkantis organizacine struktura.
1. INTRODUCTION
The maintenance of urban green spaces concerns not only local park
departments, but also to a large extent housing companies. More than
one-third of dwellings in Sweden are rental apartments (SABO, 2007) and
the total amount of open green spaces that belong to these houses was
estimated to total 28,000 hectares 20 years ago (Bucht and Persson,
1987), which is a considerable proportion of Swedish urban green space.
The total area of constructed parks under municipal management has been
calculated to be about the same: 27,400 hectares (Svenska
Kommunforbundet, 1997). This makes housing companies important actors in
the task of providing good quality green open spaces for urban
residents. For tenants, these spaces are used on an everyday basis as
part of their home.
Organisational structures and corporative management models have
been issues for research for a long time, including those in housing
organisations. However, very little attention has been given to the
management and organisation of open space maintenance. There are many
different opinions among housing companies on how such maintenance
should be organised. In this article we explore how a number of Swedish
housing companies organise their open space maintenance and what
arguments they give for the organisational structure they have chosen.
1.1. Current trends in open space management in Swedish housing
companies
According to the Swedish Association of Municipal Housing Companies
(SABO), there are approximately 4.2 million dwellings in Sweden, of
which 42% are privately owned homes, 18% cooperatives, 17% privately
owned rental apartments and 22% municipal rental apartments (SABO,
2007). According to Turner (1999), the traditional system with a
generally high standard of housing is in transition to a more
market-orientated system with growing socio-economic differentiation.
Turner and Whitehead (2002) mean that Swedish municipal housing
companies went through dramatic changes in the 1990s, mainly due to
reduced governmental subsidies. Hansson and Nilsson-Hellstrom (1993) and
Johansson (1998) mean that the organisation of open space maintenance
has also been affected and increasingly diversified. However, this field
is far from thoroughly explored and most previous studies have only
concerned municipal/public housing. The literature points at three
tendencies among housing companies over the past two decades that can
have influenced their organisational structure in different directions:
(1) outsourcing of maintenance services; (2) customer orientation; and
(3) a growing interest in self-management and other forms of resident
involvement. These tendencies are described more closely below.
One crucial tendency in the rental housing sector is the
outsourcing of maintenance tasks. In some cases housing companies
purchase all property management from another company, which in turn can
use contractors for certain maintenance tasks (see Castell, 2005). In
other cases only some parts of property management, such as open space
maintenance, are purchased from another company. Outsourcing has been a
major trend in housing management in Sweden and other countries, and the
central motive discussed has been to increase economic efficiency (see
e.g. Sirmans et al., 1999; Priemus et al., 1999; Saugeres and Clapham,
1999; Becker et al., 2001; Yik and Lai, 2005). In the United Kingdom,
the public housing sector has even been forced into outsourcing from
central government through Compulsory Competitive Tendering (Saugeres
and Clapham, 1999). For the countries within the EU, general directives
on the procurement process complement national legal systems, such as
the public procurement act (LOU) in Sweden (see Ohno and Harada (2006)
for an international comparison). A shared problem among several
countries is that the legal system for procurement unfortunately often
leads to contractors being chosen mainly on an economic basis, with less
attention to quality and service issues (Zavadskas and Vilutiene, 2006;
see also Becker et al., 2001). In the Netherlands, many non-profit
housing associations have turned to performance-based maintenance
partnerships, where the contractor is consulted not only for the
maintenance tasks, but also for planning and strategic development
(Straub and van Mossel, 2007).
A second major tendency is the change from a technical property
orientation to a customer orientation in housing management (see e.g.
Johansson, 1998; Hogberg and Hogberg, 2000; Blome, 2006). Companies that
emphasise their customer orientation place a higher priority on personal
relations with tenants and on issues relating to the social environment
in residential areas. Customer orientation also seems to be a general
trend in the housing management sector in the United Kingdom (see e.g.
Spink, 1998; Clapham et al., 2000). This tendency has led to changes in
the overall organisational structure in many companies. It has opened
the way for more differentiated ways of organising maintenance tasks
among Swedish municipal housing companies (Johansson, 1998), as well as
in the European housing market as a whole (Priemus et al., 1999). One
common implication of this customer orientation has been a changeover
from a centralised to a more decentralised decision chain, giving higher
responsibilities to management staff directly involved with the daily
practical maintenance work. It has become more popular to have local
area-based managers and their role has changed. The 'new'
local manager role differs from the 'traditional' in having
much wider responsibilities, e.g. for finances and in particular for
contacts with tenants (Johansson, 1998; also compare Clapham et al.,
2000). According to Johansson (1998), this change of orientation and
organisational structure in Sweden has been led primarily by SABO, i.e.
by the public housing companies.
A third tendency is the seemingly growing interest in
self-management, i.e. when residents are involved in open space
management and take over maintenance tasks themselves. Since the
mid-1990s in particular, a number of self-management projects have been
initiated. Such projects have gained considerable attention among
housing companies and tenants' organisations. This tendency is
partly in line with the interest in customer relations and social issues
described above, but it is also frequently connected with other motives,
such as revitalisation of declining urban areas (see e.g. Alfredsson and
Cars, 1996; Delshammar, 2005), initiating grassroots democracy (see e.g.
Bengtsson et al., 2003) and increasing environmental awareness (see e.g.
Ericsson, 2002). Moreover, self-management has been promoted in
government reports as a means of developing democracy (see e.g. Swedish
Government, 1997, 2000). In other countries, small and larger programmes
supporting resident involvement in open space management have been
reported to be very successful (see e.g. Hawtin, 1998; Kurtz, 2001;
Aalbers et al., 2002; Bartolomei et al., 2003; Glover et al., 2005).
However, there have also been some critical voices suggesting that
resident management is not necessarily accompanied by empowerment, and
that it may be viewed as a way of housing companies escaping their
responsibilities (see e.g. Peterman, 1996). With respect to previous
research on resident involvement in open space management in residential
areas, it could be claimed that the diversity and complexity of the
issue have to a large extent been neglected. Studies have usually
focused on rather well-organised and well-established self-management
groups, ignoring numerous processes that are of a more spontaneous
and/or temporary character (Castell, 2005, 2006). Moreover, such
processes have not been mapped out systematically and they have not been
related to the characteristics and motives of the housing companies.
To sum up, previous research has brought some clarity regarding
tendencies affecting the organisation of open space management within
housing companies and how this has developed over time. However, it has
not provided knowledge on the frequency and distribution of different
organisational structures, nor have the arguments for the choice of
organisational structure been studied specifically. To our knowledge,
this study is the first to actually map out the frequency and
distribution of different organisational structures among housing
companies, to study their motives and to analyse how these relate to
different management approaches.
1.2. Design and implementation of the study
The organisational structures of housing companies were mapped out
through a series of telephone interviews with managers and directors of
62 housing companies, located in the province of Skane and in the city
of Goteborg in Sweden. The sample reflected the changing conditions of a
region with a variety of municipalities: small to medium; rural and
urban; in decline and in growth. It also included two larger cities
(G6teborg with more than half a million inhabitants and Malm6 with
almost 300 000), coping with rapid expansion and transition from a
manufacturing to knowledge economy, as well as socio-economic
segregation and stigmatisation of certain residential areas. The 62
companies included all members of SABO (1) in the region of Skane and
all companies--municipal and private--owning or managing at least 200
apartments in Goteborg. This amounted to almost 40% of the total number
of rental apartments in Skane and 75% of those in Goteborg, see Figure
1.
In the interviews, one or several employees (directors, managers
and/or operational staff, depending on company size and structure) of
each company were asked about how open space management is organised and
about the benefits and disadvantages of different organisational
structures. They were also asked whether there were any examples of
self-management or other forms of resident involvement in their housing
areas, and how the company viewed such initiatives. Detailed notes were
taken during these telephone interviews. The reason for not recording
and transcribing the interviews in full was that we believed that
recording would have risked making interviewees more reluctant to
provide information and would probably even have discouraged some from
participating. Instead, we attempted to include all companies listed in
the survey and obtain information under rather relaxed circumstances.
Each interview lasted for about 10-60 minutes. The information went
through several steps of analysis, using spreadsheets. Each
company's organisational structure was categorised in accordance
with a model described in section two. Data on company size, ownership
and geographical location were used to analyse the frequency and
distribution of different organisational structures. All arguments were
then listed, rearranged and grouped according to the kind of
organisational structure they supported, after which different
interpretations and possible thematisations were elaborated and
discussed within the research team. These results can be seen in the
last section of the paper.
1.2.1. About the companies in the survey
Goteborg's five municipal housing companies work in the same
corporate group and together they own about half the city's 139,000
rental apartments. The two smallest companies are organised to take care
of one suburban district each. The other three each manage around 20,000
apartments, spread around the city. The largest municipal housing
company in the Skane region is of a similar size, while the smallest
only has 130 dwellings to manage. The three largest private companies in
Goteborg manage about 5,000 apartments each (although two of these have
since amalgamated into one company that owns almost 10,000 apartments in
Goteborg). As can be seen in Figure 2, the number of individual
apartments per company varies from about 3,000 down to below 200.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
1.2.2. Model of organisational structures
Johansson (1998) has pointed out that there is a strong
differentiation among housing companies in the organisation of work.
However, little has been done to conceptualise these differences and
there have been no attempts to map them out. In this paper,
organisational structure is used as a concept for how housing companies
organise their open space maintenance. It covers three aspects:
(1) Whether the maintenance is carried out by in-house staff or by
an external contractor;
(2) Whether there are locally based maintenance staff or a more
centralised organisation with teams circulating between several areas;
(3) Whether or not there are examples of self-management or other
forms of resident involvement.
These three aspects reflect the three tendencies in the Swedish
housing market outlined in the introduction. The first aspect relates to
a commonly described concern in practice--whether it is better to carry
out the maintenance work within the company or contract it in from a
separate firm. This has been discussed in relation to housing management
previously (see e.g. Sirmans et al., 1999; Persson, 2005; Blome, 2006).
This aspect roughly describes the formal relations of the maintenance
organisation but it gives little information on how the maintenance work
is structured and carried out. It also provides no information on how
responsibilities are allocated among the management and maintenance
staff. These issues are better covered by the second aspect, which
describes the geographical and task-wise distribution of
responsibilities among the staff. It concerns levels of specialisation
and decentralisation in the organisation. The third aspect included in
the framework is the occurrence and forms of resident involvement in
open space maintenance. Resident involvement processes are perhaps an
area-based phenomenon rather than a part of a company's
organisational structure, as they depend on much more than a strategic
decision in the executive board of the company. Most obviously, they
depend on the residents' will and engagement. However, it has been
shown that it is not unusual for housing companies to have an explicit
strategy to promote and support involvement initiatives and even
actively initiate such processes (as the case reported in Lindgren,
2005).
2. THE PRACTICE OF DIFFERENT ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES
This section further describes the three main aspects of
organisational structure, drawing on the empirical findings. It also
provides a presentation of the frequency and distribution of different
organisational structures among the companies studied and relates it to
the size of the company and whether it is private or public.
2.1. (1) In-house and contractor management
The first aspect of the organisational structure is whether the
maintenance tasks are performed within the housing company's own
organisation or outsourced to a contractor. When the housing
company's own employees perform the tasks, this is referred to here
as in-house management (2). The opposite situation, contractor
management (3), is when maintenance tasks, or property management as a
whole, are performed by staff from a firm of contractors. This is
commonly known as outsourcing, even though the strict definition of this
term is debated (see e.g. Bhagwati et al., 2004).
A mixture of in-house and contractor management can be used within
the same housing company. For example, some of the companies studied had
their own staff managing some housing areas and contractors managing
other areas. Another common mixed form was when companies had their own
staff, but hired contractors for certain tasks, such as lawn-mowing or
hedge-trimming. Altogether, this gives rise to four categories: (1)
in-house management, (2) in-house management but contractor for certain
areas, (3) in-house management but contractor for certain tasks, and (4)
contractor management.
The survey revealed that there was a relatively even distribution
between in-house management (24 companies) and contractor management
(19). It was also common to have in-house management combined with
contractors for certain tasks (15). It was less frequent to have
contractors only in certain areas (4). There was no obvious connection
between company size and in-house or contractor management (see Figure
3). Outsourcing was possibly the most common option for medium-sized
companies, as in the size range 800-2000 apartments, 50% of companies
used contractors for all their open space maintenance work, while the
figures for the smaller and larger companies were 19% and 17%
respectively. There was no apparent difference between municipal and
private housing companies in this regard.
2.2. (2) Local managers and circulating teams
The second aspect is whether there are locally based maintenance
staff or a more centralised organisation with teams circulating between
several areas. The way of organising the management into rather
decentralised, small and locally based units is here referred to as the
local manager system (4). The local manager (in Swedish often named
husvard or bovard) is a representative of the housing company or the
contractor who has full responsibility for a smaller area (normally 200
to 400 apartments). As the local managers work in the local area, they
can be addressed face-to-face for different kinds of concerns by the
tenants. The role of the local manager can vary. In some companies in
the study, this role focused more on social issues and customer
relations. In other cases the role was mostly technical, to plan and
perform the maintenance tasks. Some companies had local area offices
open for the residents to visit. Other companies instead had a central
office for customer services. It was also common to have combinations of
local area offices and central customer service.
Circulating teams of maintenance staff move around during the
season between different housing areas (5). This is a more centralised
type of organisation. The staff are not permanently present in one area
but visit the areas with various frequencies to carry out their tasks. A
circulating team system does not necessarily imply that the management
units are larger in terms of number of apartments than when there are
local managers. Small housing companies that have the same number of
apartments as the common local manager area may still use the
circulating team option if the houses are spread out and do not form a
coherent area unit. Having local managers would not be a relevant
alternative for these companies since the units would be too small and
therefore too costly to maintain.
Some companies in the study mixed local managers and circulating
teams. One way of mixing was to have local managers in some areas and
circulating teams in others. Another was that local managers took care
of certain tasks and circulating teams took on other tasks in the same
area. Sometimes the local staff performed regular everyday tasks, such
as cleaning of open spaces, while the circulating teams mowed grass or
did tasks demanding more specialised skills, such as tree-cutting.
More companies (although generally smaller in size) relied only on
circulating teams (30 companies) than relied only on local managers (17
companies). Combinations were also common--about one-quarter (15) of the
companies used both local managers and circulating teams. There appeared
to be some differences between private and municipal companies (see
Figure 3). Local managers, often in combination with in-house
management, were more common among municipal housing companies, while
circulating teams were more typical of private companies. Local managers
dominated among larger municipal companies (with 8,000 apartments or
more), while among the smallest companies (with 500 apartments or less),
circulating teams were standard. This may be explained by the fact that
most small companies had their properties spread out and not in coherent
areas of appropriate size for a local manager unit.
2.3. (3) Self-management and other forms of resident involvement
The third tendency mentioned in the introduction was the interest
in self-management, which has led to a number of local initiatives
involving residents in open space maintenance. There are many diverse
forms of resident involvement in open space maintenance. They range from
informal, small-scale individual initiatives to thoroughly organised
groups with full control over the entire management process. Regarding
the responsibility and autonomy of resident involvement, three main
types can be distinguished, as listed in Table 1.
Each of these three types can have sub-categories depending on the
kind of compensation the residents receive and whether or not there are
formal arrangements such as contracts between the group and the housing
company (Castell, 2006).
The study revealed that there were a limited number of
self-management processes of the high autonomy kind and likewise of the
supervised self-management kind (see Figure 3). As there was a high
uncertainty regarding the number of informal involvement processes
(those processes were often not recognised by the central management
staff), only formalised processes are included in the figures.
It was difficult to identify any specific area conditions that are
prerequisites for or favourable for the presence of formal resident
involvement processes. The areas where involvement processes existed
showed a great variety in terms of building age and spatial
configuration of the houses, as well as socio-economic indicators such
as demographic structure, unemployment, income levels, ethnic
distribution, education levels, share of households receiving social
benefits, etc. (see Castell, 2005). One clear pattern, however, was that
formal resident involvement processes existed exclusively in areas
managed by municipal housing companies. Possible reasons for this are:
(a) that the municipal companies in general are large, and that size is
important for the ability to initiate and support different kind of
local processes; (b) that there is a long tradition of collaboration
between the municipal housing companies and the Union of Tenants, a
collaboration that has resulted in central and local agreements on
resident influence; and (c) that municipal housing companies, at least
traditionally, have often had political commitments to social
responsibility inscribed in their objectives.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Another finding was that formal resident involvement processes
mainly appeared in companies with local manager systems. This supports
what previous case studies have suggested--that local managers often
play a crucial role in initiating and facilitating local involvement
processes (see e.g. Alfredsson and Cars, 1996; Bengtsson et al., 2003).
3. ARGUMENTS BEHIND CHOICE OF ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
In this section, arguments for choosing certain organisational
structures are presented, based on the interviews with directors,
managers and maintenance staff.
3.1. In-house--for customer relations and control
Common arguments for in-house management were that it matters for
company image and customer relations. One interviewee described it as a
safety issue for the residents that the on-site staff wear the company
brand on their working clothes. Another saw it as trust-building that
there is continuity and clarity in contacts with tenants. Several other
arguments can be associated with the possibility to control the
management process. A very concrete example, which several companies
brought up, was the advantage of being able to redirect the maintenance
staff when an unforeseen situation occurs. It was reported that it is
hard to demand other duties from a contractor than those defined in
advance in the contract, but in-house staff can easily be given new
tasks if necessary. Another advantage mentioned is that the
decision-making chain is shorter with in-house operational staff working
directly for the management executives. This may give a faster response
to new directives. When it comes to economics, it was debatable whether
in-house management is cheaper or more expensive than outsourcing. Some
advocates of in-house management claimed that it is cost-neutral or even
cheaper when the benefits of better control are included. These
interviewees also believe that it gives better incentives for
development of long-term cost-saving improvements, e.g. by changing the
vegetation present or redesigning the area. Others stated that it is
very difficult to calculate and predict the costs of an in-house
management system. Another disadvantage mentioned with in-house
management is the problem of seasonal variations in workload. This has
to be resolved by inventing a lot of tasks for staff during the winter
or by employing seasonal workers during the summer.
To sum up, the main arguments for in-house management were that it
gave good customer relations, a trustworthy image and a high degree of
control of the management process. Opinion differed on whether it was
economically efficient or not. The main challenge seemed to be how to
deal with the seasonal variations in workload.
3.2. Contractor--for cost-effectiveness and calculability
The main arguments for outsourcing concerned saving money in
different ways. One was that some costly investments could be avoided,
according to some of the companies. For example, they did not have to
buy machines for specialised tasks, e.g. lawn-mowing. Another saving
mentioned was that that some employer obligations could be avoided.
Instead, the contractor bears the costs and risks of employing the
operational staff. Moreover, the task specialisation of the contractor
may make it more cost-effective than in-house management, as some of the
companies had concluded. According to some interviewees, the main
disadvantage with outsourcing is associated with the contracting
process. One problem is the difficulties involved in formulating good
measurable criteria for open space quality. This was said to need high
expertise and to be quite time-consuming. In-house advocates claimed
that there is a clear pattern that money goes before quality in this
process. Some complained over the legal system where public
institutions, such as municipal housing companies, have to choose the
cheapest tender if several meet their defined criteria in the
procurement process 7. One interviewee claimed that a great advantage
with contractors is that the client knows in advance what they are
getting and exactly what it costs. Another interviewee was frustrated
over the variable quality and the difficulties in knowing in advance
what will be provided. It was also said that with a contractor, the
staff could not be given new tasks outside the contract without extra
payment being demanded. In contradiction to the lack of control
argument, however, one manager argued that it is easier to put pressure
on a contractor to get something done than to put pressure on in-house
staff.
To sum up, cost-effectiveness was the main argument for choosing a
contractor. Another argument was the avoidance of employer obligations.
It was disputed whether contract work improved calculability, whether it
was more flexible and how it affected the quality. The main challenge
was clearly the contracting process, lack of expertise within the
companies and the legal system, said to lead to low costs but poor
quality. See Table 2.
3.3. Local manager--for personal contacts with tenants
Making closer contacts and being well-known among the tenants were
the main motive for having local managers. The benefit with this,
according to some interviewees, is that tenants know who is in charge
with local manager and thereby they can easily address him/her over the
telephone or by walking down to the local area office if such exists.
Common arguments for having local managers were thus that it is
trust-building and that it gives good service opportunities for the
residents. One company that had changed to circulating teams said that
this was not popular, since the tenants had been very satisfied with the
local managers. Likewise, to be locally situated was said to be positive
for the working situation of the operational staff. Some of the local
managers interviewed expressed their content at being well-known and
having frequent personal contacts with the residents. A couple of the
housing companies also saw an advantage in having local managers as
regards tenants' opinions on the quality of services delivered. One
white-collar employee reported that the tenants might have opinions on
things but never complaints about the local managers. This suggests that
having well-known local managers also gives an impression of better
service, despite questionable technical quality. The other side of being
well-known is that the company knows the tenants well. Some companies
saw this as an advantage, as having known representatives may simplify
contact with large groups of tenants. Thus, the local manager can
contact the most interested tenants to provide information or feedback
on certain questions, in the hope that this will spread to the rest
through them. Another argument raised by an employee working in a team
of local managers was that their presence brings some calm and safety to
the area. For example, no young people dared to drive their motorbikes
in the yards before the end of the working shift.
Arguments against having local managers were mainly economic, but
also connected with the expected technical quality of maintenance. One
opinion was that having local managers was costly and there were several
different reasons given as to why. One reason was that local offices and
maintenance equipment are needed in each area. Another was that the work
often becomes inefficient due to the constant disruptions by residents
who stop by to talk to the staff. However, one company made the point
that local managers were good from an efficiency point of view, since
they had an individual responsibility. After organising a local manager
system, this company could easily relate every result to a specific
employee's work. This, they said, was beneficial for their ability
to manage efficiently. Continuity of the local managers was stated to be
both positive and negative. One positive aspect, although only
indirectly stated, can be that the continuity can give a more constant
quality of maintenance than circulating teams, as maintenance intervals
can be shortened and there is someone continuously checking the
conditions. Becoming well-known and trusted among the tenants was seen
as positive from a customer relations perspective. The negative point
was that it may lead to local staff getting bogged down in routines.
This could lead to a loss of creativity and enthusiasm in their work, as
one maintenance worker explained. Some companies claimed that it is
difficult to find people with the right skills to employ as local
managers. Several had experienced problems with keeping the same staff
when the focus changed from technical issues and the physical
environment to social relations with tenants and between neighbours.
This suggests that the realisation of such a change is quite dependent
on the individual local managers.
To sum up, arguments for local managers were first and foremost
connected with the relations to tenants. Local managers were said to
have a good effect on how the tenants experienced their services, the
working situation of operational staff, the company's image among
the tenants and the local social environment in the housing areas. The
efficiency of local managers was disputed, as were the effects of having
the same local manager in an area for a long time.
3.4. Circulating team--for specialisation and efficiency
Having a circulating team was said to improve efficiency in several
ways. One argument was that resources are optimally utilised when
individuals with various specialist skills work together in a
circulating team. Others claimed that the efficiency of circulating
teams was because they make it easier to direct efforts to where they
are most needed, which gives flexibility in the prioritisation between
different areas. The circulating team has the resources to 'give an
extra hand' when needed, it was said. Another efficiency aspect
raised was that circulating teams may focus more on maintenance of the
physical environment, as they are less involved in social issues in the
neighbourhood. Others believed that the maintenance levels might
fluctuate more than with local managers, who can provide more constant
maintenance. This can be seen as both positive and negative. One
informant reported that everything looked great just after the
circulating team had been there, but that the area often got weedy
before they came back again. A few of the companies that had chosen to
have circulating teams saw working in a group as positive for the
employees. For the group to function well, it was reported that the team
leaders are particularly important. One company claimed that it was hard
to find the right person for this position. In their case, they took the
risk of converting to a circulating team system because the team leader
was well-known from working as a local manager. However, it was still
considered a risk to have a circulating group, since that person could
resign.
To sum up, efficiency was the most frequent motive for choosing
circulating teams and ther