There's an old parable about a scorpion who hitches a ride
across a river on the back of a frog, and then stings the frog in
mid-river. "Why?" the frog asks. "Now you're going
to drown." Says the scorpion: "I can't help myself.
It's just my nature."
The past few weeks have not been happy times for anyone who hoped
to see a kindlier, gentler Microsoft. The U.S. Court of Appeals
effectively gutted the three-year antitrust case against the company,
leaving only a few hard-to-prove loose ends for new lawyers at the
Justice Department to take back to a new judge. Meanwhile, Microsoft has
already begun making meaningless concessions: PC manufacturers will soon
have the right to pre-install any browser they want with Windows XP
machines. Oops, there really are no other browsers left, but presumably
it's the thought that counts.
Elsewhere in the news, we have the sad tale of Eastman Kodak, which
thought its new photo imaging software--desperately needed to help
replace Kodak's old film-based business--would pop up more or less
automatically on the new XP desktop. Oops, what pops up is a Microsoft
knockoff; the Kodak product is buried so deep that Kodak officials say
digital camera users will have to call Kodak's tech support to find
it.
And so it goes. Microsoft swaggers through the market, jacking up
prices, rewriting license agreements, demanding software piracy audits
with no evidence of wrongdoing. In the enterprise world, Microsoft is
finally winning serious market share in operating systems and SQL
databases; in the consumer world, the X-box videogame system is likely
to bring more millions of consumer households into the Microsoft camp.
And on the Web, there's a good chance that Microsoft will
eventually own much of the infrastructure for digital commerce, with a
few well- placed toll booths to capture a brand-new cascade of cash.
We're not talking 800-pound gorillas any more: This is King Kong
reborn.
In fairness, much of Microsoft's swagger these days is the
well- deserved payoff for good strategic thinking and ambitious
investment. But Microsoft collectively is also a company with a culture
that encourages petty, paranoid, manipulative behavior. A pinch of
corporate paranoia may be useful, as Intel's Andy Grove once
pointed out, but Microsoft's behavior goes way off the scale--often
so far off that the company gets in hot water for no tangible benefit.
And the trouble is, Microsoft is now so pervasive in the software
world that its presence and behavior have become crucial marketplace
factors. These days, running a business without a solid "Microsoft
strategy" is probably as dumb as--well, dot-com business plans come
to mind, and we all know what happened to those folks.
So what sort of survival strategies make sense in a
Microsoft-dominated environment? A few suggestions:
* Never ride Microsoft's coattails: Microsoft has a huge
arsenal of marketing programs, ranging from Windows desktop real estate
to deep discounts on OEM software. So it's no surprise that even
giants like AOL and Kodak make respectful pilgrimages to Redmond, hoping
to work out co-marketing campaigns. However, the risk from these deals
is substantial: Microsoft gets some of its most valuable market
intelligence from co-promotions, and regularly uses this intelligence to
jump-start its own competing products. Bottom line: Marketing deals with
Microsoft may look like a way to put growth on a fast track; in
practice, they just speed up competition. (Partnering with Microsoft on
purely technical issues seems to be less dangerous: The risk factor is
usually directly proportional to the money on the table.)
* Establish a proprietary standard: An important part of the
Microsoft playbook is grabbing control of weakly-defended
interoperability standards, which it then "embraces and
extends." Since most vendors let ineffectual committees handle the
standard-setting process, Microsoft can usually co-opt a standard
without much opposition (as it's now doing with digital imaging and
XML standards). Microsoft has a much harder time when a company
aggressively brands and controls a standard- -witness AOL's
effective defense of its proprietary Instant Messaging protocols.
* Seize the high ground: If a technology can't be quickly
transformed into a low-priced, mass-market commodity, Microsoft often
has trouble turning a profit. Thus, it's generally safe to target
high-end professional niches where customer acceptance depends more on
hard-to- find domain knowledge rather than pricing or access to mass
channels. Accounting and project management, for example, are two
segments where Microsoft has never successfully challenged the high-end
market leaders, despite hefty investments in product development and
marketing.
* Build service-centric relationships: For all its new embrace of a
service-oriented business model, Microsoft is fundamentally a product-
centric company. At least for the moment, the company tends to offload
the messy work of system integration and ongoing support to
"business partners," who are much less formidable competitors
than the Redmond steamroller. Companies that have built strong
reputations for service expertise and responsiveness are generally able
to hang on to customers, especially for relationships where services
make up a large percentage of the total price.
* Trust the marketplace: Now that the Microsoft antitrust case has
largely fizzled, it's worth remembering that the case was
inspired-- rightly or wrongly--by unhappy competitors who hoped a big,
bad government troll would defend their interests. It's also worth
remembering that Lotus, WordPerfect, and SPC (all now gone as
independent companies) once refused to develop Windows titles and
instead tried to steer users toward IBM's OS/2. And it's also
worth remembering Apple's long and wasted lawsuit over control of
the desktop metaphor. In the end, political and legal challenges have
been a losing alternative to the only sensible anti-Microsoft strategy:
Listen to customers and deliver what the market really wants.
COPYRIGHT 2001 Soft-letter Reproduced with permission of the copyright holder. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.
Copyright 2001, Gale Group. All rights
reserved. Gale Group is a Thomson Corporation Company.
NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.