Divisible-good auctions: the role of allocation
rules.(econometric analysis)
We examine the role of allocation rules in determining the set of
equilibrium prices in uniform-price auctions. Beginning with Wilson
(1979), the theoretical literature has argued that these . . .
Bankruptcy and small firms' access to credit.
We investigate how personal bankruptcy law affects small
firms' access to credit. When a firm is unincorporated, its debts
are personal liabilities of the firm's owner, so that lending to
the firm . . .
RAND journal of economics turnaround times.(Illustration)
RAND Journal of Economics Turnaround Times
First Decision (%)
Month 0-3 4-6 7-9 10+ No Decision Total
Submitted Months Months . . .
The welfare impact of Medicare HMOs.(Health Maintenance
Organization)
We estimate the welfare associated with the Medicare HMO program,
now known as Medicare+Choice (M+C). We find that the creation of the M+C
program resulted in approximately $18.7 billion in . . .
AIDS policy and psychology: a mechanism-design approach.
Economic theorists have given little attention to health-related
externalities, such as those involved in the spread of AIDS. One reason
for this is the critical role played by psychological . . .
Rivals' search for buried treasure: competition and
duplication in R&D.
We analyze an R&D race in which, in each period, two firms each
choose which of two research projects to invest in. Each observes the
other's past choices and so strategic" search is . . .
On the "receiver-pays" principle.(microeconomic
analysis of telephone call receiving mechanism)
This article extends the theory of network competition by allowing
receivers to derive a surplus from receiving calls and to affect the
volume of communications by hanging up. We investigate how . . .
Little patents and big secrets: managing intellectual
property.
Exploitation of an innovation commonly requires some disclosure of
enabling knowledge (e.g., to obtain a patent or induce complementary
investment). When property rights offer only limited . . .
Competition and market power in option demand markets.
We call markets in which intermediaries sell networks of suppliers
to consumers who are uncertain about their needs "option demand
markets." In these markets, suppliers may grant the . . .
Prior health expenditures and risk sharing with insurers
competing on quality.
Insurers can exploit the heterogeneity within risk-adjustment
classes to select the good risks because they have more information than
the regulator on the expected expenditures of individual . . .
Exit in duopoly under uncertainty.
I examine a declining duopoly in which the firms must choose when
to exit from the market. The uncertainty is modelled by letting the
revenue stream follow a geometric Brownian motion. I consider . . .
Capacity dynamics and endogenous asymmetries in firm
size.(economic analysis)
Empirical evidence suggests that there are substantial and
persistent differences in the sizes of firms in most industries. We
propose a dynamic model of capacity accumulation that is consistent . . .
Competition among hospitals.
We examine competition in the hospital industry, in particular the
effect of ownership type (for-profit, not-for-profit, government). We
estimate a structural model of demand and pricing in the . . .
Structural estimation of a principal-agent model: moral hazard in
medical insurance.
Despite the importance of principal-agent models in the development
of modern economic theory, there are few estimations of these models. I
recover the estimates of a principal-agent model and . . .
Dominant retailers and the countervailing-power
hypothesis.
I assess rigorously the countervailing-power hypothesis using a
model that captures the main ingredients of Galbraith's (1952)
arguments as well as some of the important features of the . . .
Patterns of retail price variation.(econometric analysis)
We examine retail price variation across a range of goods and
regions of the United States. We find that the typical grocery product
has a regular price and stays at that price at least 50% of the . . .
Competitive procurement with corruption.(microeconomic
analysis)
We study competitive procurement administered by a corrupt agent
who is willing to manipulate his evaluation of contract proposals in
exchange for bribes. With complete information and no . . .
Assessing competition in hospital care markets: the importance of
accounting for quality differentiation.
Quality differentiation is especially important in the hospital
industry, where the choices of Medicare patients are unaffected by
prices. Unlike previous studies that use geographic market . . .
Contracting with limited commitment: evidence from
employment-based health insurance contracts.
Impediments to worker mobility serve to mitigate the attrition of
healthy individuals from employer-sponsored insurance pools, thereby
creating a de facto commitment mechanism that allows for more . . .
Introduction.
In June 2002, the Heinz School at Carnegie Mellon University and
the Management Science Group of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
sponsored an economics conference focusing on problems of . . .
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