Preference externalities: an empirical study of who benefits whom
in differentiated-product markets.
Theory predicts that in markets with increasing returns, the number
of differentiated products, and the tendency to consume, will grow in
market size. I document this phenomenon across 247 U.S. . . .
Forward markets and signals of quality.
We analyze how information about quality may be conveyed via
forward trading. A privately informed monopolist has the opportunity to
make forward sales. Speculators and consumers, participating in . . .
Antitrust limits to patent settlements.
Patents, patent litigation, and patent settlements increasingly
influence competition. Settlements of patent disputes come in many
forms, including licensing and cross-licensing agreements, patent . . .
Chicken & egg: competition among intermediation service
providers.
We analyze a model of imperfect price competition between
intermediation service providers. We insist on features that are
relevant for informational intermediation via the Internet: the . . .
Leasing, lemons, and buybacks.
In his seminal article of 1970, Akerlof argued that the used-car
market is not efficient because adverse selection causes too little
trade. We construct a competitive model of the new- and used-car . . .
Network competition in nonlinear pricing.
Previous research, assuming linear pricing, has argued that
telecommunications networks may use a high access charge as an
instrument of collusion. I show that this conclusion is difficult . . .
To grab for the market or to bide one's time: a dynamic
model of entry.
We consider a simultaneous-move, dynamic-entry game. The fixed cost
of entry is private information. Entering earlier increases the
likelihood of being the monopolist but also increases the . . .
Exchanges of cost information in the airline industry.
We empirically analyze exchanges of cost information in a
multimarket oligopoly model for the airline industry with entry and
incomplete information on marginal costs. We develop an algorithm . . .
Internet interconnection and the off-net-cost pricing
principle.
We develop a framework for Internet backbone competition. In the
absence of direct payments between websites and consumers, the access
charge allocates communication costs between websites and . . .
Introduction.(Editorial)
In January 2001, the Institut d'Economie Industrielle (IDEI)
sponsored a conference at the University of Toulouse (France) on
"The Economics of the Internet and Software Industries." The
goal of . . .
On the interplay of informational spillovers and payoff
externalities.
Informational spillovers induce agents to outwait each other's
actions in order to make more-informed decisions. If waiting is costly,
we expect the best-informed agent, who has the least to learn . . .
An economic analysis of corporate directors' fiduciary
duties.
I present a principal-agent model where the shareholders
(principal) can take legal action against the director (agent). The
court's decision provides a verifiable but costly and imperfect
signal . . .
Competitive equilibrium in a radial network.
In a competitive market over a network with finite capacity, we can
focus without loss of generality on simple allocations, where the net
transaction over a link is equal to the gross transaction . . .
Ownership and control rights in Internet portal alliances,
1995-1999.
We examine the structure of more than 100 alliances by Internet
portals and other firms between 1995 to 1999 from a contract-theory
perspective. Models of incomplete contracts frequently invoke . . .
The effects of mergers in open-auction markets.
The buyer solicits bids from suppliers with different cost
distributions defined by their capacities. The expected market share of
each supplier is the ratio of its capacity to the industry . . .
Procurement auctions and unit-price contracts.
In competitive procurement auctions, bids often have the form of
unit-price contracts (UPCs). We show that optimal bidding behavior in
UPC auctions is typically nonmonotonic and therefore may lead . . .
Horizontal mergers in the paper industry.
I examine mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. paper and paperboard
industry, which experienced a wave of horizontal mergers during the
mid-1980s. I describe how the mergers affected investment . . .
Regulatory inertia.
Regulatory independence from political control enlarges the
collusive opportunities between regulators and interest groups. This is
costly for current politicians because deterring capture becomes . . .
The winner's curse, reserve prices, and endogenous entry:
empirical insights from eBay auctions.
Internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and
are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce. We examine
a unique dataset of eBay coin auctions to explore the . . .
Price and quality competition under adverse selection: market
organization and efficiency.
Firms compete with prices and qualities in markets where consumers
have heterogeneous preferences and cost characteristics. Consumers
demand two goods, which can be supplied jointly or separately . . .
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