Limited-liability and incentive contracting with multiple
projects.(project management efficiency model)
I examine a principal-agent model with multiple projects where a
risk-neutral manager is protected by limited liability. The analysis has
several interesting implications: (i) Incentive problems . . .
Asymmetric information in health insurance: evidence from the
National Medical Expenditure Survey.(health insurance and health c
Adverse selection is perceived to be a major source of market
failure in insurance markets. There is little empirical evidence on the
extent of the problem. We estimate a structural model of . . .
Managerial career concerns and investments in
information.(research information)
We extend the "implicit incentives" literature by
analyzing how career concerns affect a risk-neutral manager's
decision about how much to learn about a project before investing in it.
The manager . . .
Bargaining, interdependence, and the rationality of fair
division.(research information)
We consider two-person bargaining games with interdependent
preferences and bilateral incomplete information. We show that in both
the ultimatum game and the two-stage alternating-offers game, . . .
Damages and injunctions in protecting intellectual
property.(patent law)
We investigate how liability rules and property rules protect
intellectual property. Infringement might not be deterred under any of
the enforcement regimes available. However, counterintuitively, . . .
Inside versus outside ownership: a political theory of the
firm.
If contracting within the firm is incomplete, managers will expend
resources on trying to appropriate a share of the surplus that is
generated. We show that outside ownership may alleviate the . . .
Optimal collusion with private information.(cartel competition
model)(Statistical Data Included)
We analyze collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, where
prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately
observed, i.i.d, cost shock in each period. Productive efficiency . . .
Strategic delegation: An experiment.(research
information)
We examine the effects of strategic delegation in a simple
ultimatum game experiment. We show that when the proposer uses a
delegate, her share increases both when the delegate is optional . . .
The equivalence of price and quantity competition with
delegation.(research information)
In a two-stage differentiated-products oligopoly model,
profit-maximizing owners first choose incentive schemes in order to
influence their managers' behavior. In the second stage, the
managers . . .
RAND Journal of Economics Turnaround Times.(Brief
Article)(Statistical Data Included)
RAND Journal of Economics Turnaround Times
First Decision (%)
Month 0-3 4-6 7-9 10+
Submitted Months Months Months Months
April . . .
On information sharing and incentives in R&D.(employees and
the exchange of research and development data)
I investigate the issue of endogenous spillover of R&D
information across firms through information exchange between their
employees. Although the firms typically cannot observe and . . .
Vertical foreclosure in experimental markets.(Statistical Data
Included)
We report the results of experiments designed to test recent
theories of vertical foreclosure. Consistent with the theory, vertical
integration improves the upstream firm's ability to commit . . .
Contractual form and market thickness in trucking.(industry
research)
A central proposition of the transaction costs literature is that
firms will substitute more complicated contractual arrangements for
simple spot arrangements when transactions involve . . .
Downstream integration by a bottleneck input supplier whose
regulated wholesale prices are above costs.(economic research)
We examine the consequences of allowing a bottleneck input supplier
to vertically integrate downstream and compete with users of the input
when the input has a regulated price above cost. If the . . .
Strategic behavior and price discovery.(research
information)
We analyze the effects of strategic behavior by a large informed
trader in a price discovery process used in opening auctions in
continuous trading systems. It is found that the large informed . . .
Competition in price and availability when availability is
unobservable.(video rental industry model)
I present a strategic model of competition in price and
availability in which demand is uncertain and consumers choose where to
shop given firms' observable prices and their expectations of
firms' . . .
Incentives versus transaction costs: a theory of procurement
contracts.(private construction industry model)
Inspired by facts from the private-sector construction industry, we
develop a model that explains many stylized facts of procurement
contracts. The buyer in our model incurs a cost of providing . . .
Empirically distinguishing informative and prestige effects of
advertising.(research information)
This article introduces techniques to empirically distinguish
different effects of brand advertising in nondurable, experience-goods
markets. I argue that advertisements that give consumers . . .
Advantageous selection in insurance markets.(insurance industry
research)
This article reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric
information plus competition results in insufficient insurance
provision. Risk-tolerant individuals take few precautions and . . .
Reinventing public R&D: patent policy and the
commercialization of national laboratory technologies.(research and
development)
Despite their magnitude and potential impact, federal R&D
expenditures outside of research universities have attracted little
economic scrutiny. We examine the initiatives since 1980 to . . .
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