Incentives and invention in universities.
We show that universities in the United States that provide
stronger royalty incentives to faculty scientists generate greater
license income, controlling for university characteristics. We . . .
Erratum.(Correction notice)
Due to an error in the RAND Journal of Economics 38:4 on page 1105,
an equation printed incorrectly.
The corrected equation appears below.
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. . .
The value of information and optimal organization.
The article addresses the issue of optimal organization of
production. I compare three organizational forms: centralization (one
agent produces different inputs), decentralization (each of two . . .
Imperfect competition and quality signalling.
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete
information in the context of price competition among firms producing
horizontally and vertically differentiated substitute . . .
Properties of scoring auctions.
This article studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to
buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions
of the good (price, level of nonmonetary attributes), and . . .
Durable goods and conformity.
A consumer's demand for a durable good is governed not only by
his individual preferences but also by preferences of other market
participants. This interdependence of preferences arises from . . .
Costly contracting in a long-term relationship.
We examine a model of contracting where parties interact repeatedly
and can contract at any point in time, but writing formal contracts is
costly. A contract can describe the external environment . . .
Optimal choice of characteristics for a nonexcludable
good.
In this model, a principal decides whether to produce one
indivisible good and which characteristics it contains. Agents are
differentiated along two substitutable dimensions: a vertical . . .
Single sourcing versus multiple sourcing.
We show that in contrast to results in the extant literature,
single sourcing may not be the optimal strategy of a buyer facing
suppliers with strictly convex costs. As we argue, previous . . .
Retailers' choice of product variety and exclusive dealing
under asymmetric information.
This article considers vertical relations between an upstream
manufacturer and a downstream retailer that can independently obtain a
low-quality, discount substitute. The analysis reveals that . . .
Parallel imports and price controls.
Price controls create opportunities for international arbitrage.
Man), have argued that such arbitrage, if tolerated, will undermine
intellectual property rights and dull the incentives for . . .
Status and incentives.
This article introduces status as reflecting an agent's claim
to recognition in her work. This is a scarce resource: increasing an
agent's status requires that another agent's status be
decreased. . . .
Market forces meet behavioral biases: cost misallocation and
irrational pricing.
Psychological and experimental evidence, as well as a wealth of
anecdotal examples, suggests that firms may confound fixed, sunk, and
variable costs, leading to distorted pricing decisions. This . . .
Can cost increases increase competition? Asymmetric information
and equilibrium prices.
We present an analysis of competition under asymmetric information
where prices react asymmetrically to changes in firms" marginal
costs. When one firm has private information about some customers, . . .
Industry dynamics with stochastic demand.
We study the dynamics of an industry subject to aggregate demand
shocks where the productivity of a firm's technology evolves
stochastically over time. To characterize the intertemporal evolution . . .
Optimal rewards in contests.
We study all-pay contests with effort-dependent rewards under
incomplete information. A contestant's value to winning depends not
only on his type but also on the effort-dependent reward chosen by . . .
A theory of factor allocation and plant size.
This article develops a theory of how capital, skilled labor, and
unskilled labor interact at the plant level. The theory has implications
for the relationship between factor allocation and plant . . .
Information and bargaining in the hold-up problem.
This article incorporates an information structure with partial
information into the canonical hold-up problem. The optimal information
structure balances the tradeoff between ex ante efficiency . . .
Efficient partnership dissolution under buy-sell clauses.
Buy-sell clauses are commonly used contractual provisions to
determine the terms of dissolution of partnerships. Under them, one
party offers a price for the partnership and the other party . . .
Understanding strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions: a case
study of the Texas electricity spot market.(Case study)
We examine the bidding behavior of firms in the Texas electricity
spot market, where bidders submit hourly supply schedules to sell power.
We characterize an equilibrium model of bidding and use . . .
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