Tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations.(Column)
Previous literature has shown that demand fluctuations affect the
scope for tacit collusion. I study whether discount factor fluctuations
can have similar effects. I find that collusion depends not . . .
Nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly market: the case of specialty
coffee.(Company overview)
Firms that use nonlinear pricing may distort product
characteristics away from their efficient levels. This paper offers the
first empirical study of this issue. Using data from a specialty . . .
Something to prove: reputation in teams.
Agents work for their own reputations when young but for their
firms' when old. An individual with an established reputation
cannot credibly commit to exerting effort when working alone. . . .
Spatial organization of firms: the decision to split production
and administration.
A firm's production activities are often supported by
nonproduction activities, such as administrative units including
headquarters, which process information both within and between firms.
Firms . . .
Teams versus individual accountability: solving multitask
problems through job design.(Column)
Many organizations are structured so that workers are jointly
accountable for performance, even though there exist alternative
organizational structures that align incentive compensation more . . .
Product boundary, vertical competition, and the double mark-up
problem.
We develop a model in which a main product (called product A)
provides a performance quality z by itself, whereas a complementary
product (called product B) is useless by itself but enhances the . . .
Measuring consumer welfare in the CPU market: an application of
the pure-characteristics demand model.
In this article, I estimate demand for the personal computer
central processing unit and measure consumer welfare using the pure
characteristics demand model. The model is based on a . . .
The welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination with
nonlinear demand functions.
The welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination are
analyzed when demand in one market is an additively shifted version of
demand in the other market and both markets are served with . . .
Optimal information revelation in procurement schemes.
A buyer procuring a single input possesses private information
about each potential supplier's degree of fit with the buyer's
needs. She can search among suppliers either sequentially . . .
Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games
(with entry/exit examples).
We estimate parameters from data on discrete dynamic games, using
entry/exit games to illustrate. Semiparametric first-stage estimates of
entry and continuation values are computed from sample . . .
Auctions and information acquisition: sealed bid or dynamic
formats?
The value of an asset is generally not known a priori, and it
requires costly investments to be discovered. In such contexts with
endogenous information acquisition, which selling procedure . . .
Durable-goods oligopoly with secondary markets: the case of
automobiles.
We study the effects of durability and secondary markets on
equilibrium firm behavior in the car market. We construct a dynamic
oligopoly model of a differentiated product market to incorporate . . .
Collusion under monitoring of sales.
Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms'
prices are private information and their quantities are public
information; such an information structure is consistent with . . .
Long-run price competition.
We generalize the standard repeated-games model of dynamic
oligopolistic competition to allow for consumers who are long-lived and
forward looking. Each period leaves some residual demand to . . .
Outsourcing, information leakage, and consulting firms.
I analyze the R&D investment of firms that decide between
outsourcing and in-house production when information leakage is present
(contractors learn clients' technology and can diffuse it . . .
Consumer preferences and product and process R&D.
Firms often conduct both product and process R&D. Consumer
preferences typically play a vital role in determining these R&D
choices. The economics literature, however, has mostly ignored . . .
Collusion and dynamic (under-) investment in quality.
In a dynamic game of investment in product quality, I investigate
whether collusive underinvestment equilibria can be supported by the
threat of escalation in investment outlays. When there are . . .
Merger waves: a model of endogenous mergers.
We develop a model of endogenous mergers to study their dynamic
process. Firms choose whether, when, and with whom to merge. Two
necessary conditions are identified for mergers to occur: . . .
Does divestiture crowd out new investment? The "make or
buy" decision in the U.S. electricity generation industry.
An empirical model of the "make or buy" decision faced by
independent power producers (IPPs) in restructured U.S. wholesale
electricity markets is derived to analyze power plant . . .
Corporate strategy and information disclosure.
We examine voluntary disclosures of information about corporate
strategies. We develop a model in which managers choose whether to
reveal their strategic plans only to some partners of the firm or . . .
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