Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable
implications.
Several recent articles on empirical contract theory and insurance
have tested for a positive correlation between coverage and ex post
risk, as predicted by standard models of pure adverse . . .
Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for
public utilities.
We analyze the shape of contracts between local governments and the
contractors they hire to run public facilities on their behalf.
Governments are privately informed about the quality of the . . .
Quantifying equilibrium network externalities in the ACH banking
industry.(automated clearing house)
We seek to determine the causes and magnitudes of network
externalities for the automated clearing house (ACH) electronic payments
system. We construct an equilibrium model of customer and bank . . .
Pricing and commitment by two-sided platforms.
I study pricing and commitment by platforms in two-sided markets
with the following characteristics: (i) platforms are essential
bottleneck inputs for buyers and sellers transacting with each . . .
Your network or mine? The economics of routing rules.
In many markets, including payment cards and telecommunications,
service providers operate networks that support customer transactions
with each other. When the two sides of a transaction belong to . . .
Competition in two-sided markets.
Many markets involve two groups of agents who interact via
"platforms," where one group's benefit from joining a
platform depends on the size of the other group that joins the platform.
I present . . .
Two-sided markets: a progress report.
We provide a road map to the burgeoning literature on two-sided
markets and present new results. We identify two-sided markets with
markets in which the structure, and not only the level of prices . . .
Introduction.(Institute of Industrial Economics' conference
on two-sided markets)
In January 2004, the Institut D'Economie Industrielle (IDEI)
at Toulouse University and the Center for Economic Policy Research
(CEPR) sponsored a conference on the economics of two-sided . . .
An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product-type
choices.
I describe a model of entry with endogenous product-type choices.
These choices are formalized as the outcomes of a game of incomplete
information in which rivals' differentiated products . . .
The role of firm characteristics in pharmaceutical product
launches.
I examine the determinants of new pharmaceutical launches since
1980 in G7 nations. Both market and firm characteristics, and their
interaction, are important in explaining entry. New drugs are 1.5 . . .
Multiproduct Cournot oligopoly.
We study a Cournot industry in which each firm sells multiple
quality-differentiated products. We use an upgrades approach, working
not with the actual products but instead with upgrades from one . . .
The benefits of extended liability.
We characterize the optimal regulation of a firm that undertakes an
environmentally risky activity. This firm (the agent) is protected by
limited liability and bound by contract to a stakeholder . . .
Sales and consumer inventory.
Temporary price reductions (sales) are common for many goods and
naturally result in a large increase in the quantity sold. We explore
whether the data support the hypothesis that these increases . . .
Internal promotion competitions in firms.
Using a sample of skilled workers from a cross section of
establishments in four metropolitan areas of the United States, l
present evidence suggesting that promotions are determined by . . .
Delegating management to experts.
Owners of property and assets frequently delegate decisions about
operating and maintaining their property to managers who are better
informed about local market conditions. We analyze how owners . . .
Profit sharing (with workers) facilitates collusion (among
firms).
We show how profit sharing by firms with workers facilitates
collusion among firms in a dynamic oligopoly environment with uncertain
demand. We first show that firm profits can always be increased . . .
Estimating a continuous hedonic-choice model with an application
to demand for soft drinks.
Using micro-level scanner data, I study empirically the consumer
demand for soft drinks, which is characterized by multiple-product,
multiple-unit purchasing behavior, I develop a continuous . . .
Price-matching guarantees.
Are price-matching guarantees anticompetitive? We examine the
incentives for price-matching guarantees in markets where information
about prices is costly. The conventional explanation of price . . .
Optimal state-contingent regulation under limited
liability.
We consider an optimal regulation model in which the regulated
firm's production cost is subject to random, publicly observable
shocks. The distribution of these shocks is correlated with . . .
Store characteristics in retail oligopoly.(Statistical
data)
I use a consumer choice model for the British supermarket industry
to compare the incentives of firms, selecting store characteristics,
with the interests of consumers. I perform a series of . . .
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