Competitive procurement with corruption.(microeconomic
analysis)
We study competitive procurement administered by a corrupt agent
who is willing to manipulate his evaluation of contract proposals in
exchange for bribes. With complete information and no . . .
Capacity dynamics and endogenous asymmetries in firm
size.(economic analysis)
Empirical evidence suggests that there are substantial and
persistent differences in the sizes of firms in most industries. We
propose a dynamic model of capacity accumulation that is consistent . . .
Little patents and big secrets: managing intellectual
property.
Exploitation of an innovation commonly requires some disclosure of
enabling knowledge (e.g., to obtain a patent or induce complementary
investment). When property rights offer only limited . . .
RAND journal of economics turnaround times.(Illustration)
RAND Journal of Economics Turnaround Times
First Decision (%)
Month 0-3 4-6 7-9 10+ No Decision Total
Submitted Months Months . . .
Assessing competition in hospital care markets: the importance of
accounting for quality differentiation.
Quality differentiation is especially important in the hospital
industry, where the choices of Medicare patients are unaffected by
prices. Unlike previous studies that use geographic market . . .
Competition among hospitals.
We examine competition in the hospital industry, in particular the
effect of ownership type (for-profit, not-for-profit, government). We
estimate a structural model of demand and pricing in the . . .
Competition and market power in option demand markets.
We call markets in which intermediaries sell networks of suppliers
to consumers who are uncertain about their needs "option demand
markets." In these markets, suppliers may grant the . . .
The welfare impact of Medicare HMOs.(Health Maintenance
Organization)
We estimate the welfare associated with the Medicare HMO program,
now known as Medicare+Choice (M+C). We find that the creation of the M+C
program resulted in approximately $18.7 billion in . . .
Contracting with limited commitment: evidence from
employment-based health insurance contracts.
Impediments to worker mobility serve to mitigate the attrition of
healthy individuals from employer-sponsored insurance pools, thereby
creating a de facto commitment mechanism that allows for more . . .
Structural estimation of a principal-agent model: moral hazard in
medical insurance.
Despite the importance of principal-agent models in the development
of modern economic theory, there are few estimations of these models. I
recover the estimates of a principal-agent model and . . .
Prior health expenditures and risk sharing with insurers
competing on quality.
Insurers can exploit the heterogeneity within risk-adjustment
classes to select the good risks because they have more information than
the regulator on the expected expenditures of individual . . .
AIDS policy and psychology: a mechanism-design approach.
Economic theorists have given little attention to health-related
externalities, such as those involved in the spread of AIDS. One reason
for this is the critical role played by psychological . . .
Introduction.
In June 2002, the Heinz School at Carnegie Mellon University and
the Management Science Group of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
sponsored an economics conference focusing on problems of . . .
Dominant retailers and the countervailing-power
hypothesis.
I assess rigorously the countervailing-power hypothesis using a
model that captures the main ingredients of Galbraith's (1952)
arguments as well as some of the important features of the . . .
Network competition in nonlinear pricing.
Previous research, assuming linear pricing, has argued that
telecommunications networks may use a high access charge as an
instrument of collusion. I show that this conclusion is difficult . . .
On the interplay of informational spillovers and payoff
externalities.
Informational spillovers induce agents to outwait each other's
actions in order to make more-informed decisions. If waiting is costly,
we expect the best-informed agent, who has the least to learn . . .
Procurement auctions and unit-price contracts.
In competitive procurement auctions, bids often have the form of
unit-price contracts (UPCs). We show that optimal bidding behavior in
UPC auctions is typically nonmonotonic and therefore may lead . . .
Preference externalities: an empirical study of who benefits whom
in differentiated-product markets.
Theory predicts that in markets with increasing returns, the number
of differentiated products, and the tendency to consume, will grow in
market size. I document this phenomenon across 247 U.S. . . .
To grab for the market or to bide one's time: a dynamic
model of entry.
We consider a simultaneous-move, dynamic-entry game. The fixed cost
of entry is private information. Entering earlier increases the
likelihood of being the monopolist but also increases the . . .
An economic analysis of corporate directors' fiduciary
duties.
I present a principal-agent model where the shareholders
(principal) can take legal action against the director (agent). The
court's decision provides a verifiable but costly and imperfect
signal . . .
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