I. NEAR V. MINNESOTA: BACKGROUND
II. INCORPORATION: THE NECESSARY PRECONDITION
III. COL. MCCORMICK TAKES CHARGE OF NEAR
IV. BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
V. THE DECISION
VI. THE AFTERMATH
"The mere statement of the case makes my blood boil."
So wrote Weymouth Kirkland to his most illustrious client, Col.
Robert R. McCormick of The Chicago Tribune ("Tribune") on
Sept. 14, 1928. (1) The prominent Chicago attorney was writing about a
case then styled State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, (2) but which would
make history as Near v. Minnesota (3) when it reached its conclusion in
the United States Supreme Court nearly three years later. Both McCormick
and Kirkland were to become principal players in Near, and together they
created a role for the institutional press as "strategic
litigator," shaping the First Amendment doctrine under which
journalists operate.
Today, media corporations and their professional and trade
associations, along with organizations like Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press and the American Civil Liberties Union, carefully
monitor litigation that implicates First Amendment values and decide
whether, when, and how to intervene. It was not always so.
To be sure, such groups as the American Newspaper Publishers
Association ("ANPA") (now the Newspaper Association of
America) and, to a lesser extent, the American Society of Newspaper
Editors, had routinely lobbied and litigated on behalf of their
members' business interests: antitrust regulation, copyright
protection, postal rates, taxes, and similar matters. (4) But litigation
by an institutional press to avoid or create doctrinal precedent under
the First Amendment really began with the appointment of Col. Robert R.
McCormick to head the ANPA's Committee on Freedom of the Press in
the spring of 1928 and his involvement in Near v. Minnesota beginning
that fall.
In my previous work on this subject, I have shown that the
institutional press has been relatively successful in shaping First
Amendment doctrine, at least with respect to content regulation, through
litigation in the United States Supreme Court. (5) In this Article, I
demonstrate that, although incorporation of First Amendment values
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment made this
kind of litigation possible, the press was nevertheless reluctant to
become involved. Through extensive use of Col. McCormick's
correspondence and the Tribune's coverage, I show that
McCormick's personal and financial commitment to press freedom in
general, and the Near case in particular, ultimately persuaded the
institutional press to pursue doctrinal litigation in their own
interest.
Part I briefly outlines the background of the Near case, while Part
II discusses the role of incorporation in making a First Amendment
challenge feasible. Part III traces McCormick's efforts to draw the
institutional press into the Near litigation. Part IV covers the
proceedings before the Supreme Court, while Part V describes the
landmark opinion itself. Finally, Part VI discusses the aftermath of
Near v. Minnesota and the mobilization of the institutional press.
I. NEAR V. MINNESOTA: BACKGROUND
The story of Near v. Minnesota begins, not with Jay Near and Howard
Guilford, Near's partner in sleaze, but with John L. Morrison, a
highly religious, crusading prude with a venomous pen who waged a
one-man crusade against the purveyors of booze and prostitutes in the
wild and wooly iron mining town of Duluth, Minnesota, in the mid-1920s.
(6)
Morrison's muck-raking newspaper, the Duluth Rip-saw, also
went after the politicians who protected Duluth's rather crude
entertainment industry. They were not amused and took their pique to the
state legislature. In 1925, the Minnesota legislature--with some
drafting help by Minneapolis newspapers, no less (7)--enacted a Public
Nuisance Law, or "gag" law, that provided for abatement as a
public nuisance of any "malicious, scandalous and defamatory
newspaper, magazine or other periodical." (8)
University of Minnesota historian Paul L. Murphy attributes
enactment of the gag law to "public exasperation" with the
yellow journalism of the time and the "emergence of a number of
cheap, ephemeral scandal sheets, which were used for extortion,
blackmailing petty crooks, or pressuring concessions from venal public
officials." (9) Murphy points out that "Minnesota's
experiment quickly drew warm national approval" as a practical
alternative to administrative censorship, which would have been too
costly, or civil or criminal libel actions, which had proved
ineffective. (10)
Although Murphy does not discuss the importance of the Rip-saw to
its adoption, a target of that paper, then-State Sen. Michael J. Boylan,
came to be known as the "father" of the gag law. (11) In any
event, Publisher Morrison died of a blood clot in the brain before he
could be prosecuted under it. Of course, there was no shortage of
scandalous newspapers in that era; (12) Near and Guilford were ready
targets down in Minneapolis. (13) Near was not nearly as self-righteous
(or righteous at all, for that matter) as Morrison but was a complete
scoundrel and bigot: antisemitic, antiblack, antilabor, (14) and
unfailingly hostile to Minneapolis area officials.
In 1927, Near and Guilford launched The Saturday Press, a
scurrilous rag that, among other things, alleged that Jewish gangsters
were responsible for bootlegging, gambling, and racketeering in
Minneapolis (which probably didn't bother anyone), and that certain
law enforcement officials--especially Hennepin County Prosecutor Floyd
B. Olson--were letting the gangsters run amok (which certainly did).
(15)
Olson undertook to put Near out of business and filed a complaint
on November 21, 1927, alleging multiple instances of defamation. (16)
Describing the newspaper as "malicious, scandalous, and
defamatory," the "magic words" of the Public Nuisance
Law, Olson sought an injunction under that act. (17) A temporary
restraining order was issued the same day, enjoining Near and Guilford
from publishing The Saturday Press or anything like it. (18) The
Saturday Press never recovered, but that TRO, which lasted more than a
year, (19) became the predicate for the most important press freedom
case in American history up to that date.
At first, Near was represented only by local counsel, Thomas
Latimer, a prominent Minneapolis attorney and, in Fred Friendly's
words, a "self-appointed Legal Aid Society." (20) When Near
finally got to court in December 1927, Latimer argued that the Public
Nuisance Law was a "subterfuge" to avoid the state
constitution and the requirements of its libel law. (21) Although he
compared it to laws in fascist Italy and communist Russia, his argument
fell on deaf ears. Judge Mathias Baldwin, who had himself been a target
of The Saturday Press, refused to lift the restraining order but did
certify the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court. (22)
On May 25, 1928, the Minnesota Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
validity of the statute as an exercise of the state's police
powers. (23) "A business that depends largely for its success upon
malice, scandal and defamation can be of no real service to
society," wrote Chief Justice Samuel Bailey Wilson for a unanimous
court. "It is not a violation of the liberty of the press or of the
freedom of speech for the Legislature to provide a remedy for their
abuse." (24) Four and a half months later, Judge Baldwin made the
temporary restraining order a permanent injunction, (25) prohibiting
Near and Guilford from publishing until they agreed to publish only the
truth, "with good motives and for justifiable ends." (26)
As outrageous as the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion might
seem today, the journalism of the day may have been even more
outrageous. Murphy points out that, "with the rise of the tabloid,
1920's journalism offended many older, more serious Americans, who
were still guided by a vigorous Victorian-Progressive morality and
decorum." (27) Indeed, "[t]he national student debate topic
for 1930 was: Resolved: That the Minnesota Nuisance Law should be
adopted by every state in the Union." (28)
By then, however, word of the case had reached New York and the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), which had been formed
in 1920. (29) Although the ACLU announced that it would take the case to
the United States Supreme Court, there were doubts about the
group's financial wherewithal, and its involvement in the case was
ultimately minimal. (30) Word also reached Chicago and Col. McCormick,
who sent the case file on to Weymouth Kirkland.
II. INCORPORATION: THE NECESSARY PRECONDITION
Before turning to Kirkland's response, and McCormick's
decision to take charge of the case and use it to establish modern prior
restraint doctrine, we must remember that less than a decade earlier,
such litigation would not have been possible. Until incorporation,
usually attributed to Gitlow v. New York (31) in 1925, the First
Amendment could not be invoked against state gag laws; only Congress was
precluded from abridging freedom of the press under the federal
Constitution. (32)
Madison's proposed draft of the First Amendment had not been
so constrained on that point: "The people shall not be deprived or
abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their
sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks
of liberty, shall be inviolable." (33) That language appears to
have passed in the House, but the Senate changed the subject of the
sentence to "Congress." Paul Starr points out, however, that
without a record of the discussion, there is no way to know whether the
change was meant to be substantive. (34)
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