Erratum.(Correction notice)
Due to an error in the RAND Journal of Economics 38:4 on page 1105,
an equation printed incorrectly.
The corrected equation appears below.
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
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Status and incentives.
This article introduces status as reflecting an agent's claim
to recognition in her work. This is a scarce resource: increasing an
agent's status requires that another agent's status be
decreased. . . .
Optimal choice of characteristics for a nonexcludable
good.
In this model, a principal decides whether to produce one
indivisible good and which characteristics it contains. Agents are
differentiated along two substitutable dimensions: a vertical . . .
Information and bargaining in the hold-up problem.
This article incorporates an information structure with partial
information into the canonical hold-up problem. The optimal information
structure balances the tradeoff between ex ante efficiency . . .
The value of information and optimal organization.
The article addresses the issue of optimal organization of
production. I compare three organizational forms: centralization (one
agent produces different inputs), decentralization (each of two . . .
Market forces meet behavioral biases: cost misallocation and
irrational pricing.
Psychological and experimental evidence, as well as a wealth of
anecdotal examples, suggests that firms may confound fixed, sunk, and
variable costs, leading to distorted pricing decisions. This . . .
Single sourcing versus multiple sourcing.
We show that in contrast to results in the extant literature,
single sourcing may not be the optimal strategy of a buyer facing
suppliers with strictly convex costs. As we argue, previous . . .
Efficient partnership dissolution under buy-sell clauses.
Buy-sell clauses are commonly used contractual provisions to
determine the terms of dissolution of partnerships. Under them, one
party offers a price for the partnership and the other party . . .
Imperfect competition and quality signalling.
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete
information in the context of price competition among firms producing
horizontally and vertically differentiated substitute . . .
Can cost increases increase competition? Asymmetric information
and equilibrium prices.
We present an analysis of competition under asymmetric information
where prices react asymmetrically to changes in firms" marginal
costs. When one firm has private information about some customers, . . .
Retailers' choice of product variety and exclusive dealing
under asymmetric information.
This article considers vertical relations between an upstream
manufacturer and a downstream retailer that can independently obtain a
low-quality, discount substitute. The analysis reveals that . . .
Understanding strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions: a case
study of the Texas electricity spot market.(Case study)
We examine the bidding behavior of firms in the Texas electricity
spot market, where bidders submit hourly supply schedules to sell power.
We characterize an equilibrium model of bidding and use . . .
Properties of scoring auctions.
This article studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to
buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions
of the good (price, level of nonmonetary attributes), and . . .
Industry dynamics with stochastic demand.
We study the dynamics of an industry subject to aggregate demand
shocks where the productivity of a firm's technology evolves
stochastically over time. To characterize the intertemporal evolution . . .
Rules of proof, courts, and incentives.
We analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court
decision making in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of
incentives for potential tort-feasors to exert care when . . .
Imperfect durability and the Coase conjecture.
This article considers a market served by a monopolist who sells a
durable good that depreciates stochastically over time. We show that
there exist three types of stationary equilibria: a Coase . . .
Market effects of environmental regulation: coal, railroads, and
the 1990 Clean Air Act.
Many environmental regulations encourage the use of
"clean" inputs. When the suppliers of such an input have
market power, environmental regulation will affect not only the quantity
of the input . . .
Do enhancements to loyalty programs affect demand? The impact of
international frequent flyer partnerships on domestic airline
d
Frequent flyer programs (FFPs) may allow airlines to exercise
market power on routes that depart from airports at which they are
dominant. Prior research, however, has not disentangled the effects . . .
Moonlighting: public service and private practice.
We study job incentives in moonlighting, when public-service
physicians may refer patients to their private practices. Some doctors
in the public system are dedicated, and behave sincerely, . . .
Bidding to lose? Auctions with resale.
A losing bidder can still purchase the prize from the winner after
the auction. We show why a strong bidder may prefer to drop out of the
auction before the price has reached her valuation and . . .
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